

THE PAKISTAN-CHINA AXIS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

The Kashmir Story

THE PAKISTAN-CHINA AXIS

B. L. SHARMA

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To
My Mother

PREFACE

THE PAKISTAN-CHINA AXIS IS ONE OF THE MOST fascinating developments in international affairs. Like an exploding meteorite, it has affected many countries and regions in various ways—India, South and South-East Asia, West Asia, the Soviet Union, Africa and the West, principally the U.S.A. It is no less remarkable in its defiance of international practice, diplomatic propriety, loyalty to allies, and in its betrayal of professed ideology. Normally such a development should be impossible, as seemed the concept of Pakistan. Both have become a reality. Are the two superficially related or is there a causal nexus?

I have made an attempt to examine this question. Since chronologically one precedes the other—the interval between the two is spread over nearly two decades—it was found necessary to make a broad survey of the foreign policy of Pakistan, a task which proved to be no less rewarding than a critical examination of the main issue, for it brought to light a number of common determining factors which are prominent throughout the growth and development of that policy. As the military alliance is directed against India, I have naturally examined the question from that angle, a comprehensive and detailed study of the foreign policy of Pakistan being outside the scope of this work.

In his book, *Friends, Not Masters—A Political Autobiography*, Field Marshal Ayub Khan expounds a new view of international relations, presenting the world as a collection of religious constellations, one of which he would presumably be happy to see revolve round Pakistan. This has necessitated the expansion of the last chapter. Basically his political autobiography is an attempt to present Pakistan foreign policy in a more attractive guise, with ugly blemishes which caused so much embarrassment to his country in its relations with the U.S.A., China, the Soviet Union, and the Arabs, concealed under heavy make-up.

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The politicians' nightmare is the printed or recorded word which cannot be bribed into silence or oblivion. President Ayub Khan forgets that his past statements on the subject are public documents, and they are not tongueless. No skill in selection, editing, and interpretation of his past utterances can help falsify history or represent his somersaults in foreign affairs as a demonstration of sound political judgement, international cooperation and understanding, much less a genuine desire for peace and friendship with India. In my book I have relied on President Ayub Khan's views as published in the past, not on the doctored version which he now offers in *Friends, Not Masters*.

K-77, Hauz Khas Enclave
New Delhi-16
September 1967

B. L. SHARMA

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Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan

"WHATEVER OTHERS MIGHT SAY," SAID MOHAMMED Ali Jinnah, the founder of the new State of Pakistan, a few months before the partition of the Indian subcontinent, "I think that these two States of Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutual interest, will be friends in the sub-continent. They will go to each other's rescue in case of danger and will be able to say 'hands off' to other nations. We shall then have a Monroe Doctrine more solid than in America."¹

This was not a chance utterance. Jinnah had expressed similar views on previous occasions. "We are not enemies of Congress,"² he said in Lahore on 5 August 1944. "Only we do not agree on certain points. But we should be united against common enemies.... We shall have many things in common even when Pakistan is established. If we must have a separate State, that will not mean we shall have nothing to do with each other." He then asked: "Do you think we shall allow anybody, whether he is Afghan or Pathan, to dominate us? We will tell them and others—India is for Indians. Hands off India."³ A few months later he was equally emphatic: "Pakistan will not tolerate any outside design or aggression on the sub-continent. In fact we will vigorously observe something like Monroe Doctrine."⁴

¹At a press conference in New Delhi on 15 November 1946. (Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, Lahore, p. 363.)

²The Indian National Congress, the political movement for country's freedom led by Gandhi and Nehru.

³Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence*, Guild Publishing House, Karachi, 1966, pp. 83-4.

⁴Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 140.

Admirable sentiments, sound in the recognition of the geographic unity of the subcontinent with its consequent relevance to defence and security.

Yet twenty years later, on the Republic Day parade in Rawalpindi, the Pakistan authorities proudly displayed Chinese tanks and MiG aircraft which they had obtained from Peking for use against India! China was reported to have supplied weapons for three new infantry divisions of Pakistan, with a promise to provide more arms and ordnance factories.

Between Jinnah's enunciation of policy in 1946 and what the Pakistan Government did in 1966 occurred one of the most remarkable metamorphoses in history. Many questions leap to the mind. Was Jinnah sincere when he put forward a Monroe Doctrine for the Indian subcontinent? If so, what steps did he take, after he became the fountainhead of all authority in Pakistan, to give meaning to his doctrine? Or was it no more than a tactical move, a declaration intended for propaganda not for implementation? Or were Pakistan leaders unfaithful to the father of their nation, preferring to chart their own course in the troubled sea of international intrigue and adventure?

A careful examination of the foundation of the State of Pakistan may perhaps help to clear up the mystery. Though the idea of a Muslim State occurred to Mohammed Iqbal, the famous Urdu and Persian poet,⁶ the word "Pakistan" was coined by Chaudhury Rahmat Ali.⁷ It seemed, then, an airy nothing and even Muslim leaders of undivided India regarded it as "only a students' scheme," and something "chimerical and impracticable."⁸ But as Jinnah was responsible, with British help, for translating this scheme into reality and as his thoughts and utterances nourish the Govern-

⁶In his Presidential address at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1930, Iqbal said: "I would like to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North West India." (Dr. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan, The Formative Stage*, Pakistan Publishing House, Karachi, 1960, p. 112.)

⁷Ibid., p. 113.

⁸Pendrel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1961, p. 11.

ment of Pakistan and guide its leaders, it is hardly possible to understand Pakistan, much less its foreign policy, without a peep into Jinnah's mind. Such a peep is even more necessary because responsible leaders of Pakistan had left the world in no doubt about what they considered to be their obligations to Western countries vis-a-vis the Communist States.

The new State of Pakistan was built by Jinnah in whose thought and action must be traced its form and unfoldment. This is easier said than done, for immediately one is beset with serious difficulties. A search into his mind and thought does not disclose a natural growth, from leaf to bud and from bud to blossom, but something artificially stimulated in perpetual conflict. An outstanding characteristic of his thought process was contradiction—assertion, followed by denial, followed by reassertion. There was a consistency of a sort in so far as what was denied was reasserted; but the reassertion often cast doubt on the sincerity of the denial, as denial cast doubt on the sincerity of assertion and reassertion. As time passed, the element of denial assumed major importance.

Gokhale⁸ had said of Jinnah that there was "true stuff in him, and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity." And Jinnah had said that it was "his ambition to become the Muslim Gokhale."⁹ His ambition wilted before the challenge of events; and, ironically, he became the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim strife ending in mutual slaughter.

What was the justification for Pakistan? Jinnah, in whose veins flowed the blood of Hindu ancestors,¹⁰ held Hindus and Muslims to be two "nations," their blending being impossible.¹¹ He could not tolerate even the suggestion that Muslim and Hindu Jats¹² belonged to one stock.¹³ "We are a nation of a hundred

⁸Gopalakrishna Gokhale, a prominent, moderate Indian leader who advocated the attainment of Indian freedom by constitutional methods.

⁹Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah*, John Murray, London, 1954, p. 55.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹*Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 9.

¹²A farming community inhabiting parts of the former Punjab province and comprising both Hindus and Muslims, which was treated by the British as a martial class.

¹³*Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 9..

million," he said, "and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambition—in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life."¹⁴ Muslims claimed the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit.¹⁵ "We [the Hindus and Muslims] are different in everything. We differ in our religion, our civilization and culture, our history, our language, our architecture, our music, jurisprudence and laws, our food and society, our dress—in every way we are different. We cannot be together only in the ballot box."¹⁶ Since, commented Gandhi, Jinnah did not claim Muslims to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam, would the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam?¹⁷ The only real though lawful test of nationhood had arisen out of their common political subjection.¹⁸ Jinnah had no answer to Gandhi's question.

Strangely enough, for Jinnah, Pakistan began the moment the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India, even before the Muslims established their rule in the country. According to him, it was a duty imposed on a Muslim by Islam not to merge his identity and individuality in any alien society.¹⁹ Clearly, Jinnah was confusing nationality with religion. If every religion were to constitute a nation, the world would be broken up into fragments. History, language, culture would mean nothing, and as soon as an individual embraced Islam, he would become an alien to his own society, a stranger to his ancestors. Here was repudiation of one's own self, root and branch.

Jinnah was too shrewd to put his faith in such a perversion of human experience. The denial of his assertion about the incompatibility of Hindus and Muslims came in many forms. On

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 228-9.

¹⁷Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence*, Guild Publishing House, Karachi, 1966, p. 105.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁹*Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 2.

his seventieth birthday, he said that it was a wicked lie to say that he was fighting the Hindus. "We are not fighting the great Hindu community.... Let the Hindus join us in our struggle for freedom."²⁰ Both Hindus and Muslims in India were slaves under the heel of the British rulers. His party was fighting the British, not the Hindus. "We have to get our freedom and establish Pakistan from the British and not from Hindus. The Muslim League is fighting the British and not the Hindus."²¹ So Hindus and Muslims had at least one common interest—namely, freedom, involving common struggle against the British. This is exactly what Gandhi had said. And yet, in London on 14 December 1946, he put all emphasis on differences between Hindus and Muslims. These, he said, were so fundamental that there was nothing that mattered in life upon which they agreed.²²

Significantly, this pathological emphasis on religion in justification of a separate homeland for Muslims was not supported by religious leaders of Islam in India who had not only made no effort to put forward a demand for Pakistan but had in fact opposed it. Maulana Maududi, head of the Jamait-e-Islami, explained why he opposed the demand. "Why should we foolishly waste our time in expediting the so-called Muslim national State and fritter away our energies in setting it up, when we know that it will not only be useless for our purposes, but will rather prove an obstacle in our path."²³ While professing religion to be its basis, the movement for Pakistan was, in fact, a political campaign because "the background of the men who organised the campaign was not theology and Islamic law but politics and the common law, not Deoband [an important Islamic theological centre in India] but Cambridge and the Inns of Court."²⁴ In other words, the religious leaders of Islam in India had neither propounded the two-nation theory nor supported it. And yet the Muslim League tried to mobilize support for this theory by inciting Muslim masses against non-Muslims on the grounds of religion. And while, thus, the Pakistan movement had little basis in religion, it was,

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 268.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*, p. 389.

²³Quoted in Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 200.

²⁴*Ibid.*

nevertheless by exploiting religion that Jinnah, who was himself rather secular in outlook and intensely political in ambition, brought into existence the theocratic State of Pakistan.

Denial and antithesis were instruments which Jinnah wielded to allay doubt, to gain advantage of the moment, to divert attention from unpleasant prospect, to cover up inconvenient contradictions and to build up propaganda for his cause. If all the Muslims in India constituted a nation, then what would happen to those of them whom partition on the basis of religion, or for that matter on any other basis, would inevitably leave behind in India? Jinnah was asked what he proposed to do for the areas where the Muslims were in a minority. He answered: "These areas, like Madras for instance, will have a Hindu Government and the Muslim minorities there will have three courses open to them. They must accept citizenship in the State in which they are. They can remain there as foreigners; or they can come to Pakistan. I will welcome them. There is plenty of room. But it is for them to decide."²⁵ What consolation for Muslims of the areas in which they were in a minority! But Jinnah's true purpose was different. This he revealed a week later. "We are not going to start with quarrels," he told the Muslim Legislators' Convention on 11 April 1946. "We shall have enough to do and they will have enough to do, but if they begin it and *our* minorities are ill-treated Pakistan cannot remain a passive spectator. If Britain in Gladstone's time could intervene in Armenia in the name of protection of minorities why should it not be right for us to do so in the case of *our* minorities in Hindustan if they are oppressed."²⁶ Gifted with the facility of making the best of both the worlds, Jinnah found no discrepancy or contradiction between his two statements. Overnight, Muslim minorities, who were advised to accept Indian citizenship or migrate to Pakistan where they would be received with open arms, became Pakistan citizens in India with respect to whom Jinnah visualized for himself the protector's role. Thus he swung from one extreme to the other.

If religion determined nationality, the Sikh population con-

²⁵ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 282.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 285-6. (Italics mine.)

centrated in areas which would become part of Pakistan would also be a nation with a valid claim for a homeland of their own in those areas. To Jinnah this was preposterous. He admitted that every community was entitled to the right of self-determination. According to his own criterion, he could not deny the Sikh demand without being guilty of gross partiality and injustice. He then proceeded to make a distinction between nations and subnational groups, advising the latter to be content with what could be expected from a civilized Government.²⁷ The term "subnational group," the Sikhs were told obliquely, was only a constitutional phrase which meant people belonging to a nation scattered all over a given territory or even islands, such as the Muslims were in non-Muslim majority provinces,²⁸ without a right to a homeland. The Sikhs could not, therefore, be treated as a separate nation with a right to have their own territory carved out of Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders did little to reassure the Sikhs. Jinnah repeatedly admitted that, by the partition of the Punjab, the Sikhs would suffer the most. The Sikhs themselves were only too convinced of this, but "partition seemed to them preferable to blind submission to Muslims, and Jinnah had not made the slightest effort to persuade them to the contrary."²⁹

When, in 1944, Gandhi asked Jinnah to agree to a plebiscite in areas in north-west and east India where Jinnah's Muslim Leaguers were not in absolute majority, he reacted with characteristic venom, and gave expression to something which he forgot would be the essence of any partition proposal. Rejecting Gandhi's offer, he said: "What should we have left? A Pakistan probably pitted with islands of Hindustan not only on the frontiers but deep within Pakistan territory.... This is not independence."³⁰ Gandhi, he said, was offering "a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan."³¹ Curiously, immediately before and after Independence, Jinnah tried to do exactly what he had objected to. Of this more later.

²⁷Ibid., p. 30. ²⁸Ibid., pp. 82-3.

²⁹Pendrel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1961, p. 82.

³⁰Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, p. 138.

³¹Ibid., p. 75.

Coming to the methods of establishing Pakistan, Jinnah favoured the struggle to be constitutional, not a violent one.³² In the same breath he qualified his position. "But we should not forget at the same time that we have some obligatory duty to perform, and that is to destroy all such forces which are likely to come in our way."³³ In protest against the formation of an interim government by Nehru, in 1946, the Muslim League called for "Direct Action" to achieve Pakistan. Addressing the Muslim League Council in Bombay on 29 July 1946, Jinnah threw all his pseudo-constitutional methods to the winds and proclaimed: "This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods."³⁴ In his Id message in 1946, this votary of constitutional proprieties urged the Muslims to "go through the test and fire of being suppressed, oppressed and persecuted." The "Direct Action" decision was ominous, observes a writer on Indo-Pakistan relations, for it set in motion "the disastrous civil war which was to engulf the sub-continent for the next eighteen months."³⁵ When the Congress formed the interim government, Jinnah, who had refused to join hands with it, declared that if Congress regimes were going to suppress and

³²*Ibid.*, p. 47.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 314.

³⁵Michael Brecher, *Nehru*, Oxford University Press, London, p. 317.

"On August 16th, which the Muslim League celebrated as 'Direct Action Day,' there was an appalling outbreak of rioting in Calcutta, lasting several days. According to official estimates about 5,000 persons were killed and 15,000 injured.... In these riots the Muslims had been the oppressors.... The disturbances spread to East Bengal where the Muslims were in a considerable majority." The same authority commenting on the chain of rioting which followed in the Punjab said: "The first outbreak took place in Lahore on 4th [March].... It was followed in the next couple of days by rioting in Multan, Rawalpindi and Amritsar. The Muslim mobs, after their weeks of 'non-violent' agitation, suddenly as though on a preconcerted signal came out in their true colours and with weapons in their hands, and, in some places, steel helmets on their heads, indulged in murder, loot and arson on a scale never witnessed before in the Punjab during a hundred years of British rule.... In the north-west of the province [in the Rawalpindi and Attock districts], and in the Multan district in the south-west the trouble spread to the rural areas. Here the Muslims were in overwhelming majority and the minority communities practically helpless." (Pendrel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 58 and 77-9.)

"For four days Calcutta accordingly witnessed scenes of hooliganism and vulgarity which should have sobered Mr. Jinnah." (Lord Birdwood, *A Continent Decides*, Robert Hale Limited, London, 1953, p. 28.)

persecute the Mussalmans, it would be very difficult to control disturbances. And yet when he was asked whether the Muslim League could put confidence in Jawaharlal Nehru's statement to the press that India was "going to be run by Indians, for the benefit of Indians, whatever the religion or creed they may belong to and in whatever province or part of India they may live," Jinnah's response was an emphatic "No."³⁶ A foreign correspondent told him that according to his critics his attitude was purely destructive and could only end in civil war. Jinnah replied: "The last thing I seek is bloodshed. Although if driven to it, no Muslim is afraid to defend himself."³⁷ And eventually there was bloodshed on an unprecedented scale. A few years earlier Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, the Chief Minister of the Punjab, had expressed his fear that Pakistan, if created, would mean a massacre.³⁸ His fear proved to be only too true and a tremendous massacre engulfed Muslims, Hindus, and others alike.

The division and conflict in Jinnah's thought was reflected no less clearly in his attitude towards the princely States. It was "not the policy of the Muslim League to interfere in the administration of the state or to raise grave issues between the Maharaja's government and the people," he assured the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir in Srinagar on 25 July 1944.³⁹ The Lahore resolution in which the Muslims had asked for Pakistan, he emphasized, was confined only to British India,⁴⁰ and had nothing to do with princely States. A few months before the partition, when asked about princely States, he confined the demand for a division of the country into Pakistan and Hindustan to British India, though the States at a later stage would be free to join either Pakistan or Hindustan. "My own view is: let these States develop for themselves."⁴¹ In 1947, he affirmed and reaffirmed that the ruler of a State would be free to accede to India or Pakistan, knowing full well that accession in disregard of a State's geographical position

³⁶ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 327.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

³⁸ Pendrel Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 62.

⁴⁰ *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence*, p. 114.

⁴¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 327.

or the wishes of its inhabitants would create considerable anomalies: he had himself opposed the creation of Indian islands in Pakistan. While he was busy making these statements, Muslim officers in the Army Headquarters of undivided India with the knowledge and help of senior British officers were apparently busy preparing plans for the invasion of Kashmir. These preparations must have also been fully within Jinnah's knowledge.

Since almost all the princely States were situated in India, Jinnah's insistence on the independence of rulers of princely States in the matter of accession was intended to create pockets of conflict in India in order to weaken its territorial and political unity. One of the Hyderabad delegations which negotiated with Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, had for its chairman Moin Nawaz Jung, a brother-in-law of Mir Laik Ali, who was Pakistan's Representative in the United Nations in September 1947 and later succeeded the Nawab of Chhatari as the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. Campbell-Johnson writes: "The possibility that all this manoeuvring may be the prelude to some attempt by Hyderabad to align herself with Pakistan cannot be overlooked and was very frankly dealt with by Mountbatten at his Lahore meeting with Jinnah. There has been general contact between Karachi and Hyderabad both before and after the transfer of power, but Jinnah was at pains to stress that he has had nothing whatever to do with the Nizam's reversed decision and has never discussed any form of agreement with him."⁴² Yet, there was gun-running from Karachi to Hyderabad. Pakistan received a substantial loan from the Nizam. When the Indian Government took over the State, Moin Nawaz Jung fled to Karachi, and in a minor betrayal of Jinnah's protestations to Mountbatten the Pakistan High Commission in London laid claim to the Nizam's funds in a British Bank there.

Not content with putting his finger in the Hyderabad pie, Jinnah managed to secure the accession of Junagadh by means which were, on the most charitable interpretation, underhand. At his meeting with Mountbatten in Lahore on 1 November 1947, Jinnah asked him to believe that he had at first been against accepting

⁴²Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, p. 233.

the accession of Junagadh and had demurred for some time only to give way finally to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan. However, a month earlier in Delhi, Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, had given no indication of any such misgiving.⁴³ Also what Jinnah told Mountbatten was at variance with the correspondence on the subject between the two governments.⁴⁴ The ruler of Junagadh had proclaimed his belief in the solidarity and integrity of Kathiawar of which Junagadh formed a part. But the Muslim League "advised" the ruler, through Mohammed Zafrullah Khan and Muslim members of the ruler's council, to accede to Pakistan, in violation of the principle of geographic contiguity and in utter disregard of the State's economic dependence on the surrounding territory of Kathiawar, the known wishes of the overwhelming majority of its population to join the Indian Union, and irrespective of the existence within Junagadh territory of pockets of States which had already acceded to India and, equally, the existence of pockets of Junagadh territory inside Indian territory.⁴⁵ Neither the ruler nor the Pakistan Government informed the Government of India of this fraudulent accession and the latter's letters and telegrams remained unanswered till 25 September 1947.⁴⁶ In the words of an observer of the Indo-Pakistan scene, by accepting Junagadh's accession, Jinnah gave, in effect, tacit recognition to the principle that the ruler need not consult his people, a principle on which he was to insist so much in the case of Kashmir. Years later, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Manzur Qadir, had the courage to admit that Junagadh was of no importance to Pakistan.⁴⁷

It is noteworthy that Zafrullah Khan, who represented Jinnah, tried to secure the accession of princely States whose populations were overwhelmingly non-Muslims, no matter whether their rulers were Muslim or non-Muslim, violating the very principle which

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁴⁴See author's *The Kashmir Story*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1967, Chapter Four.

⁴⁵V.P. Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, Chapter VI.

⁴⁶For further details, see author's *The Kashmir Story*.

⁴⁷Press conference in Karachi on 24 January 1960; see *Hindu*, Madras, 25 January 1960.

Zafrullah Khan was to enunciate and elaborate so much in the debates on Kashmir question in the Security Council.⁴⁸ In pursuit of its policy of grab, Pakistan went out of its way to secure the accession of the States of Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner which by the wishes of their people obviously belonged with India. In a desperate bid to secure the accession of Jodhpur, Jinnah is said to have signed a blank sheet of paper and given it to the ruler along with his own fountain pen, saying: "You can fill in all your conditions."⁴⁹ In all these areas the overwhelming majority of the population was Hindu with whom he had proclaimed to have nothing in common, and hence his struggle for a homeland for Muslims. Apparently, this was sheer opportunism to capture as much area and power as possible with the object of frustrating nationalist, secular forces in India. To Jinnah's way of thinking, while Indian islands in Pakistan would be a denial of Pakistan independence, the creation of Pakistan islands in India would be unexceptionable. To him the independence of India mattered little. His aim was obstruction to achieve political pre-eminence and power. When the Indian National Congress in a final bid to achieve independence agreed to the creation of Pakistan, thereby putting an end to British manoeuvres and those of Jinnah, the latter was surprised. Said he in Karachi: "Do you know, I never expected to see Pakistan in my life time."⁵⁰

From this analysis of Jinnah's thought and actions certain basic attitudes emerge. First, what he claimed for Muslims of Pakistan he would not concede to other communities, such as the Sikhs, which according to him were also nations. If as a minority the Muslims did not feel secure in undivided India because of what he called the brute majority, how could he expect non-Muslim minorities to feel assured about their position in Pakistan under another brute majority, albeit Muslim? Jinnah refused to see the similarity between the two positions. His two-nation theory threatened India with disintegration, but he would not tolerate disintegration of Pakistan which was threatened by the same theory.

⁴⁸See author's *The Kashmir Story*.

⁴⁹V. P. Menon, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁵⁰Hector Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

On 12 October 1947, the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, stated the policy of the Government of India, a policy fashioned by the Indian National Congress over a period of sixty years.

So far as India is concerned, we have very clearly stated both as Government and otherwise that we cannot think of any state which might be called a communal or religious state. We can only think of a secular, non-communal, democratic state, in which every individual, to whatever religion he may belong, has equal rights and opportunities. It was natural for the predominant cultural outlook of a country to be governed by the majority of its population but no person should have a special right because he happens to profess a particular creed and no person should be deprived of any right because he professes some other creed. We want a secular democratic state. That has been the ideal of the Indian National Congress ever since it started 65 years ago and we have consistently adhered to it.

After having been an active member of the Indian National Congress for many years, Jinnah, "the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity," opposed tooth and nail the achievement of such a goal of a secular democratic Indian State. At one stage he had warned the Muslims of India that, if they failed to realize their duty, they would be reduced to the status of untouchables and Islam would vanish from India.⁵¹ And yet on 11 August 1947, while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in Karachi, Jinnah struck a note which according to some of his own assertions would sound the deathknell of Muslims in India. He said:

We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish.... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—

⁵¹ *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 244.

that has nothing to do with the business of the state.... We are starting with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.... Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense, as citizens of the state.⁵²

What Jinnah told the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan destroyed his political philosophy built around a narrow, suffocating, sectarian view which he now realized he could no longer sustain. Here was a reversion to secular nationalism. But even now Jinnah's mind was far from clear, to put it no lower, for a week later on 18 August 1947 in his Id message, he assured the Muslims of India that Pakistan would never neglect or forget them. "Our hearts go out to them, and we shall consider no effort too great to help them and secure their well-being, for I recognise that it is Muslim minority provinces in the sub-continent who were the pioneers and carried the banner aloft for the achievement of our cherished goal of Pakistan."⁵³ The conversion to secularism, if it was not a pretence in the first instance, was short-lived.

The poisonous weed planted by Jinnah in the Indian political soil was tenderly nurtured by the British who were, naturally, interested in clinging to power in India for as long as possible. Jinnah had taken a leaf out of the British book which advocated fragmentation of communities and setting them by the ears. Churchill, for example, had shown no scruple in attempting to break up the Hindu society by encouraging one caste to fly at the throat of another. The British hope was that internal political and communal struggle would weaken the forces of nationalism and put off the evil day of the transfer of power. If such a policy led to civil war and a holocaust at the time of partition, would that not show how incompetent the "natives" were to govern the country which had been fortunate enough to receive the blessings of British rule in such abundance! On the eve of partition, senior

⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 402-4.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 410.

British military officers made no secret of their conviction that the Indian Army, which Britain had forged with so much skill, would go to pieces under Indian command, and one could not help feeling that it was their wish and prayer that this should be so.

Another characteristic of Jinnah's political thinking was double-posture on major public issues. He was never tired of saying that, once Pakistan was agreed to, there would be no cause for conflict between the two countries. That was a public posture, in contrast with which was the other posture of ceaseless effort to create conflicts with India as, for example, in the matter of accession of princely States. He laid down principles and then set to work against them. He talked about a Monroe Doctrine for the subcontinent, when, according to his own two-nation theory, Hindus and Muslims could not coexist, let alone cooperate. He denied any responsibility for the invasion of Kashmir, first by the tribesmen from Pakistan and then by the Pakistan Army, when he was involved in both to the hilt. He steadfastly refused plebiscite as a means of resolving differences over the accession of States before Independence and after, denounced the one in Junagadh, agreed to it in Kashmir but did everything possible to avoid its being taken without the least embarrassment. He wrongfully accepted Junagadh's accession but indignantly objected to Kashmir's accession to India. No principle, no understanding, was sacred. Jinnah worked in many ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert, to achieve India's dismemberment and to retard its unification. He complained that India was out to destroy the nation of his making! And yet he—and his successors—would not hear of a No-War Declaration or a treaty of peace and friendship with India which Nehru proposed often, only to be rebuffed. This bogey of fear of India created by Jinnah presumably to achieve Pakistan and to hold together its two wings was to be exploited later to build up military parity or near-parity with India with the charity, in terms of military hardware, of the Western powers and latterly of China, a modern-day protagonist of the equality of nations!

Jinnah took back with one hand what he appeared to give with the other. There was something slick about his tactics which betrayed overconfidence and insensitivity to human suffering. Cassey

said of him: "He is dogmatic and sure of himself; I would believe that it does not even occur to him that he might be wrong."⁵¹ The same element of irrationality, which characterized his claim for Pakistan on the basis of a principle that he denied to others, is noticeable in the twin postures. "If I had not been a fanatic, there never would have been Pakistan."⁵² And yet he had said in 1924 that he was almost inclined to say that India would get dominion responsible government the day Hindus and Muslims were united.⁵³ They got it on the day they were divided.

The perseverance of Jinnah in keeping up the thinnest appearance of pseudo-constitutionality deceived nobody. The Council of the Muslim League consisted of his dummies whom he dominated and intimidated. He sought to give the impression that it was for the Muslim League to decide all political questions concerning the Muslims and that constitutionally he was entirely dependent upon the League, whereas he was, in fact, the League. Despite his ostentatious respect for constitutional methods and constitutionalism, when it came to a choice between law and violence, cooperation and conflict, Jinnah in the end threw his weight behind violence and conflict. He took pride in holding up Pakistan as having been created by the power of the pen forgetting that the same power of the pen was responsible for one of the biggest bloodbaths in history. Blind to the past, irresponsible to tradition, cold to humanity, he preached the pernicious doctrine of religious hatred year after year, consigning millions of innocent men, women, and children to insensate mass hysteria and turning countless hordes into homeless refugees fleeing for life and honour. No invasion of India in the past two thousand years had wrought such havoc and inflicted so much agony and suffering on its people, Hindu and Muslim alike, as had Jinnah from within.

Apparently, the dreamer of a homeland for Muslims had little faith in their political liberty. As the first Governor-General of Pakistan, he assumed powers under the 9th schedule rather than Part II of the 1935 Act "which gave him at once dictatorial powers

⁵¹R. G. Cassey, Governor of Bengal, quoted in *Jinnah*, p. 166.

⁵²Hector Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 89.

unknown to any constitutional Governor-General representing the King." As an eyewitness put it, here indeed was Pakistan's King-Emperor, Archbishop of Canterbury, Speaker, and Prime Minister "concentrated into one formidable Quaid-e-Azam."⁵⁷ The only freedom which politicians enjoyed in Jinnah's Pakistan was the freedom to malign India, and to nurse and propagate the illusion of an India determined to destroy Pakistan. In Pakistan which rose out of a sea of blood, all absolute power was concentrated in the hands of one individual. There was no vision here of fundamental rights, of democracy, of liberty, and of human equality and tolerance for which the great religion of Islam is so well known.

Such was the structure of Jinnah's thought and actions which laid the foundation of Pakistan and, inevitably, furnished the blueprint for Pakistan policy towards India and its relations with other countries. At the root of his thinking lay the assumption that there was nothing in common between Hindus and Muslims. If such a view were accepted, the gulf between India and Pakistan could never be bridged. In the face of this patent absurdity, he was led to acknowledge that there might, after all, be common interests including the inexorable factors of history and geography. Such acknowledgement inevitably weakened the agitation and argument in justification of Pakistan but Pakistan having become a reality, this would matter little. Caught between these two millstones, Pakistan foreign policy, particularly, in relation to India, could hardly be rational, realistic, or stable. It would be riven by an inner conflict, which could be resolved only by dissolution of that policy. There appears to be no escape from this predicament so long as Pakistan leaders hug the illusions of which they seem to be willing victims.

CHAPTER TWO

Why Indo-Pakistan Differences Persist

TO WHAT EXTENT IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS WAS
Pakistan attitude influenced by the cleavage and conflict in Jinnah's
thinking?

One of the major problems which arose between the two countries was the division of waters of the Indus basin. The line of partition cut across the Indus river and its tributaries. The five rivers in the basin fed a number of irrigation canals, some of which called the inundation canals were uncontrolled and operated only during the summer when the rivers are high. The more important irrigation canals took off above diversion dams with their supplies under full control. The partition placed all the irrigation canals in Pakistan. Out of a total of 115 canals fed by diversion dams, only nine were allotted to India; and out of the 32 inundation canals only five came to India. Of these five, two lay across Indo-Pakistan boundary.

All this resulted in a grave threat of famine to India's northern territories. Of an area of 26 million acres irrigated by the canals, only five million fell to India's share. Of the total irrigable area of 65 million acres in the Indus basin, only 26 million acres were in India, with no more than 19 per cent thereof enjoying any irrigation facilities. The irrigated area per head of population was only 0.24 acre. These facts deepened the national concern about the well-being of 21 million Indian people who would now have to depend on the meagre supply of waters of the Indus system that India could command.

The Indian side had suffered from neglect because of the political

and financial policies of the old British Government of India. Before the Indus basin was developed, large areas called crown waste lands and owned by the State were barren and unoccupied. In the early part of the twentieth century, it was decided to reclaim waste lands in what was then called British territory. The Government of the day reclaimed, in the first instance, those waste lands from which it could derive large additional revenues. This was done by the sale of State-owned lands and by sacrificing, for the time being, the interests of those private landowners in the area which partition gave to India. Also culturable lands in the basin lying in some of the Indian States, although within reach of the rivers, were not developed by the rulers who lacked the financial resources for the purpose. The development of the basin had thus been lopsided. The partition projected on the national screen the grievous effect which this would have on the population of northern India.

The total irrigated area in the Indus basin, on both sides of the India-Pakistan border, was by far the largest of any river system in the world. Some of the canals in the Indus basin carried more water than the river Thames in flood. Not that there was any dearth of water in the region. The total annual flow of the Indus system of rivers, after allowing for losses and gains in the river, was about 150 million acre feet. Pakistan used 66 million acre feet of irrigation water a year as compared with India's nine million acre feet. About 75 million acre feet, as much as the two countries used, flowed unused into the Arabian sea. From April to September, this waste represented a volume nearly five times the total flow of the Colorado system in the U.S.A. Most of these waters were wasted from the western rivers, the Kabul, the Jhelum, and the Chenab, while a large part of the Indus basin in India was a well-known "famine area."

Here was a problem which, if not handled with care and imagination, could wipe out millions of people. Pakistan had ample area for food production and ample supply of water. India found itself in serious difficulties. The Indus and the Jhelum flowed in India only in the mountainous regions of Kashmir where there could be no big irrigation development. From the Chenab, India

received little water although it could from its upper reach in the Punjab. The Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej which flowed through the plains of the Indus basin in India together carried only one-fourth of the waters that flowed in the other rivers of the Indus basin.

India considered this as an engineering problem which could be solved by the two countries through cooperative technical development of the entire resources of the Indus system for the benefit of both. However, Pakistan held a different view. Its leaders claimed the waters of all the rivers in the Indus basin and considered India responsible for letting flow, without any reduction or interruption, the water flowing through Indian territory into West Pakistan. Any other course by India, they argued, would reduce millions of fertile acres in Pakistan to a desert. India's appeal that neither country should live under the spectre of famine when co-operation could ensure an equitable development and distribution of waters fell on deaf ears. Of the 66 million acre feet of water used by the canals in Pakistan, prior to the partition, about 10 million acre feet or 16 per cent was obtained from the limited supplies available in the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej. Pakistan could easily replace this supply by fresh diversions from the unused waters of the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab, through canals linking these rivers to the Ravi and the Sutlej. India was willing to allow reasonable time to Pakistan to build replacement canals. There was no other way by which India could supply the very means of existence to its arid and famine areas awaiting development. This would have left the existing irrigation in Pakistan unaffected, leaving plenty of water for future development.

So far as Pakistan was concerned, however, the upper riparian had no rights except those that Pakistan conceded. Elements of irrationality, characteristic of Jinnah's political thinking, were now to govern the policy of the Pakistan Government on the question of canal waters. In 1948, Pakistan leaders advanced the argument that India had an obligation to continue historic supplies of water till Pakistan arranged alternative supplies from its own resources. This left the matter more or less at the sweet will of Pakistan which

might take years to develop alternative supplies, leaving India no alternative to starvation for its people in the Punjab and in parts of Rajasthan. Ten years later, Pakistan argued that India should pay for replacement works in Pakistan. By 1959, when the World Bank, which had been using its mediatory offices to bring about the settlement of the problem, proposed the allocation of the three western rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab, to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers, the Ravi, the Sutlej, and the Beas, to India, Pakistan ambitions had grown. It argued that replacement and development were indivisible. India and friendly countries should, therefore, pay not only for replacement works but for replacement-cum-development works in Pakistan!

On 15 December 1959, President Ayub Khan declared that Pakistan's interest in Kashmir had increased because of the basis on which the agreement for a solution of the canal waters dispute was being worked out. "Now we have much greater interest in Kashmir because we have been reduced to the use of the three western rivers of the Indus basin." This issue was there not only for the present but would continue for centuries to come, he went on. "Therefore, we have got to have access to the catchment areas of these rivers to control floods, generate electric power and store water."¹ The Indus Waters Treaty was signed by the Prime Minister of India and President Ayub Khan in September 1960. The treaty disposed of the canal waters problem and made adequate provisions for irrigation, generation of hydroelectric power and storage. But from official statements in Pakistan it appeared that no settlement would satisfy its leaders and one wonders whether they really wanted a settlement.

"Now just look at the map of Kashmir," said President Ayub Khan in August 1961. "Just look at the location of the three rivers on which the life of the whole of West Pakistan, of some 45 million people, depends.. As our population increases, every drop of that water has got to be husbanded, stored and utilised."² India and the World Bank had gone out of the way to reassure

¹Dawn, Karachi, 16 December 1959.

²Address at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 25 August 1961. (See Ayub: *Soldier and Statesman*, p. 156.)

Pakistan of water supplies: the assistance offered to Pakistan for replacement and development works was generous. But to Pakistan this settlement meant, more than anything else, a means of aggravating differences over another issue.

During the joint talks in 1962-63, Pakistan delegates claimed control over the watersheds and catchment areas of the western rivers in Jammu and Kashmir on the ground that Pakistan could not otherwise store water for irrigation or generate hydroelectric power. If such an argument were to be accepted, every lower riparian could claim the watershed of a common river in the territories of the upper riparian States. This would mean in effect that the country last in the line should have control of the watershed in all others through which a river passes. Few national boundaries in Asia, Africa, Europe, or Americas would be secure if such an expansionist theory were to be encouraged or upheld.

In 1963, Ayub Khan disclosed that Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, one of the previous Prime Ministers, had been prepared to settle the canal waters problem for \$100 million and proudly asserted that he had settled it for \$876 million and was demanding \$1,800 million more. The latter figure presumably referred to his request for aid from countries other than India. He had settled the problem for \$876 million: but soon enough in violation of the settlement he proceeded to claim the whole of Kashmir. Thus even while the Indus waters problem has been settled by the Indus Waters Treaty, Ayub Khan insists on keeping it open. Pakistan leaders howl with dismay if a problem is not settled, but howl with greater dismay if it is. The result is conflict, and the settlement of a problem really makes no difference. Because of this policy, harmony and mutual understanding between the two countries are seldom within easy reach. The Indus Waters Treaty stands between Pakistan and its territorial ambitions. If these ambitions are more valuable to Pakistan than honouring a treaty, why did Pakistan sign the treaty?

Another problem which arose between India and Pakistan concerned the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Going against his own pronouncements that accession was a matter for the ruler to decide, Jinnah claimed Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of

religion. It was immaterial whether the people of Kashmir were to have any say in the matter or whether or not they had any sympathy for Jinnah's claim. His claim was plainly expansionist and annexationist. Jinnah was in a hurry, and he began to put political and economic pressure on the State to bend its people to his own will. When this failed, he organized a tribal invasion of the State in the course of which the people of the State were subjected to wholesale loot, arson, rape, and slughtter. Threatened with another failure, Pakistan put its regular forces in Kashmir. When faced with the complete ouster of its forces by the advancing Indian Army, Pakistan accepted the cease-fire. It then agreed to the wishes of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite on the condition of prior vacation of its aggression and proceeded to obstruct, in every possible way, the implementation of the U.N. Commission's resolutions on the subject. In order to achieve its objective of seizing Kashmir by the force of arms, Pakistan joined Western military blocs and signed a military aid agreement with the U.S.A. When this proved to be an illusion, Pakistan made common cause with the People's Republic of China. Thus having secured over two billion dollars worth of tanks, jet fighters, and sophisticated weapons from the U.S.A. and other Western allies, and having received assurance of Chinese support, Pakistan tried massive armed infiltration into Kashmir in August 1965 followed by a full-fledged invasion with armour and air force.³

In the case of Kashmir, the attitude of Pakistan betrayed a series of contradictions. The rulers' right to accede to India or Pakistan, subject to geographical compulsions and wishes of the people, was upheld by Jinnah in a number of statements. But in the Kashmir case he dismissed the right on the plea that the ruler was a Hindu. The majority of the people being Muslim, they were assumed to have no objective other than that of losing their identity in Pakistan. For years, Sheikh Abdullah was described as a "quisling." More recently, it has become the fashion in Pakistan to lionize him. It is equally fashionable in Pakistan to enforce the martial law at home, to suppress liberty, to deny basic rights to its inhabitants, to muzzle the press,

³For details, see author's *The Kashmir Story*.

to incarcerate political leaders of the eminence of Abdus-Samad Khan and to cry hoarse about the right of self-determination of other people in other lands.

The leaders of Pakistan make professions of peace and train professional "liberators" for wars upon Kashmir and other parts of India. When claims to Kashmir on the grounds of religion prove of little avail, they shift the basis of their territorial demands to the requirements of Pakistan's communications, economy, and defence. This is simple territorial expansionism; Jinnah's "moth-eaten" Pakistan seeks to acquire territory—a process to which the wishes of the people or their right of self-determination has no relevance.

In other words, as in regard to the concept of Pakistan, or interference in the internal affairs of India whether in Junagadh, Hyderabad, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, or Bhopal, the attitude of Pakistan remains irrational and unrealistic. It does not make for harmony or mutual understanding between the two countries. It is calculated to perpetuate tension and conflict, the very things which the creation of Pakistan was intended to overcome and avoid.

Another problem which has bedevilled relations between the two countries is evacuee property. Millions of people migrated from West Pakistan to India and from north India to West Pakistan, not to mention many more who were forced to flee to India from East Pakistan. The migrants from West Pakistan were mostly landowners, entrepreneurs in business and industry, and members of various professions like law, medicine, and teaching. Those who left India for Pakistan belonged mainly to the poorer classes, being tillers of the soil, artisans, labourers, or petty shopkeepers. The value of evacuee urban property left by Hindus and Sikhs in West Pakistan amounts to over Rs. 500 crores (one billion dollars) against less than Rs. 100 crores (200 million dollars) worth of property left behind by Muslim migrants to Pakistan.

Unsatisfactory though it was, India accepted an agreement in January 1949, which provided for private sale and exchange of urban immovable property. No sooner was the agreement signed than Pakistan leaders and newspapers opened a barrage of propaganda to undermine it. As if this were not enough, the Pakistan

Government put a spoke in the wheel by arbitrarily reducing rents of evacuee urban property payable by refugees by 80 per cent and by other tenants by 33 per cent. This precipitated a steep fall in the value of evacuee properties. The Government of Pakistan followed up with an ordinance making it obligatory for any visitor to Pakistan to obtain an income-tax clearance certificate before leaving Pakistan unless his period of stay was less than 15 days at a time and less than 60 days in a year. In the circumstances, no displaced person could hope to sell or exchange his urban immovable property at a fair price. The Government of Pakistan, while supporting the proposal for private sale and exchange of property, in fact rendered it impossible for anyone to arrange sale or exchange without inviting insolvency.

In April 1956, Pakistan proposed a spot verification of claims by a Pakistan team for immovable property of the value of Rs. 50 lakhs and above submitted by Muslim evacuees from India. Two years later it was agreed at a conference that claims for urban immovable property of the value of Rs. 5 lakhs and above should be verified by joint teams of the two countries. The proposal, which Pakistan had made on its own initiative, was however not implemented by its government.

In the case of agricultural lands, the principle of government-to-government settlement had been accepted by a joint committee of the two countries. In the matter of movable property also, agreements were arrived at on government-to-government basis. A problem of enormous magnitude and complexity involving hundreds of thousands of houses, shops, factories, workshops, and institutions of all kinds, besides million of acres of agricultural land, could be solved only at government level. Other countries faced with a similar situation would adopt a similar remedy. The value of urban evacuee property in India does not exceed 20 per cent of the value of the corresponding property left in Pakistan. India suggested that properties up to a certain valuation might be exchanged on government-to-government level, properties above that valuation being left open for private sale and exchange. In 1953, India expressed its willingness to consider the Pakistan suggestion of private sale and exchange, provided the Government

of Pakistan were prepared to offer a reasonable solution for the properties which would remain undisposed of by private sale and exchange. To India's regret, Pakistan refused even to discuss this and other implications of the proposal for private sale and exchange.

It is said that when Jinnah looked at the scheme prepared by the joint committee he remarked that he had no wish to mortgage the future of Pakistan. He realized that, in any settlement with India, Pakistan would have to pay to India a large difference between the values of the evacuee properties in the two countries, and negotiations were, therefore, ground to a halt. In 1952, India offered to have the question of the method of valuation referred to arbitration or to an impartial tribunal or to the International Court or to any ad hoc court consisting of nominees of the two governments. On the question of payment of the difference in values, India suggested that it should be possible to arrive at a workable agreement after taking into account the paying capacity of Pakistan. All these offers were rejected by Pakistan.

Equity and justice had no place in Pakistan policy on immovable evacuee property, as indeed they had no place in its policy on the canal waters problems. Once again there was a flight from facts, a refusal to face realities, or to own any responsibility on the basis of a mutually acceptable principle or arrangement. Arbitration as a method of settling international disputes, which Pakistan put forward now and again for settling the Kashmir question, a political issue involving India's sovereignty, was firmly rejected by Pakistan when it came to evacuee property whose settlement by arbitration would be truly relevant and appropriate.

Misappropriation of evacuee immovable property in East Pakistan was organized with greater thoroughness. An owner of property in East Pakistan, if he is not residing there, cannot collect rent from his tenants or receive the sale proceeds of his property. His relatives or agents, even when residing in East Pakistan, are also helpless. Prevented from collecting rents or selling his property, the absentee owner is unable to pay land revenue, agricultural income-tax, estate duty, municipal and other local taxes. The Pakistan Government, not to be deflected from the policy of misappropriation,

tion, decided to sell some of the properties by auction. The properties of the Maharajas of Mymensingh, Natore, and Dinajpur were disposed of in this fashion. In pursuit of inimitable Pakistan logic, the Government of East Pakistan then proceeded to charge interest on the outstanding dues of absentee owners, without making any provision for allowing interest on arrears of rent and the like due to the absentee owner from the government. Thus, Pakistan ensures victory for itself in all circumstances. The principle is simple. If something can be had for nothing by a mere manipulation of the law for which Pakistan seems to have little respect, why not do it? The Pakistan Government recognizes no obligations not even those arising from its own actions and agreements.

The Nehru-Liaquat Agreement on 8 April 1950 made an important provision about minorities. Article A of the Agreement stated:

The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure to the minorities throughout its territory complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces. Both Governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to enforce them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention to the effect that these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its constitution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar provision exists in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights shall be assured to all their nationals without distinction.

No one can pretend that in India there have been no regrettable communal incidents since the Agreement was signed. What can

be claimed is that, in spite of the poisonous propaganda by the Muslim League prior to the partition and by Pakistan after it, the Government of India and the State Governments have tried their best to adhere to the principle and purposes of secular democracy. The gradual but increasing success of this policy has been acclaimed by many independent authorities, including several Islamic States.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, the treatment of minorities leaves them as only second-class citizens, serving as targets for periodic, officially stimulated mass attacks on their life, honour, and property. Thousands of communal incidents have taken place in the two wings of Pakistan on most of which the Government of India and the State Government concerned have had to lodge protests with the Pakistan authorities, though in vain. The squeeze is put on helpless minorities to force them to flee to India and in the process to seize their property, to molest their women and subject them to forced conversion. There are hardly any minorities left in West Pakistan, and, already, nearly five million inhabitants, including Buddhists and Christians, have been forced out of East Pakistan. Discrimination is exercised against minorities in employment, business and rent remittances as a matter of policy, and their immovable properties are requisitioned or acquired by force. They are also subjected to a systematic and discriminatory denial in passport and visa facilities.

A detailed examination of this problem here would be out of place, but one or two of its unusual features are noteworthy. No member of a minority can hold the highest office in Pakistan under its present constitution. No Hindu has held any portfolio in the Central Government during the last seventeen or eighteen years much less responsible appointments in the police or defence services. No Hindu has held the office of a Chief Justice or a Judge, or similar other positions. And yet there are some eight to ten million Hindus in Pakistan. Ability and integrity are of no consequence. The two-nation theory is applied in practice with a vengeance. In other words, the minorities are suspect. The vicious theory is also being applied to reduce the population of East Pakistan to silence its leaders' claim for a special position in

Pakistan based on its larger population. It is one of those cases in which a policy if not subjected to rational control tends to set its own supporters by the ears.

A minority journal of East Pakistan in its issue of 3 September 1964 commented with despair:

If 80 per cent people of any country tell the remaining 20 per cent that they are a separate nation and they have no ideological or philosophical affinity with them what is left for the minority but to accept it and organise itself separately? After living together for 17 years, today it is being discovered anew that Hindus and Muslims are separate and under no circumstances can they be identified with each other.... After the establishment of Pakistan, the minority community had demanded to be known simply as Pakistan citizens and had wanted only citizenship, constitutional rights and national integration. It had supported joint electorates even at its own cost. But today it has become clear that it is impossible to build up a unified nation in Pakistan.*

This would suggest that only a Muslim can be a national of Pakistan. Strangely enough, all Muslims in Pakistan are not being treated as its nationals. Some of them are pushed surreptitiously into Assam—and also Burma—and when evicted by the Government concerned are dubbed as Indian nationals. The Indian census figures for 1961 show that there was an increase of 25.6 per cent in the population of Muslims in India during 1951-61, against an overall increase of 21.5 per cent in the population of India. Not only could there be no question of Muslims leaving India, Muslims from Pakistan had in fact been infiltrating into the surrounding Indian States of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura in large numbers. This is also proved by Pakistan census figures. The Muslim population in East Pakistan, according to the census of Pakistan, increased by 26 per cent during the period between 1951 and 1961. Significantly, much smaller increases were recorded in some of the districts of East Pakistan bordering India. Noakhali had an increase of only 4.7 per cent, Comilla 15.4 per cent, and Bakarganj 16.8 per cent; and Sylhet indicated a rise of only 13.9

**Amar Desh.*

per cent, against the overall provincial increase of 26 per cent. The Indian census figures in the neighbouring border districts of Indian States are complementary and reveal that the population of Muslims in Tripura rose by 68 per cent, in Darjeeling by 200 per cent, in Dinajpur by 74 per cent, in Malda by 62 per cent, in Garo Hills by 49 per cent, and in Khasi and Jaintia Hill Districts by 88 per cent. Considering that the overall increase in the Muslim population in India as a whole was 25.6 per cent, such an extraordinary increase could not have been possible without a large-scale influx from East Pakistan, particularly from those districts which, according to Pakistan census figures, show abnormally low increases in population.

In contrast, nearly 40,000 Pakistan Muslim nationals were working in India before the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965. This is a sad commentary on the economic prospects for the homelanders in Pakistan.

It is clear that the homeland for Muslims, for which Jinnah had struggled, is in effect being used as an instrument for creating and maintaining tension with India and adding stresses to the latter's economy. Subversion and the arming of Indian nationals are resorted to as in the case of the Nagas and the Mizos. These and similar other actions coupled with its negative responses to India's offers of friendship and no-war pacts are good enough indication of the lack of desire on the part of Pakistan for friendly relations with its neighbour.

It was in January 1950 that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru first offered a no-war pact and for many other reasons, he wrote in a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, "it is inevitable that many issues arise between the two countries which require settlement. A firm declaration that we will in any event settle them by peaceful methods will itself be a great service to our two countries and the world, because it will remove fear of war from the minds of our people."⁴ This led to correspondence between the two Prime Ministers which lasted nearly a year. The Prime

⁴Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on "No-War Declaration," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1950, pp. 2-3. (The letter was written on 18 January 1950.)

Minister of Pakistan viewed the matter differently. He argued that such a declaration would not eliminate tension which was caused by the continuance of the Kashmir issue and other Indo-Pakistan problems. He proposed that there should be a clear-cut procedure with an agreed time-table which would make it binding on both governments to carry through the settlement of their disputes to its final peaceful conclusion. For example, from the date of the declaration two months could be allowed for negotiations and another two months for mediation if negotiations failed, after which the unresolved dispute or disputes should be referred automatically to arbitration.⁵ He felt that if a dispute could not be settled by negotiation and mediation, it must be referred to arbitration, because in all disputes there was a danger that the party which was in possession and wished to withhold the rightful views of the others might so conduct itself as either to prevent a fair settlement or to cause such delay in settlement as to give the same results.⁶

"I confess I do not see how," wrote Nehru in reply, "in the complicated world that we live in, we can lay down a rigid time-table or lay down an identical procedure for all manner of disputes that may arise. These disputes may be political, economic or financial; they may be justiciable or not. The difference of opinion between us has been as to whether a uniform procedure, including a time-table, should be set out in proposed declaration as being applicable to all disputes, present or future, or the declaration should be in general terms as proposed by us and the procedure for each dispute should be agreed upon with specific regard to its nature and relevant circumstances."⁷ Nehru saw no objection to a justiciable dispute like the one relating to evacuee property being referred to arbitration after other methods of settlement had failed. But political disputes like the one relating to Kashmir, he added, could be settled in the last resort only by agreement between the two governments.⁸

No reply was forthcoming from the Pakistan Prime Minister to Nehru's simple question: "Is it not our aim to avoid war

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 19-20. (Letter dated 8 October 1950.)

between our two countries in any circumstances, and to resolve all our disputes by peaceful methods alone?"⁹ The issue was basic and required a categoric answer, which Pakistan was not prepared to give, arousing the suspicion that Pakistan's allegiance to peace and peaceful methods was apparently subject to mental reservations, and Nehru gave expression to his misgivings in his letter of 27 October 1950. "I said that I had stated on previous occasions, and repeated at a recent press conference, that India would not resort to war in Kashmir unless we were attacked. This is an unequivocal statement by which we stand regardless of what Pakistan may say. I had asked you to make a similar statement on behalf of Pakistan as this would go far to remove the fears and tensions from which our countries suffer. I had brought this matter to your notice more especially because the Pakistan press and the statements of many prominent persons in Pakistan have been full of appeals for war against India for many months past. I had hoped that you would condemn this kind of talk in emphatic terms and make a declaration similar to mine. That you have not done so is likely to encourage the inference that there is a possibility of Pakistan attacking India, even though there might be no attack by India on Pakistan."¹⁰

The question was a simple one. Did Pakistan want to settle Indo-Pakistan problems by war or by peaceful means? The evidence did not show, as it does not show today, that the Pakistan Government believed in the principles of the Charter to which it is a signatory. The Indo-Pakistan Consultative Committee had failed to function because Pakistan reserved to itself the right of organizing propaganda for what it called its case for Kashmir, the main plank of that propaganda being the cry of *Jehad* or holy war against India. Tension was maintained not so much by Indo-Pakistan problems as by this propaganda of *Jehad* or war against India on Kashmir. A no-war declaration would put an immediate stop to such propaganda, but this did not suit the ends the authorities of Pakistan had in view. Some Pakistan leaders have argued that, since Pakistan and India are signatories to the Charter, there is hardly any need for another agreement concerning the renunciation of war. The Charter did not stop Pakistan from

⁹Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰Ibid.

committing aggression in Kashmir in 1947 and 1948 or in the Rann of Kutch and again in Kashmir in 1965. Peace pacts are meaningful only if confidence is restored that they will be honoured. A no-war pact between India and Pakistan would, in addition to restoring confidence, open up avenues of cooperation between the two countries. The refusal of Pakistan to make common cause with India in renouncing war for the settlement of their differences acquires meaning only in so far as Pakistan feels that in the last resort force alone will resolve them and that Pakistan must have this weapon to hand. Pakistan's attack on India in 1965 exposed the scope and significance of the reservations concerning a no-war pact. It is another matter that resort to force by Pakistan on four occasions in the last twenty years has not helped solve any of the Indo-Pakistan problems.

In spite of successive failures, Pakistan still clings to its faith in the arbitrament of arms. This has been authoritatively stated by President Ayub Khan. Addressing the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 25 August 1961, Ayub Khan said: "What should be the foreign policy of Pakistan towards India? I maintain that while wanting to live in peace with India we shall continue to lean against India till such time that resolution of these problems has been found."¹¹ This is a contradiction almost in the style of Jinnah. If Pakistan is going to lean against India till Indo-Pakistan problems are solved, the afflux of time may only create more problems. And such living together is bound to be an experiment in strife and tension resulting in occasional resort to arms. By seizing every opportunity to promote conflict with India, whether the opportunity is offered from within India or from outside, Pakistan has been, what its President is pleased to call, leaning against India. The conflict of 1965 was a result of this policy. Will there be another repetition of that folly? This policy of "leaning against India" stands self-condemned, for, on the face of it, it is a policy of mischief and expediency. When a country plays with its future and the future of its neighbour in this manner, the end product might turn out to be a packet of surprise.

¹¹Ayub: *Soldier and Statesman*, p. 156.

This brief survey of the problems dividing India and Pakistan shows that their continuance and aggravation is ensured by lack of desire on Pakistan's part to solve them in amity and peace and on the basis of mutually acceptable principles. Pakistan has not honoured any of the agreements forged to resolve them. Constantly shifting its position from conference to conference or from agreement to agreement, it has brought about a situation in which the problems refuse to yield a solution. When India endeavours to secure Pakistan's cooperation in resolving them, as by implementing the Tashkent Declaration unilaterally to a very large extent, cooperation is assiduously denied. The Pakistan Government's endeavour seems to be to keep its own people from any close and cooperative association with the people of India, lest such association should expose the danger and futility of chasing the two-nation theory in preference to the pursuit of more fruitful courses worthy of the attentions of an independent Pakistan. Do the present leaders of Pakistan fear, perhaps, that any cooperative endeavour between the two countries might undermine the very *raison d'etre* of a military regime rather precariously perched on the pedestal of Basic Democracies? Pakistan itself is a reality and does not need to raise bogies to ensure its continued existence. Friendship and cooperation with India can only add to Pakistan's stability, strength, and prosperity.

Refusal to cooperate with India in tackling these problems with patience and a sense of realism, as envisaged in the Tashkent Declaration, is a striking feature of Pakistan's attitude towards them. The absence of cooperation gives the problems a fresh lease of life and leaves them exactly as they were, except where they are aggravated by further acts of aggression or incitement to violence against the minorities. The principal reason for withholding cooperation is the assumption that what Pakistan chooses to dictate is a fair and just solution and that India has no choice or say in the matter. There is no guarantee in these circumstances that, even if some of the problems are settled on Pakistan's terms, fresh problems will not be created by its government. As a matter of fact, Pakistan has been busy adding to India's difficulties as, for example, by training and arming the Nagas and the Mizos and by infiltrating

its nationals from East Pakistan into neighbouring areas of India. All this does not help resolve the existing problems.

And so the wheel turns full circle. Jinnah had said that there was nothing in common between Hindus and Muslims and, therefore, by implication between India and Pakistan. That being the case, there would naturally be little room for cooperation between the two, and just as Pakistan was created by resort to violence, which left the Indian National Congress no alternative except to agree to partition to usher in independence, Pakistan seeks to resolve Indo-Pakistan problems by dictating terms to India from a position of strength.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, geography, the distance between East and West Pakistan with the consequent problems of communications, and the requirements of the subcontinent's defence do not admit of any two-nation theory or the like. Floods flow across Indo-Pakistan boundary with freedom. A thousand miles of Indian territory between the two wings of Pakistan necessitates cooperation with India if communications between them are to be maintained with any degree of satisfaction. In the economic field the interdependence is much greater, however unpalatable that fact may be to the present rulers of Pakistan.

Here again Pakistan is caught between two millstones—the thesis according to which there is or should be no ground for cooperation between India and Pakistan and the antithesis presented by the realities on the ground that dictate cooperation. Jinnah's thinking permeates the policy of Pakistan towards India. And while this policy continues the results cannot, obviously, be radically different from the harvest that the two countries reaped at the time of partition of the subcontinent.

CHAPTER THREE

Failure of Another Dream

CONCEIVED IN HATRED, PAKISTAN WAS BORN and brought up in hatred. Psychologically, therefore, Pakistan has no choice in determining its foreign policy. Hatred has its own laws and mechanics. Hatred seeks to divide, undermine, and annihilate the object of its attentions. It greets those who support the enemy with hostility, those who oppose him with applause. The supporters of the enemy must be weakened, or divided or weaned away from him, and those sitting on the fence encouraged to oppose him. As hate springs from fear, Pakistan leaders constantly harp on their fear of India, a bogey entirely of their own creation. The party which is the object of hatred must be enfeebled so that it may not resist. If possible, the enemy must be destroyed. It is all one endless destructive effort. Jealousy is but another name for hatred. In its numerous manifestations, hatred is all too evident in the policies and actions of Pakistan vis-a-vis India.

On the strength of religious ties, Pakistan counted a great deal on the support of Muslim countries in its feud with India. To this end, every effort was made to rouse Muslims of other countries about the so-called grave danger to which their co-religionists on the subcontinent were exposed at the hands of caste-ridden Hindus who, it was suggested, had made it impossible for Muslims in India to live in honour. The slogans were: "genocide" of Muslims, Islam in danger, and the like. Unless Muslim countries raised their voice against India, Islamic culture on the subcontinent, argued Pakistan leaders, would be faced with extinction. The problem was not so simple. Quite for some years, many people in foreign lands were not even aware of the

existence of the new State of Pakistan. Besides, the names which had captured the imagination of Afro-Asian countries were of Gandhi and Nehru not those of Jinnah or other leaders of the Muslim League. The struggle of the Congress leaders against the mightiest empire in the world by unconventional methods had raised new hopes for millions among the people held down by alien arms in other parts of the world. A new trail of freedom was blazed by heroic sacrifice and self-imposed denial as free from hatred as possible. Gandhi was at pains to make the Indians aware of the distinction, on the one hand, between the British Government in India and its imperialist methods of division, domination, and exploitation which the Indian National Congress opposed and, on the other hand, the British people behind it who were as much their victims as the people of India. No Afro-Asian country, free or still under colonial subjugation, welcomed the division of India which was attributed to Britain's policy of "Divide and Rule," and there was some awareness abroad that Jinnah and his party had played the British game,¹ thereby strengthening the hands of imperialist and colonialist forces, correspondingly weakening the forces of freedom and progress in Asia and Africa.

Not only did Pakistan overestimate the power of religious appeal to Muslim countries, it overrated its own capacity to mislead them and to incite religious passion to white heat. There were frequent threats of *Jehad* or holy war against India in Pakistan, without evoking any response from countries in West Asia. The explanation perhaps lay in the fact that, while a number of those countries had visions of social and economic progress made possible by science and technology, Pakistan was looking backwards and nursing medieval notions. Jinnah had said: "If I had not been a fanatic, there would have been no Pakistan." But the days of religious fanaticism were coming to an end and while there might be lapses into savagery by frenzied mobs, as were witnessed during and after the partition in West Pakistan and north India, no civilized government in the twentieth century could hold these

¹"Pakistan's independence was related to the internal workings of the British political system." (Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 320.)

up as an ideal to revive the flagging energies of its people. Muslim countries had their own internal and external problems and were not prepared to be led by the nose by Pakistan which sought to mislead and use them for its own aims and purposes. "We are Egyptians first," said Azam Pasha, the first Secretary General of the Arab League, "Arabs second, and Muslims last." The first Arab regional organization was not called "Muslim League" but "Arab League."²

In Liaquat Ali Khan's view the Muslim countries between Cairo and Karachi had an important role to play between the two power blocs³—a third bloc as it were, comparable to the third force of which Nehru was the creator.⁴ Liaquat Ali Khan explained the ideological aspect of the question:

The underlying idea of the movement for the achievement of Pakistan was not just to add one more country to the conglomeration of countries in the world or to add one more patch of colour to the multi-coloured global map. Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of this sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practised and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries.⁵

The best guarantee of independence was for Pakistan neither to be tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc nor to be a camp-follower of the communist bloc.⁶

Pakistan sounded, at about this time, Muslim countries, Arab and non-Arab, about holding an Islamic conference towards the

²Quoted in M.S. Agwani, "India, Pakistan and West Asia," *International Studies*, July-October 1966, p. 159.

³Interview with London *Times* correspondent. (*Dawn*, Karachi, 14 May 1949.)

⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 3 May 1952.

⁵*Pakistan News*, Karachi, 18 February 1951, pp. 16-7.

⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 9 March 1951.

end of 1949, states a Pakistan writer.⁷ "This move did not meet with success. Pakistan then tried to set up an Inter-Islamic Consultative Body in which Iraq showed keen interest. But this too could not take shape. Attempts to form an Islamic Conference continued and Pakistan was able to interest Egypt and Saudi Arabia in it. But nothing very substantial could be achieved."⁸ A convention in Karachi was summoned with the object of setting up Anjuman-i-Shabal-Musalimeen (Muslim People's Organization). It drew up an eight-point programme the main purpose of which was to work for the creation of "Islamistan" not as a mere matter of common cultural or religious interests, but as a practical force, with all the qualities of a "bloc" pledged to defend mutual interests against alleged attack. Its sponsor, Chaudhari Khaliquzzaman, defined the objective as a "free and independent Islamistan."⁹ Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, who subsequently became the Governor-General of Pakistan, appealed to the Muslim countries at the International Islamic Conference, which opened in Karachi towards the end of November 1949, "to become an organic whole in which each part strengthens the whole and the whole imparts life to each part" and urged them to "develop a system of collective bargaining and collective security."¹⁰ Nothing came of this venture.

In Muslim countries, the sincerity of Pakistan was in doubt and ulterior motives were attributed to it,¹¹ presumably because of its close association with Britain which had always favoured pan-Islam to safeguard its own oil and political interests in West Asia. Liaquat Ali Khan asked in 1951: "If the Western democracies can enter into pacts to protect their way of life, if the communist countries can form a bloc on the basis that they have an ideology, why cannot the Muslim people get together to protect themselves and to show to the world that they have an ideology and

⁷Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security*, Longman Green & Co., Pakistan Branch, 1960, pp. 88-9.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Lord Birdwood, *A Continent Decides*, p. 174.

¹⁰Aslam Siddiqi, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 89.

a way of life?"¹² Inevitably, there was a reaction to Pakistan attempt to assume leadership among Muslims. Many Turks were apprehensive, points out a writer, "over the appearance of budding theocracy in Pakistan," even asking Pakistan to recall one of its envoys on the grounds of encouraging religious reactionaries in Turkey. Many Arabs suspected the Islamic orthodoxy of these "foreign" Muslims who could not even speak Arabic. The rector of the Al Azhar University in Cairo protested that too many Islamic conferences were being held in Pakistan.¹³

Pakistan had one leg in the British camp and was seeking to plant the other in a Muslim camp which it tried to set up to serve Western colonial and economic ends along with its own. While Muslim countries of West Asia and North Africa struggled against European colonial powers, Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, warned their people against taking the law into their own hands. "It is devoutly to be hoped that in the first instance law and order in all Middle East countries, in which Pakistan is also included, will be impartially, firmly and, if necessary, even ruthlessly maintained."¹⁴ To imperialist powers, these words were the essence of wisdom and statesmanship. It is hardly surprising that Zafrullah Khan was described by some Pakistan politicians as "an agent of British imperialism."¹⁵ The swipe which he gave to Moussadiq was of no less interest. Referring to Persia and Egypt, he said: "Our sympathy with them is very deep, but it does not mean that on account of these factors, if any of these countries were in the wrong and we thought they were in the wrong,

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 95; also see *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 36.

"At the same time it is true to say that, in common with the rest of Islam, Pakistan has not yielded to that obsession with economic life so characteristic of Russia and like. These thoughts suggest that Pakistan may have some new and heartening message to announce. In politics, as in the things of the spirit, a marriage of forces, themselves destined to perish, may generate a fresh force of greater power. It is not too much to hope that through Pakistan, some new strength of this kind may animate the Muslim world." (Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power*, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, 1951, p. 188.)

¹³Richard V. Weekes, *Pakistan*, D. van Nostrand Co., New York, 1964, p. 251.

¹⁴Lord Birdwood, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 176.

we would nevertheless support them simply because they are our neighbours or Muslim States or Arabic States.”¹⁶

Such was the role Pakistan envisaged for itself as leader of the Muslim world. The weight of its judgement fell, more often than not, behind predatory actions of colonialist-imperialist powers and against the countries of West Asia—as in the case of Israelite-Anglo-French invasion of the United Arab Republic in 1956.

By signing the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan dealt a severe blow to the Afro-Asian world. This pact was directed not only against the Soviet Union but also against the nonaligned Arab States. In order to strengthen its position on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan exploited the pact against India. In pursuance of it, Britain and Iraq concluded a special agreement on 4 April 1955, no provision of which could be directed against Israel. “In effect,” observes a Pakistan writer, “the new agreement confirmed Britain in its position of power in the Middle East. It will be recalled that British policies in that region, particularly those which led to the establishment of the State of Isreal, had caused much bitter resentment in Egypt and other Arab countries. Having failed in their efforts to prevent the Baghdad Pact, those countries denounced it as aiding Western imperialism and giving implied recognition and support to Israel.”¹⁷ Significantly, Pakistan did not join the Arab economic boycott against Israel.¹⁸

At Damascus in February 1958, Nasser condemned the Baghdad Pact as representing foreign domination in the region and said that “through our opposition to the Baghdad Pact we aim at achieving true liberty, Arab solidarity and Arab unity.” The Baghdad Pact had divided the Arab world. Through its membership of that Pact, Pakistan was responsible for contributing to that division. By destroying Arab unity, the Baghdad Pact also increased instability in the region.¹⁹ Thus Nehru’s fears of military pacts and U.S. military aid to Pakistan were not so unreal as Pakistan leaders had tried to make out at the time. In their hatred of India, Pakistan

¹⁶Ibid., p. 177. (At a press conference on 2 June 1952.)

¹⁷K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, p. 15.

¹⁸Richard V. Weekes, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

¹⁹K. Sarwar Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

leaders were prepared to go any length to antagonize Muslim countries which had not responded to Pakistan's call for help against India.²⁰ So suspicious was Pakistan of relations between India and Afro-Asian countries that its Prime Minister opposed greater Asia-Africa representation in the Security Council when the matter came up for discussion at the Bandung Conference in 1955.²¹

By the time the Suez crisis occurred, Pakistan had travelled far. Its characterization of the nationalization of the Suez Canal as "international brigandage" is well known. The Anglo-French aggression in Egypt was "aimed at restricting the sovereignty of a certain country for the benefit of the world," said Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Suez developments strained relations between Cairo and Karachi. Nasser declined to accede to the request of Prime Minister Suhrawardy to visit Cairo to meet him. He also refused to accept any contribution from Pakistan to the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Suhrawardy complained that the Egyptians were insulting Pakistan. No less clear was the justification offered by the Pakistan Prime Minister for his country's dependence on Britain and France. "People wonder," said Suhrawardy in 1957, "why we [the Islamic countries] do not get together instead of binding ourselves to Britain and France. My answer to them is that a zero plus zero will in the end add up to zero. We therefore had to reach abroad, instead of just collecting zeros."²²

Less well known, however, is the open disapproval with which Pakistan treated the revolution in Iraq in July 1958 and the justification given by Pakistan for American intervention in the Lebanon. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Commerce Minister in the "Revolutionary" Government of President Ayub Khan, who speaking in Karachi on 13 March 1959 approvingly cited the American intervention in the Lebanon under the Eisenhower

²⁰For details of India's attitude to the military pacts, see author's *The Kashmir Story*.

²¹K. Sarwar Hasan, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

²²Abdel Azim, "Suhrawardy's Equation," *Al Masava*, Cairo, 10 September 1957.

Doctrine.²³ The Shah of Iran and the Presidents of Pakistan and Turkey hailed this intervention as a "bold and appropriate decision" designed to "renew and increase the faith of the free world in the leadership of the United States."²⁴

Pakistan was oversimplifying the problem of its relationship with Muslim countries as determined under the stress of its conflict with India which it had itself generated. Not all Muslim countries are deeply moved by a narrow, restrictive, and ultra-fanatical view of religion. Their people accept religion as a part of their lives; whereas the leaders of Pakistan wear it as a badge on their sleeves. Their problems are varied and they have no particular reason to feel antagonistic towards India. On the contrary, they find much in common with what Gandhi and Nehru said against racial discrimination, colonial and imperialist domination of Asia, and the need for Asia to stand on its own feet.²⁵ Pakistan will, perhaps, learn in time from the countries of West Asia that the hallmark of religion and truly religious outlook is tolerance and not hatred or narrow sectarianism.

No sooner was Pakistan born than it found itself in conflict with Afghanistan, a Muslim neighbour, over the issue of Pakhtoonistan, a problem still far from solution. Afghanistan insisted on the application of the principle of self-determination to certain areas in the north-west of West Pakistan, a principle which Pakistan strongly opposed, though calling for its application in Kashmir. This may explain why Afghanistan opposed the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations and voted against it.

²³*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 14 March 1959.

²⁴M. S. Agwani, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

²⁵"Pakistan was one area from which support might have been expected in the Muslim world. Pakistan was founded to advance the cause of Muslims. Other Muslims might have been expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But this assumed that other Muslim countries would take the same view of the relation between religion and nationality. In fact, the political upsurge elsewhere was based largely on territorial and racial nationalism, anti-Western, anti-White. Religion played a part in this but it was a lesser part than colour, language and a political theory of violent opposition to colonialism and exploitation.... If a choice had to be made [by other Muslim countries between friendship with India or Pakistan] India as more powerful, more stable and more influential, was likely to have the advantage." (Keith Callard, *op. cit.*, p. 314.)

Pakistan was too close to countries like the United Kingdom and France under the heels of which groaned a number of Muslim countries in West Asia and Africa. During the Suez crisis, as already explained, it supported aggression by the U.K., France, and Israel on an Arab State. In succeeding years Pakistan made common cause with Britain and Saudi Arabia against the Republican Yemen, also a Muslim State, supported by the United Arab Republic. Its earlier initiative in mobilizing Muslim support in favour of its policies was taken in Muslim countries as "an attempt by Pakistan to lead the Muslim World," as admitted by Zafrullah Khan.²⁶

Pakistan promoted the creation of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), with Iran and Turkey, also directed against the nonaligned Arab States. Its leaders find more in common with feudal monarchies than with progressive socialist States, although they did not hesitate to join up with Sockarno's Indonesia to promote the policy objectives of Mao's China in the Afro-Asian world. During his tour of Muslim countries, in 1960, Ayub Khan played on carefully selected themes to rouse religious hatred against India. At a reception in the Cairo University Hall on 7 November 1960, he asserted that Pakistan had been and still was under pressure from India,²⁷ and said that Pakistanis expected "open and substantial support from all our Muslim brethren all over the world."

It is impossible to explain this foreign policy except in terms of motivations of hatred and impulse rather than reason or a rational assessment of Pakistan's fundamental and peripheral interests. What is more, it tends to be guided by aims and interests other than those of Pakistan or the subcontinent as a whole, such as British, American, and now Chinese aims and interests. This policy regards nonaligned Muslim countries, being closer to India, as hostile. Britain, France, and Israel, whose invasion of Egypt was condemned by India as naked aggression, were considered friendly. Pakistan appeals to religion when convenient, as against India, and betrays it by bolstering the interests of

²⁶Dawn, Karachi, 3 May 1952.

²⁷Dawn, Karachi, 9 November 1960.

colonial powers. The earlier claim, encouraged by the British, of Pakistan being the biggest Muslim country in the world did not help. The assertion of arrogance by a fanatical upstart evoked due resentment and contempt in countries where Islam had taken birth and attained glory. At a press conference in Cairo on 10 November 1960, Ayub Khan saw little good in recognizing the provisional Algerian Government, since by doing so, he argued, Pakistan would destroy whatever goodwill it had with France in the matter.²⁸ In the course of the same visit, he referred to some people in his country having complained against the Muslim world not giving its support "in the gigantic struggle that Pakistan had been forced to go through by a very powerful neighbour next door to us."

He now sought their support against India in the name of Islam. "Please do remember one thing," he appealed, "as Muslims we, all of us everywhere, owe to ourselves and Allah a loyalty which is higher than any other loyalty. This is a loyalty to our faith. It is this greater loyalty which in spite of all external discords and political disputes between Governments binds the Muslim people everywhere in the world in unbreakable and indivisible ties of mutual goodwill and sympathy. These ties are stronger and more valuable than diplomatic and political relationship."²⁹ In other words, the Muslim States should loose their identity and forget their interests in surrender to Pakistan's animosity to India. And all this crusade against a country in which Islam has flourished for centuries and sixty million of whose population are as good Muslims as any in Pakistan or elsewhere in the world.

Wherever Ayub Khan went, he appealed to local Muslims over the heads of the States of which he was a guest. In Mecca, where a few years earlier Nehru was hailed as Rasool-us-Salam (messenger of peace), he dwelt on what he called India's "intransigence." Ascribing it three causes—India's desire for territory, its unwillingness to give freedom to other people, and the strategic advantage that Kashmir gave India over Pakistan—Ayub Khan

²⁸Dawn, Karachi, 12 November 1960.

²⁹Dawn, Karachi, 10 November 1960.

appealed to all Muslim countries which had achieved independence to forge a bigger brotherhood of Islam. Speaking to Muslims in Rangoon, at the mausoleum of the last Mughal Emperor of India, he said he was reminded of the fact of the war of independence of 1857 having failed because the Muslims of the subcontinent had lost those qualities for which God granted them the blessings of a free homeland.

A Muslim anywhere, he said on another occasion, was bound with other Muslims by relations of equality and brotherhood.³⁰ In Indonesia, a country known for religious tolerance, he appealed for support on the grounds of religion over the head of its government which adhered to secular principles in the affairs of the State. Here was another desperate attempt by Pakistan to go back to its policy of early years in the hope of forging the instrument of pan-Islam to further its own foreign policy objectives.

Failing to drive a wedge between the U.A.R. and India, Ayub Khan sought to bring about a rift between India and Indonesia. Addressing a public meeting in Bandung on 7 December 1960, he traced the origin of Pakistan to the fear among the 100 million Muslims of being dominated by the rigid caste system of the Hindus which might condemn them to new slavery. He justified the fear and said that he had gone to Indonesia because "people of both countries believed in the same philosophy of Islam."³¹ Immediately, Soekarno challenged the premises of Ayub Khan's exposition. In regard to the Muslim demand for Pakistan, he referred to Indonesia's multireligious composition (Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus) and explained that his country had its own philosophy for the solution of the problem.³² It was British imperialism which was responsible for the division of India in 1947. The two countries, Pakistan and Indonesia, even though Muslim, had differences in their foreign policies but could still be friends because of the similarities in the conduct of their national administration.³³ On Ayub Khan's statement that "with time and opportunity Indonesia would become one of the mightiest countries

³⁰*Dawn*, Karachi, 4 December 1960.

³¹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 8 December 1960.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

in Asia," Soekarno commented that Indonesia had no wish to be mighty in the sense of power or domination over other people. "Mankind is one," he said, "completely the same under the skin."³⁴ What heresy, Ayub Khan must have thought!

Another year added to Ayub Khan's disillusionment. In his address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 25 August 1961, he made a confession:

... there is a tremendous upsurge in the Muslim countries. But let us be quite clear that the upsurge in other Muslim countries, by and large, is racial, is linguistic, is territorial, is anti-imperialist, anti-colonial; it is very little religious. I should, therefore, think that when we expect other Muslim countries to agree entirely with us in principle we find that we are disappointed.... We are also misunderstood at times when our point of view is not accepted because the new Muslim countries have their own problems. They have their problems with the colonial powers, and they have their problems mutually. In the resolution of both, Pakistan cannot exert a decisive influence. ... Their demands and requests at times are racial, but when there is an upsurge of that type and when nationalism in its extreme form takes charge human reasoning gets second place.

Denunciation of nationalism and anti-colonialism truly worthy of a British Tory! Ayub Khan continued:

They do not understand our point of view sometimes, because their quarrel perhaps is amongst themselves or is with their previous colonial powers. We have no quarrel with our previous colonial powers; we have no quarrel with the British; they are our friends. We have quarrel with our next door Asian power, and that is the fundamental difference in our outlook. When they talk about Afro-Asian solidarity, Afro-Asian stand and so on and so forth and we differ with them sometimes, they do not quite understand why we take that attitude because they are not under the same pressure as we are.³⁵

³⁴*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 12 December 1960.

³⁵Jafri, Ayub: *Soldier and Statesman*, Mohd. Ali Academy, Lahore, 1966, p. 153.

On every occasion, he said, forgetting the Suez invasion and Pakistan's attitude thereto, Pakistan had given the fullest moral and other support to Muslim countries. "But one thing must be quite clear to Pakistan: it is that we cannot go beyond that; that any attempt to take sides will be fatal and will be futile."³⁶ This honesty was praiseworthy. How could an ally of imperialism take sides against imperialist adventures? How could the aggressor in Kashmir take sides against aggression elsewhere? And yet he expected Muslim countries to take sides in *his* quarrels with India, an India steadfastly nationalist, independent, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, an India democratic, tolerant, secular, and non-aligned!

The key to Pakistan's relations with Muslim countries was and still is India. The extent to which Pakistan could go in its animosity against India was illustrated when Pakistan broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia after the latter's representative had spoken up in the Security Council against Pakistan aggression in 1965. Commenting on this development, the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs of Malaysia, Ghazali Ben Shaffie, said that Pakistan's "unkind attitude" towards Malaysia had been followed consistently since the emergence of a Peking-Rawalpindi-Jakarta axis and that Rawalpindi broke off diplomatic relations with Malaysia under pressure from Peking "in the context of their common struggle against India." In his view, Pakistan probably "yielded to this pressure on the calculation that the sacrifice of Malaysia's friendship was a small price to pay for Sino-Pakistan collaboration against India." Accusing the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Bhutto, of having conspired with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to keep Malaysia out of the Afro-Asian conference, Ghazali remarked that the Pakistan leaders seemed ready to enter into collusion with any and every power, however "disreputable," as long as that power was hostile to India.³⁷

The attitude of Pakistan to Muslim interests in foreign countries is determined by their response or indifference to its appeal for support on Indo-Pakistan differences, particularly on Kashmir.

³⁶Ibid., p. 154.

³⁷Reported in *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 29 October 1965.

The reaction in Pakistan to Muslim fortunes or reverses abroad varies accordingly. Pakistan has shown considerable capacity for opposing Muslim countries if they do not see eye to eye with it on Kashmir, or for appearing not to notice the oppression of Muslims elsewhere if discreet silence helps to serve its interests. The persecution of Muslims in China and their flight from Sinkiang into Uzbekistan has evoked no protest from the Government of Pakistan. For, such a protest would jeopardize the growing collaboration between China and Pakistan against India. The interests and well-being of Muslims in China are considered a small price for Pakistan to pay for the attainment of its objective. Similarly, Razakars or Muslim crusaders are welcome if their activities are directed against India, but fit for incarceration if they cause trouble for Pakistan. Referring to the Arakan-East Pakistan border where the Burmese were being terrorized by the so-called "Mujahids," Ayub Khan said in Rangoon that "General Qasim" of the so-called Mujahid movement was under home arrest in East Pakistan. "He has been eight years in Pakistan, five of which he has spent in jail. This is how we give shelter to 'Mujahids'."³⁸ The treatment of the Razakars or Mujahids for Kashmir is, however, another story.

In twenty years, Pakistan's success with Muslim countries has been limited largely to Iran and Turkey. With their cooperation, Pakistan has succeeded in converting CENTO in relation to these two countries into a new arrangement of economic orientation in outward appearance but really political and military in character. The point was driven home when the three countries, at the time of launching the Regional Coordination for Development, described themselves as "non-Arabs." During and after the armed conflict which Pakistan forced upon India, Iran furnished war materials to Pakistan, and there have been reports of financial help from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan for buying arms, and of some assistance from Turkey and Jordan. Indonesia gave assistance in the form of naval vessels and MiG aircraft, but this was cut short by the unsuccessful Chinese communist coup d'état in that country, culminating in Soekarno's downfall.

³⁸Pakistan Times, Lahore, 5 December 1960.

"The heart of the matter is that Pakistan's alliances with the West cannot be supported ideologically," observes a Pakistan writer.³⁹ There is a canker in the heart of the foreign policy of Pakistan, particularly in so far as it pertains to Muslim countries. Impossible postures are adopted, leading to incongruous and often absurd consequences. Even when the truth is in their grasp, the leaders of Pakistan shrink from applying it to their relations with India. Addressing the Emergency Session of the National Assembly, the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali, said:

In international relations there can be no eternal friends nor can there be eternal enemies. The only thing eternal is the national interest—history teaches us that England and France have been fighting for a hundred years, and today they are friends. We also know that during the last war America and Russia fought together side by side but today they are at loggerheads. So there is no eternal friendship in international relations and there is no eternal enmity.⁴⁰

There is yet hope perhaps that, in its relations with India also, the leaders of Pakistan may see the wisdom of basing their policies on national interest and not on a war-mongering ideology.

A former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto, had to admit that Pakistan leaders "adopted a stand in the Suez crisis which almost irreparably destroyed our position in the Arab, Muslim and Asian-African worlds as a self-respecting country." His own record was no better. As an Arab League spokesman said recently:

The UAR Government was indignant about Pakistan supplying arms to Saudi Arabia to curb the Yemeni Republic where the UAR has more than 50,000 of its best troops supporting the Government of President Sallal. Where India supports the Arabs over the vital issue of Palestine Arabs, Pakistan sends arms to the Yemeni Royalists.⁴¹

³⁹ Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, Allies Book Corporation, Karachi, 1964, p. 25.

⁴⁰ *Dawn*, Karachi, 23 November 1962.

⁴¹ *Statesman*, New Delhi, 28 March 1967.

The plea of ideological affinity with Muslim countries was abandoned, except in the case of those who raised their hands in support of Pakistan, right or wrong. From merely refraining from supporting a Muslim country, Pakistan, after passing through the intervening stages of supporting colonial and imperialist powers in their disputes with Arab States, and a rupture of diplomatic relations, as with Malaysia, has now no hesitation in poking its finger in Arab disputes, and goes to the extent of arming one Arab State against another. This is Pakistan's way of teaching the nonaligned Arab States a lesson. Meanwhile, it has been busy trading with Israel.⁶²

Briefly then the attempt of the Pakistan Government to bring under the umbrella of the two-nation theory all or most of the Muslim countries to confront India with a united challenge to force it to its knees has proved to be a flop. Pakistan assumes India to be an enemy, India's enemies to be its friends, and India's friends to be its enemies. This lends to the Pakistan foreign policy the character of a futile and negative expediency even in relation to Muslim countries. The lack of genuine sympathy for Muslim countries was noted by an influential newspaper of Cairo, *Al Akhbar*, when it observed in 1962:

Following the downfall of the former Pakistan Government, and the formation of the new Government, we tried to forget the attitude of the former Government and worked to improve our relations with the new Government. President Nasser then [1960] visited Pakistan and President Ayub Khan returned the visit [1961]. It was during the visit of President Ayub Khan to Cairo that the Pakistan side refused to include in the joint statement any reference to Pakistan's support for the Palestinian cause or the case of Algeria. The joint statement was then broadcast, without making any reference to these two important Arab causes.

⁶² *Statesman*, New Delhi, 24 March 1967. "Official Israeli Government figures show that in 1964 Pakistan exported to Israel goods [mainly jute] worth \$66,000 and in 1965 this figure went up to \$68,000. While Pakistan is one-fifth India's size these figures are nearly one-half of India's exports—\$157,000 in 1963, \$154,000 in 1964 and \$146,000 in 1965. In the first half of 1964 Pakistan also imported goods worth \$25,000 from Israel."

In other words, the spirit of the foreign policy of Pakistan was not even ideological. It was purely anti-Indian. The reason why Ayub Khan had refused to support the Palestinian issue or the case of Algeria was Nasser's refusal to agree to any mention of Kashmir in the joint communique. In no other case has the exposure of Pakistan foreign policy been so complete. Once the ideological skin was peeled off, as in this case, no ground was left for that policy to claim special consideration at the hands of other Muslim countries. Pakistan repudiated its own slogan of Islamic unity which its leaders had been shouting for over a decade in pursuit of anti-Indian objectives. This inner contradiction in their policy was to torment them time and again in the years to come.

CHAPTER FOUR

Alliance with the West

MUSLIM COUNTRIES HAVING REFUSED TO WALK into its parlour, Pakistan now turned to the U.S.A. The affinity between the Western countries and Pakistan was close indeed. The motivation behind the new shift was still the negative urge against India. Pakistan sought to strengthen itself against India with American support. In this, as in earlier manoeuvres vis-a-vis the Muslim countries, the initiative came from Pakistan. In February 1954, Pakistan made a formal request for American military aid and support on the plea that the demands for adequate defence were becoming heavy, imposing an increasing strain on its economy.¹

As a matter of fact, the Pakistan Army, not the Government of Pakistan, had begun soundings in the Pentagon as early as 1952. President Ayub Khan, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, instructed the new Military Attaché to Washington, Major-General M.G. Jilani, to explore the possibilities of a military alliance with the United States. This was done apparently with a minimum of Cabinet direction. In October 1953, Ayub Khan visited the United States, once more without significant evidence of his government's support. In fact, the Government of Pakistan "had not corresponded with the State Department at all about it."² Apparently, in support of military policy, states a writer, irrespective of formal Cabinet leadership, Ghulam Mohammed

¹Khurshid Hasan, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 51.

²Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, *My Chief*, Lahore, 1960, p. 75.

followed Ayub Khan to Washington to request military aid from the United States.³

The United States insisted on an alliance between Turkey and Pakistan both of which Washington regarded as constituting the two pivots upon which a viable Middle East alliance closely integrated with NATO could be constructed. Once Pakistan and Turkey which flanked the approaches from the Soviet Caucasus to the oil fields of West Asia were brought together by an alliance, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia which produced oil would be tempted to join them. Moreover, in Washington's reckoning "a tie up between Pakistan and Turkey would fully establish Pakistan's qualifications as a recipient of American military aid, since Turkey was already participating fully in the free world defence arrangements through its membership of NATO."⁴

Pakistan was not slow to act, and signed in April 1954 an "Agreement for Friendly Cooperation" with Turkey. The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States followed in May of that year. One thing led to another. Pakistan became a member of SEATO and, in the following year, of the Baghdad Pact subsequently designated CENTO. Finally, to complete the network of joint treaties with the United States, Pakistan signed a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the U.S.A. in March 1959. The aid which flowed into Pakistan under these agreements was on grant or gift basis, though it took various forms. Asked about CENTO and SEATO at the National Press Club in Washington, Ayub Khan said that Pakistan had "not joined them because it was forced to, neither did it join them with its eyes

³Wayne Ayres Wilcox, "The Pakistan Coup d'etat of 1958," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1965.

"In June 1954, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan was in Washington to assure the United States that Pakistan would cooperate fully in creating a South East Asia Defence Organisation. To gain admission into the proposed pact, Pakistan did its best to impress upon the Western Powers that the threat of a Communist attack on its territory was not remote and that it was faced with a Communist subversion in East Pakistan." (Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China," *Policies Toward China*, edited by A.M. Halpern, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1965, p. 232.)

⁴Stebbin, *The United States in World Affairs*, 1954, New York, 1956, p. 323.

shut." Pakistan joined them "in order to be able to enhance its security."⁵

Neither Pakistan nor the U.S.A. has disclosed the quantum of military aid received by Pakistan except in general and sometimes misleading terms. In the early years it was even suggested that the quantum was small. This was probably done to allay fears in India. According to one Pakistan writer, the amount of military aid ran at approximately \$80 million to \$90 million a year.⁶ However, the same writer discloses that, in 1957 alone, aid given to Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand under SEATO amounted to \$700 million which was provided principally by the United States.⁷ Presumably, the lion's share of this amount went to Pakistan. Even if it was divided equally among the three, the total aid received by Pakistan in 1957 would at least be \$200 million, excluding the assistance it received under CENTO. This figure excludes expenditure incurred by the U.S. defence forces in Pakistan, e.g. on the communications bases near Peshawar and in Gilgit and elsewhere. It also makes no allowance for expenditure, under civil heads, undertaken to build, improve, or extend strategic roads, bridges, airfields, docks, and dockyards. A U.S. provision for runways and development of the Pakistan coastline, made some years ago, was obviously intended to support the Pakistan Navy. In other words, aid of this type might be shown under projects which on surface view may appear to have nothing to do with the armed forces, but which, in reality, would be intended for military purposes.

In 1957, according to the President of Pakistan, the U.S. military aid amounted to 40 per cent of the Pakistan budget. He did not explain whether this was 40 per cent of the revenue budget or of revenue and capital together. A year later when opposition parties began to criticize the government for being tied to the apron-strings of the U.S.A., James M. Langley, then U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, disclosed that the amount of economic aid to Pakistan was twice per capita as compared to all the aids

⁵ *Tribune*, 15 July 1961.

⁶ Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security*, p. 106.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

and loans given by the U.S. to India, that economic and military aid to Pakistan worked out to four times per capita the aid and loans the U.S. had given to India.⁸ According to Langley, the U.S. military aid to Pakistan was equal to the U.S. economic aid to Pakistan. On this basis, the U.S. military aid to Pakistan for the period 1954-58 came to \$668 million. This could not possibly have included the aid given to Pakistan under CENTO and SEATO programmes and the expenditure of the American armed forces in Pakistan. Langley was, thus, not giving an exact proportion of economic and military aid given by the U.S. to Pakistan—for that would have meant a breach of security—but a rough proportion which was, obviously, limited to one category of American military aid, and was an underestimate though adequate for his argument designed to show the extent to which the U.S.A. had helped Pakistan in the economic and military fields.

The figures of economic aid, released by the U.S. Embassy in Karachi on 1 July 1961, to mark ten years of mutual cooperation with Pakistan, showed American economic assistance in the previous decade on a per capita basis being \$15 as against \$6.20 per capita for India over the same period. Excluding military aid, the total economic and technical assistance and grants and loans from the U.S.A. to Pakistan on 30 June 1961 came to about \$1.5 billion. If Langley's formula still held good, Pakistan had received during the same decade at least \$1.5 billion in the form of U.S. military aid. In the following year, Howard R. Cottan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and South Asian Affairs, gave the following information to the Congress: "Per capita aid to India has amounted to about \$7.5, whereas to Pakistan it is \$15 per capita in economic aid alone, twice as much. Pakistan has also had a Military Aid Programme which is more or less equivalent. So it is roughly four times as large for Pakistan if you count in military programme as well as the aid programme."⁹ The U.S. economic aid to Pakistan up to the end of March 1961 was roughly of the order of \$1,435 million. This meant that, according to the State Department, Pakistan

⁸*Pakistan Sentinel*, 8 May 1958.

⁹*Pakistan Observer*, 12 April 1962.

had apparently received a similar amount under U.S. Military Aid Programme, or on the average \$250 million a year. This was confirmed by no less an authority than the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who reminded Pakistan early in 1963 that military aid programme alone had run well over \$1.3 billion, exclusive of defence support and economic assistance.

All these figures even though officially revealed are bound to be underestimates, for the simple reason that there are so many ways of disguising military aid as economic assistance, apart from non-availability of details of expenditure incurred by the Pentagon under its own appropriations in Pakistan. An unofficial estimate given in 1963 put military aid at over \$2.5 billion. "The \$5 billion in military and economic aid to Pakistan is only part of the story. The latest available figures including 1962 show that Pakistan has received a total of \$1854 million in economic aid.... The amount of military aid is classified. It could be definitely stated, however, that it is in excess of \$2.5 billion. In addition to these sums, Pakistan also has received well over \$1.5 billion in surplus debts under the various titles of Public Law 480."¹⁰

It is thus clear that, whatever the Pakistan leaders might say, the quantum of military aid which their country has received from the U.S.A. can only be described as massive in relation to Pakistan's size and requirements. All this aid is an outright gift. The quantum of this aid is also indicated by the many directions in which Pakistan's military strength has been developed. An extensive programme of communications including roads, railways, and a radar warning network was put through. Existing airports and aerodromes were improved and new airfields constructed. New cantonments, like the one at Kharian, were built. The port of Ormara was developed. The U.S. set up its communications bases near Peshawar and in the northern territories of Kashmir under Pakistan's unlawful occupation. The United States supplied Patton tanks, F-86 jet fighters, and subsequently F-104 fighter

¹⁰Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott (in a despatch from Washington), *Mancichi Daily News*, Tokyo, 17 September 1963.

aircraft¹¹ as well as air-to-air missiles, ground-to-air missiles and other sophisticated weapons. From the United Kingdom, Pakistan received ships and naval equipment on loan. Five and a half divisions of its army were reorganized and equipped on the American system. One of the problems on which CENTO powers concentrated was subversion and infiltration, and this would explain the massive scale on which Pakistan was able to organize and deploy infiltration across the cease-fire line into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965. A great variety of American military weapons and equipment were supplied. "Pakistan is being furnished," wrote Harold A. Hovey, "equipment and material consisting of, though not limited to, naval ships and equipment, jet aircraft, trucks, tanks, electronic including radar equipment, artillery, ammunition, spares, technical publications and training aids, construction programmes have improved airfields and provided supply depots, maintenance shops, barracks, and communication facilities have been improved."¹² Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate described the original programme as a "very large military programme."¹³

The transformation of the military scene in Pakistan warmed the heart of its government. As General Ayub Khan, then C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, put it: "The American Government committed itself to balancing our Army. The American commitment was to give the Pakistan Army means to create certain units that would balance certain divisions. This programme has now geared in. A certain number of divisions have been allowed to be balanced. But there is enough manpower in the Army to balance and to double the number of divisions."¹⁴ On

¹¹The Pakistan President made light of the supply of F-104 fighter aircraft and air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles to Pakistan by asserting that F-104 were not different from ordinary fighter aircraft and were being used by air forces all over the world. "Similarly there was nothing in the missiles to frighten anybody." (See *Statesman*, 21 July 1961.) He conveniently ignored the fact that his neighbour India had no such weapons.

¹²Harold A. Hovey, *U.S. Military Assistance*, New York, 1965, p. 99.

¹³Venkataramani and Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan," *International Studies*, July-October 1966, p. 102.

¹⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 16 December 1956.

30 January 1957, he said: "We are no more short of men and material."¹⁵ The Prime Minister of Pakistan was even more emphatic. "We have probably the finest Army on this side of the continent," he said on 26 February 1957. "We have such brave people behind us that I can with confidence say that we can challenge any Army in any part of the world." Equipped largely by the U.S., the Pakistan Army was "rated the best fighting force east of Suez."¹⁶ A series of exercises were held in the SEATO and CENTO areas and in Pakistan, some of them envisaging the use of tactical atomic weapons.¹⁷

In seeking and accepting the U.S. military aid, Pakistan tried to be all things to all countries. It was stated that the aid was not directed against any country. The Prime Minister of Pakistan said in 1954:

Hitherto, Pakistan has striven to build up her defences with her own unaided resources. But under rapidly changing requirements of modern warfare, the demands of adequate defence are becoming progressively heavy and are imposing an increasingly burdensome strain on the country's economy. In consequence, the development of the country's resources has, to a considerable degree, had to be sacrificed to the primary need of building up its defences. Assured thus of the adequacy of its defence for safeguarding its security and preserving its independence, Pakistan will be able to devote its resources increasingly to the development of its human and material wealth, so as to achieve greater economic stability and prosperity. It must be emphasised that the decision to obtain military aid from the United States is not aimed against any country whatsoever. Pakistan has never entertained, and does not entertain, any aggressive intentions.¹⁸

The intention expressed in the last sentence rang with hollow piety. Pakistan had already committed aggression in Kashmir

¹⁵Dawn, Karachi, 31 January 1957.

¹⁶Eli Abel, *New York Times* (Magazine Section), 30 November 1958.

¹⁷Dawn, Karachi, 16 December 1956.

¹⁸Mohammed Ali Bogra. (*Dawn*, Karachi, 26 February 1954.)

in 1947 and 1948 and was to commit aggression again in 1965 in Kutch and in Kashmir. Nevertheless here was an emphatic declaration that the U.S. military aid was not directed against any country. Pakistan assumed several postures to suit the audience and circumstances in view, but with an eye on India all the time. For more than a decade the foreign policy of Pakistan had a strong anti-communist flavour. A well-known writer of Pakistan throws some light on the motives and thinking of Pakistan's leaders:

It is very doubtful whether Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or any other Pakistan statesman ever contemplated that his country should have a pact or an alliance with the Soviet Union. For one thing, past experience showed that non-communist countries that have had such arrangements with the Soviet Union have ultimately had to change their political and economic systems and to adopt communism. They have also had to make themselves wholly and completely subservient to Russia in matters of foreign policy. Superficially there is a similarity between communism and the Pakistan ideology of Islam, which is opposed to the accumulation of wealth. But fundamentally there is a divergence between the two. Islam is theistic and individualistic, while communism is atheistic and takes no account of the personality or the rights of the individual. Clearly Pakistanis would not have been willing to sacrifice either their ideology or the essence of their sovereignty.¹⁹

The revelation of Pakistan's inmost intentions took time. Disclaiming that the acceptance of American military aid made it obligatory for Pakistan to take sides with the United States in the event of a war, Zafrullah Khan observed that the possibility of remaining neutral did not depend merely upon the desire of a people or a government. "Left to themselves, no people or government would wish to invite the miseries and horrors of war to their areas. Should, however, a conflict between the great powers become unavoidable, the choice of neutrality might become an

¹⁹K. Sarwar Hasan, *The Strategic Interests of Pakistan*, International Affairs, Karachi, 1954, pp. 2-3.

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illusion."²⁰ Gradually this cautious attitude was abandoned and Pakistan leaders became more outspoken. In 1957, Suhrawardy, then Prime Minister, declared in Los Angeles on 16 July: "We have thrown in our lot with you. We are very gravely apprehensive of communist domination, infiltration and aggression.... We consider that the peace of the world really is in your hands. Your outlook and your regard for humanity, independence, the honour and dignity of the individual are in keeping with the basic concepts of moral principles. We have no difficulty in cooperating with you in helping keep the world safe from communist aggression so that man's soul should not be repressed and he should not be turned into a machine."²¹

'Any idea of co-existence with communist countries was out of the question. "People talk about co-existence with Russia today," said Ayub Khan. "I maintain that co-existence is not possible; because the circumstances on which co-existence is based do not exist.... If communism were to prevail in our part of the world, we should have the status of a satellite. The Russians have different treatment for different countries. If the bulk of the country is large like China, it is treated as equal. Maybe if India is to become communist, she would be treated as equal because of bulk; but we would be just ground away."²² Thus communist countries were treated as a threat to the peace of the world, and Pakistan, acknowledging its obligations under the U.S. military aid agreement and CENTO and SEATO of which it was a member, expressed its determination to stand by the U.S.A. in resisting it.

In December 1960, President Ayub Khan and the Philippine President Carlos Garcia pledged their countries to strengthen SEATO politically and economically to meet the threat of communism in the cold war.²³ In Tokyo, he was more specific and categorical. Referring to developments in Laos, he said

²⁰Quoted in K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations*, Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1954, p. 61.

²¹Dawn, Karachi, 18 July 1957.

²²American Review, July 1958.

²³Dawn, Karachi, 13 December 1960.

that Pakistan was a member of SEATO and "if Pakistan is called upon to shoulder its burden and responsibility we will never hesitate to do it."²⁴ Here was a definite commitment to fight a communist power in Laos, if a decision to that effect was taken by SEATO members. As events showed, the Pakistan Prime Minister's statement that the U.S. military aid was not directed against any power made no sense. Unless these declarations were false and hypocritical and were made merely to seduce American ears, the military aid was obviously intended against the Soviet Union and China. Dealing with communism in the course of his address to a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives in Washington on 12 July 1961, Ayub Khan had said: "Heaven forbid, if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia where you will be able to put your foot in. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan—provided you are also prepared to stand by them."²⁵ An Asian Goliath, offering refuge to the world's most powerful country! So self-assured and yet so scared of India, a country which by no stretch of imagination could be described as a military power! However, the gateway to haven of security was not open to American entry in all circumstances or at all times. For the first time an attempt was made to attach a condition to Pakistan's obligations under the U.S. military aid agreement—America was required to stand by Pakistan, presumably in the latter's wars of religion upon India.

Nevertheless, the threat of communism was emphasized, sometimes, rather clownishly, for tactical purposes. "But may I say," Ayub Khan warned American Congressmen, "that we are pressing you as friends. If we make good I think you will in some fashion get it back—in many ways you will get it back. If we don't make good and, heaven forbid, go under communism, then we will still press against you, but not as friends."²⁶ But this Asian Goliath had earlier offered asylum to the U.S.A. against the communist menace! Ayub Khan did not stop there. He told American businessmen: "I fear we have about 15 to 20 years to make the

²⁴Dawn, Karachi, 15 December 1960.

²⁵Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 July 1961.

²⁶Ibid.

grade. If we can't support ourselves by that time we are bound to be overwhelmed by communism. There is no come-back after that, and everybody, you and we, would be the loser."²⁷ Evidently he had forgotten something. Had he not told the U.S. Congress that, in such an eventuality, far from being the loser, he would press against the U.S.A. not as a friend but as an ally of a communist power?

Were Pakistan leaders playing a hoax on the Western countries or were they sincere? None other than Foreign Minister Bhutto stated in the Security Council on 7 February 1964: "We are allies, we are committed in two defence alliances with our friends and we stand by those commitments and alliances.... We are willing perhaps to face nuclear annihilation for a common cause and common destiny and common values."²⁸ Here was a sacrificial lamb ready to face nuclear holocaust with a stout heart in discharge of duty to its allies!

When Pakistan accepted the U.S. military aid, Western policies were directed principally against communist countries. The view that Pakistan's membership of Western military alliances and acceptance of the U.S. military aid were directed against communist powers is reinforced by the manner in which Pakistan supported Western policies in the United Nations and outside. In the U.N. General Assembly and the Assembly's First (Political) and Special Political Committees, out of a total of 258 occasions when division was caused between 1952 and 1962, Pakistan voted with the Western powers 165 times. A writer, devoted to Pakistan's cause, states that Pakistan had "a warmth of friendliness for Britain."²⁹ This leaning towards the West—going back to Jinnah's time—was indeed re-emphasized in 1950 when Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, went to the extent of evading an invitation to visit Moscow. This policy continued during Khawja Nazimuddin's Prime Ministership.³⁰ Between 1954 and 1960, Pakistan followed a policy of "unqualified alignment" with the United States,³¹

²⁷*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 15 July 1961.

²⁸*Security Council Provisional Record*, S/PPV. 1089, p. 46.

²⁹Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1963, p. 215.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 219.

³¹Khurshid Hasan, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 55.

which is borne out by Pakistan's voting record in the United Nations. Pakistan voted with the West on all important issues. Particularly significant in this context is the change in Pakistan's position on the representation of communist China. Before its alignment with the United States, Pakistan voted in favour of communist China's representation in the United Nations. It reversed its stand after 1954 and voted, instead, for the U.S.-sponsored resolutions to defer consideration of the matter.³² The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Manzoor Qadir, declared that alliance with the West was the sheet-anchor of the foreign policy of Pakistan and that it considered its alignments as guarantees of its sovereignty.³³ At a New York luncheon in October 1962, Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali extolled Pakistan's "alliances with like-minded relations."³⁴

The Soviet Union and China reacted to these developments in varying degrees. In November 1953, Moscow sent a note of protest to Karachi, asking for clarification of Pakistan-America negotiations about military collaboration and American air bases in Pakistan. Another Soviet note to Karachi in March 1954 described the military aid agreement between Pakistan and the U.S. as an unfriendly act. When Pakistan and Turkey signed a military aid agreement, the nucleus for the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Union lodged another protest.³⁵ "We do not like the Baghdad Pact at all," said Khrushchev in Srinagar on 9 December 1955, "the most active participant of which is Pakistan." The Soviet note of April 1958 complained of Pakistan being a member of military-political alliances such as CENTO and SEATO, hostile to the U.S.S.R. It complained against the construction of launching grounds for guided missiles and rockets, military installations and runways for landing modern bombers of strategic aviation and remarked that, since Pakistan did not possess these weapons, the facilities would be used by the

³²*Ibid.*, p. 55.

³³*Dawn*, Karachi, 12 March 1960.

³⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 20 October 1962.

³⁵Werner Levi, *Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China in Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1962.

U.S.A. and other allies of Pakistan. It also charged Pakistan with having asked at the CENTO meeting in Ankara for the arming of the treaty countries with atomic and rocket weapons. Finally, the note gave a warning, in view of the geographical proximity of Pakistan to the Soviet borders and the interests of Soviet security, of "grave consequences which will inevitably await Pakistan if its territory will be allowed for the establishment of military bases with the purpose of using them against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries."³⁶

In an aide-memoire addressed to the Pakistan Government in December 1958, the Soviet Union expressed concern over the negotiations for a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the U.S.A. Finally, in May 1960 the flight of the United States U-2 aircraft, which had taken off from an air base near Peshawar in Pakistan on its mission of espionage over the Soviet Union, led to another Soviet protest. The Soviets accused Pakistan of lending its territory for carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union and warned Pakistan that it had the "means to render harmless" bases used for such purposes.³⁷ A spokesman of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. was rather outspoken with a Pakistani on the subject: He said to the latter: "You are a member of CENTO and SEATO which are like daggers pointed at us. You allow spy planes to fly from your territories over our country. You have allowed Americans to erect missile launching pads in Pakistan. You are installing American equipment to listen in to our internal military signals and tape record them. You want an American Commander to be appointed to lead a joint CENTO army."³⁸

These and other facts leave little room for doubt that the Soviet Union considered the military aid agreement between Pakistan and the U.S. and Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO a threat to its security. The assertion of the Pakistan Prime Minister that the military alliance between Pakistan and the

³⁶*Pakistan Seeks Security*, pp. 38-9.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 40.

³⁸To *Dawn's* correspondent in New York. Quoted in an editorial in *Dawn*, 8 May 1962.

U.S. was not directed against any country was deceptive and had no basis in fact.

Peking's reaction was also critical. The Chinese Government and its newspapers "did lash out against the SEATO as 'aggressive' and 'hostile' to China."³⁹ According to Chou En-lai, SEATO had been established "for the sole purpose of obtaining manpower and ensuring the setting up of new military springboards and bases."⁴⁰ In 1958, Chinese diplomats complained about Prime Minister Suhrawardy's anti-communist foreign policy.⁴¹ Subsequently, China's official organs, such as the *People's Daily* and the *Peking Review*, criticized Pakistan policies, particularly the existence of American missile and naval bases in Pakistan under the cover of SEATO and CENTO.⁴² In 1959, China protested to Pakistan for having shown courtesies to a mission of Muslims from Taiwan which had arrived in Karachi en route to Mecca for the Haj. The *Peking Review*, as a Pakistan writer says, used strong language to castigate Pakistan for receiving the Haj mission and for denouncing the Chinese action in Tibet. The Chinese Government also lodged a further protest in July 1959 with the Pakistan Embassy in Peking.⁴³

China did not like President Ayub Khan's suggestion to India for joint defence of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and asked Pakistan to indicate against whom this joint defence was intended to be organized. Manzur Qadir, the Foreign Minister, repeatedly expressed in April 1959 his misgivings and fear about communist expansionism and urged other Asian countries to join collective security arrangements.⁴⁴

Thus, China too regarded Pakistan's military alliances with Western countries as directed against its security. There was, however, a difference in that the Pakistan Prime Minister took the initiative to explain to Premier Chou En-lai in Bandung in 1955

³⁹*Pakistan Seeks Security*, p. 77.

⁴⁰G.M. Cohen, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 1955*, Cornell University Press, p. 63.

⁴¹Q. Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China," *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 83.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 85. ⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Pakistan Seeks Security*, p. 43.

that Pakistan had not joined the military pacts or received the U.S. military aid with any aggressive designs against China. In an effort to pin him down, Premier Chou En-lai said in his speech to the Political Committee of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung on 23 April 1955:

He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China.... The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the U.S. should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the U.S. launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it.... I am grateful to him for this explanation, because through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding.⁴⁵

Eight years later, on 10 April 1963, in a statement to the Associated Press of Pakistan, Premier Chou En-lai said that the leaders of Pakistan had assured him in 1954 that Pakistan had joined the Western military alliances (CENTO and SEATO) only to gain political and military ascendancy over India and that "Pakistan had no other motivation in joining the pacts."⁴⁶ The veil was, thus, cast off Pakistan's duplicity. This revelation has not been denied by Pakistan authorities.

In his statement to the Political Committee in Bandung, Chou En-lai had made no mention of any assurance of this kind having been given to him by Pakistan in 1954. Had such an assurance been given, there would have been no need for his statement to the Committee in 1955. The fact that Chou En-lai went out of his way to refer to the subject showed that the matter had been brought up for the first time by the Pakistan Prime Minister, and by making public the "explanations" he had received from Mohammad Ali, Chou En-lai pinned down Pakistan to a position in the Afro-Asian community from which it could not resile. Chou En-lai also availed himself of the occasion to ridicule Western

⁴⁵G. M. Cohen, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 1955*, Cornell University Press, pp. 57-8.

⁴⁶According to Rushbrook Williams, in *State of Pakistan*, the Pakistan Government secretly gave an assurance to the Chinese rulers that "Pakistan's participation in CENTO and SEATO would not prejudice Pakistan's friendship for the People's Republic of China."

military pacts a member of which while professing abiding loyalty to its allies was actually, in breach of faith, seeking to win the confidence of a power against which the pacts were directed. Besides, by making Mohammad Ali's assurance public, Chou En-lai tried to cause some embarrassment to Pakistan which, since the signing of the military pacts, had become a dutiful supporter of Western policies in the U.N. General Assembly, including the policy of keeping China out of the United Nations.

Whatever the explanations Pakistan may have given to China, the Soviet and Chinese protests to its government against its military alliances and the remarkable change in the voting behaviour of its delegation in the United Nations showed that the alliances were directed against the U.S.S.R. and China and that they as well as Pakistan so regarded them. It is significant that prior to the Bandung Conference there is no official statement by the Pakistan Government anticipating what Chou En-lai said in Bandung. More of this later.

Another country against which the U.S. military aid and alliances were directed, at least so far as official declarations in Pakistan are concerned, was India. Asked if a military agreement with the U.S. would not make a settlement of the Kashmir problem more difficult, Mohammed Ali Bogra, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said: "Yes, at first. But again I am convinced that ultimately it would make a settlement easier. At present we can't get a settlement mainly because India has greater military strength and Nehru is not much interested in a fair settlement. When there is more equality of military strength, then I am sure that there will be a greater chance of settlement."⁴⁷ Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, another Prime Minister of Pakistan, had said that the "hope of resolving the Kashmir tangle to Pakistan's satisfaction through the acquisition of military strength by joining Baghdad and SEATO pacts is the very *raison d'être* for Pakistan to remain a member of these pacts."⁴⁸ Suhrawardy, another Prime Minister of Pakistan, was no less unequivocal. Pakistan, he said, would "continue to seek alliances, military and otherwise, as long as there is remote

⁴⁷U.S. *News and World Report*, 15 January 1954.

⁴⁸*Times of India*, 22 April 1956.

'danger from India to the country's safety and territorial integrity.' Defending the Baghdad Pact, he remarked: "Even if there is a five per cent chance of attack from India, I must be strong enough to see that that chance should be zero chance."⁴⁹

Obviously, Pakistan objective was to dictate terms of a settlement on Kashmir to India from a position of strength. Speaking in the foreign affairs debate in the Pakistan National Assembly on 26 March 1956, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said: "The most notable achievement of the SEATO is the joint reaffirmation by the members of our stand on Kashmir."⁵⁰ Another Foreign Minister said at a public meeting in Lahore on 20 October 1956 that "a powerful neighbouring country which was inimical to Pakistan had in fact forced us to seek friendship elsewhere." "That country," he went on, "has great differences with this country and the two Pacts have enabled Pakistan to ensure its defence against aggression."⁵¹ The next day he confirmed that the country he had in mind was India. On another occasion he said: "Pakistan will not agree to commit suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact which is our defence against India."⁵² Time was to show that Western military aid to Pakistan resulted only in encouraging Pakistan to commit further aggression on India.

These statements were made, and more were to be made in subsequent years, in defiance of public assurances given to India by the President of the United States and its Secretary of State that the U.S. military aid to Pakistan was not intended to be used against India and that should it be so used the U.S. would come to the aid of India against Pakistan. The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee had to warn Pakistan in 1961 that military assistance "has never been given to Pakistan for defence against possible attack from India."⁵³ These assurances were repeated in subsequent years, only to be ignored when the occasion for their fulfilment arose in 1965.

⁴⁹*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 4 December 1956.

⁵⁰*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 March 1956.

⁵¹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 21 October 1956.

⁵²*Tribune*, Ambala, 8 December 1956.

⁵³*Times of India*, 12 June 1961.

Thus, the Pakistan Prime Minister's statement of 1954 about the military alliance with the U.S. not being directed against any country was palpably false. So far as the United States and Pakistan were concerned, it was directed against the Soviet Union and China, and in so far as Pakistan alone was concerned, against India. Ostensibly intended "to strengthen peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations," the pacts and the accompanying arms created highly surcharged nuclei of tension in West Asia and South and South-East Asia. Pakistan subscribed not to a doctrine of peace but to one of hatred, hatred of India, which had its roots in the two-nation theory. In this respect, Pakistan was completely opposed to modern Islam with its emphasis on peace among mankind and a socialist way of life for its followers. As Ayub Khan said, Pakistan had not joined CENTO and SEATO because it was forced to; neither did it join them with its eyes shut. Pakistan joined them in order to be able to enhance its security.⁵⁴ To enhance its security, as the pacts have shown, not by loyalty to its allies, but by playing one military camp against another, claiming to belong to one or both or neither as the situation demands, the only common factor of antagonism in its calculations being India.

⁵⁴"Tribune, Ambala, 15 July 1961.

CHAPTER FIVE

Joint Defence of the Subcontinent

CHINESE SEIZURE OF TIBET IN 1959 AND THE flight of Dalai Lama to India created a situation which Pakistan was quick to exploit. Here was a possibility of a threat to the sub-continent which, if it materialized, might bring India and Pakistan face to face with a new and formidable giant across the Himalayas.

The Pakistan President had already given expression to his view that the subcontinent had been repeatedly invaded in its history and that internal dissensions had led its governments to be defeated in detail.¹ In case of external aggression, he said on 24 April 1959, both Pakistan and India should come together to defend the subcontinent, adding that, following the Chinese take-over of Tibet, India should change its attitude towards Pakistan.² Taking his stand on his knowledge of military science and strategy, Ayub Khan began to unfold his proposal for joint defence. "Events and developments on the Tibet border and Afghanistan," he said, "would make the subcontinent militarily vulnerable in about five years. This is to say that facilities have been created on either flank of the sub-continent whereby a major invasion could take place. The situation demands that both countries must take note of the facts."³ Two months later, he referred to the possibility of a concerted move by Russia and China. Russia would move across West Pakistan down to the sea and China towards the Malay

¹Foreign Affairs Quarterly, June 1960.

²Pakistan Times, Lahore, 25 April 1959.

³23 October 1959. (See Pakistan Times, Lahore, 24 October 1959.)

peninsula. Not only Pakistan but the entire Indian Ocean littoral would be exposed. Air bases being built in Tibet at great speed could be used to intimidate the subcontinent, although their other uses were not quite apparent.⁴

He warned India against the "inexorable push" of the North. "As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the North in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and disengage our forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that whenever this sub-continent was divided someone or the other invited an outsider to step in."⁵

The threat could not be overlooked by wishful thinking,⁶ he argued, and concluded that India could not be defended without the help of Pakistan.⁷ This was another way of saying that, geographically the subcontinent being one, its defence could not be divided. From this analysis, certain conclusions followed irresistibly. The threat to the subcontinent was from the Soviet Union and China, the former through Afghanistan, the latter through Malay. The Himalayas were no longer an effective barrier to a Chinese invasion. India alone would not be able to meet such a challenge; this was equally true of Pakistan—a country in two parts, one separated from the other by a thousand miles of Indian territory, and because of its comparatively small size incapable of defence in depth. If that was so, every other issue affecting the two countries would be of trivial consequence in relation to the dictates of security and survival.

It soon became apparent that this was not what Pakistan meant. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Manzur Qadir, said in Canberra

⁴Morning News, 21 December 1959.

⁵Foreign Affairs Quarterly, June 1960.

⁶Interview to Tehran's *Kahyan International*. (Reprinted in Morning News, 9 November 1959.)

⁷Press conference in Karachi. (*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 18 May 1960.)

that the Tibetan revolt might force India to revise its neutralist policy and draw it closer to Pakistan. There was little concern in Pakistan for the plight of Tibet, and Manzur Qadir was striking a point to reinforce his President's thesis. Nehru was realist enough to recognize that the Tibetan authorities, engrossed as they were in their internal wrangles, had thrown away their one opportunity of safeguarding the independent entity of their country in 1949-50. He was a big enough humanist to extend asylum and hospitality to the Dalai Lama and his followers even at the risk of incurring Chinese displeasure and hostility. But it was a futile expectation that Nehru would, in all these circumstances, or worse, abandon nonalignment and take shelter in Ayub Khan's protective arms. Manzur Qadir had added: "The further it gets away from the Soviet bloc, the nearer it will come to us."⁸

It might possibly have been a Western ambition, which Pakistan set out to achieve for its allies, to bring India into the complex of alliances through the backdoor. There had been some speculation in Western circles about Pakistan serving to lure or force India into the network of their alliances and Nehru could not have been unaware of possible manoeuvres of that nature. In any case, Pakistan's implacable hostility to India's nonalignment and to the Soviet Union furnished evidence of its deep loyalty to Western military blocs of which Pakistan was a member though in Pakistan calculations its own aims would have primacy. Bhutto, a Minister in Ayub Khan's government, said in Peshawar on 26 April 1959 that, while Pakistan would welcome joint defence against external aggression from any quarter, such a thing would be possible only when problems like Kashmir and the Canal Waters were settled.⁹ At the same time Pakistan spokesmen saw in the situation an admirable opportunity for not only countering criticism in the U.S. Senate of U.S. military aid to Pakistan but also for justifying greater military assistance to Pakistan if India

⁸13 April 1959. (See *Dawn*, 14 April 1959.)

Commenting on this *Al Wahda* (Damascus), 15 April 1959, writes: "The factor that will bring India and Pakistan closer does not lie in the reconsideration by India of her policy of neutrality but lies in Pakistan's subservience to the Western Powers and in her participation in military pacts."

⁹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 27 April 1959.

refused the defence proposal. It was argued that disclosure of the proposal, and its rejection by India, would aggravate China's suspicion and hostility towards Pakistan and substantially increase the threat to the country's security from that quarter.

Outwardly the statements on joint defence appeared to be moved by a spirit of good neighbourliness towards India in the latter's growing difficulties with China. The real objective was a settlement of the Kashmir problem on Pakistan terms. India, said the President of Pakistan, would be in a far better state to face China if Nehru's attitude towards Kashmir could be changed.¹⁰ Further, India would have to support Pakistan in its dispute with Afghanistan on the Pakhtoonistan issue: how else would the two together deal with threats to the subcontinent through Afghanistan? India would thus be called upon, in Pakistan calculations, to give up its policy of nonalignment, hand over Kashmir to Pakistan, and enter into an alliance with Pakistan against Afghanistan. The fruits of joint defence, if any, would accrue to India after India had done all that. The proposal was a sham and a fraud. It was intended not to put Indo-Pakistan relations on a firm basis of friendship and understanding but to take advantage of what Pakistan believed to be a weak position in which India found itself. This was soon to become clear.

On 10 May 1959, Ayub Khan threw further light on his proposal. It did not mean a special type of pact, he said. "But the prerequisite to such a pact is the solution of big problems like Kashmir and the Canal Waters. Once these are resolved, we will look forward to this proposal."¹¹ In other words, the proposal could wait, in spite of the urgency emphasized earlier, until the Kashmir problem was solved. This was Ayub's reply to Nehru's statement in the Rajya Sabha, on 4 May 1959, that India was not going to tie itself up with other countries in military defence.

By this time many critics in India had brought up Nehru's old offer of no-war declaration as being as good as joint defence, and perhaps even better. "Why talk of war? Why not settle our

¹⁰Interview to *Reynold's News*. (Reprinted in *Dawn*, Karachi, 21 December 1959.)

¹¹*Dawn*, Karachi, 11 May 1959.

differences and talk of peace?" countered Ayub Khan in Karachi on 3 November 1959.¹² Once the outstanding differences were settled, he said, there would be no question of war, the two countries would be friends. He further observed that the establishment of friendly relations with Pakistan on a sure footing would be a source of greater confidence to India than the signing of a no-war declaration. Not joint defence but a settlement of differences including those over Kashmir to the satisfaction of Pakistan was, thus, held out to be of greater value to India than to Pakistan. A week later, he said in Tehran that Pakistan considered war as irrelevant and believed that it was not the medium to solve disputes.¹³ This was a paraphrase of the no-war declaration which India had offered and which he nevertheless continued to reject. In a number of statements, he commented on the futility of India spending the best part of its revenues on defence. As time passed, it became clear that the proposal for joint defence was not intended so much against a common threat to the two countries, as a device to keep the Kashmir issue in the limelight. To a question, in a B.B.C. television interview on 25 January 1960, about the reality of military threat from China, Ayub Khan replied that there was no great danger immediately.¹⁴

The fact of the matter is that the joint defence proposal was only a ruse by which Pakistan hoped to gain its territorial objectives in Kashmir. "When I talk of mutual defence, I mean the solution of problems between us," Ayub Khan had said on another occasion.¹⁵ The official policy was stated more clearly by the *Pakistani Times* in an editorial on 23 December 1959:

Over a month ago, on the eve of his departure for Iran, he [President Ayub Khan] had stated in an interview to a Tehran newspaper that the question of joint defence with India could be taken up after the solution of the Kashmir issue. Now he has declared categorically that no military alliance with India can be considered by Pakistan until the Kashmir issue is resolved.

¹²*Dawn*, Karachi, 4 November 1959.

¹³*Dawn*, Karachi, 10 November 1959.

¹⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 26 January 1960.

¹⁵To *Reynold's News* on 20 December 1959.

This should instantly dispel any illusion in any quarter that Pakistan's concern at the growing threat of communist aggression against the sub-continent might induce her to turn her back on the stark reality of Indian aggression on Kashmir.

Such was the duplicity attending on this proposal. It led Pakistan to absurd conclusions. "I believe that failure to solve Kashmir's problem," said Ayub Khan, "will lead both India and Pakistan to destruction. It may even result in the loss of the independence of both of them. However, we do not welcome the intervention of any country for the solving of this problem."¹⁶ In other words, Pakistan would have the world believe that the solution of the Kashmir problem was of greater importance to it than its own independence or even survival!

Nehru had said that, following a policy of nonalignment, India could not participate in joint defence with a country which was a member of CENTO and SEATO. Ayub Khan's reaction was characteristic. "We do not contend with that. I believe non-alignment means linking with neither the Communist bloc nor the other way. But we are not their rivals. Our idea is that we live in the same zone as India. The joint defence means defence of the sub-continent without any alignment with any power bloc."¹⁷ The contradiction in being a member of professedly anti-communist SEATO and CENTO pacts and at the same time remaining non-aligned vis-a-vis the socialist countries, which the President glossed over, is too obvious to require comment. The President then explained that the crux of the matter was that "our armies now facing each other should be released from this task, but look after their respective defences. This is the substance of joint defence." This suggested disengagement of forces along the Indo-Pakistan borders and the cease-fire line in Kashmir. There need not even be a covenanted pact, the President added; a mere undertaking between the two countries was enough for the purpose of defending the subcontinent.¹⁸ But this was precisely what a no-

¹⁶ *Al Ahram*, Cairo, 27 December 1959.

¹⁷ 21 January 1960. (See *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 22 January 1960.)

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

war declaration was intended to achieve, and yet the President had no use for a no-war pact or declaration.

For Pakistan the joint defence proposal was a means to an end. It was intended to rekindle the Kashmir issue to focus world interest upon it. It was a prop to be discarded when no longer needed. "Joint defence is a very desirable thing," said the President in East Pakistan on 26 January 1960, "but it is very true that it cannot come about as long as the Kashmir question is not solved, and the troops of the two countries continue to face each other across the border."¹⁹ The proposal was dropped, finally, in 1962 when the Security Council had, once again, sufficiently revived its futile interest in the Kashmir issue.*

The proposal offers a case study of motivating forces of the foreign policy of Pakistan. In retrospect, a number of noteworthy facts emerge. First, following the Chinese capture of Tibet, President Ayub Khan expressed concern about a threat to the subcontinent from the communist countries in the North, particularly China. This was in contrast with the official statements to the effect that Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO and receipt of military aid from the U.S.A. were directed not against China but India. A country which had repeatedly assured the People's Republic of China of its desire for friendly relations was now making a proposal for defence against it, when China held out no threat to Pakistan. While, on the one hand, there were the assurances given to Chou En-lai by Mohammed Ali Bogra, then Pakistan Prime Minister, about the true meaning of Pakistan partnership in SEATO there were, on the other hand, statements by President Ayub Khan warning India against the menace of Chinese aggression. Which statements were to be believed? Even Chou En-lai found it difficult to keep silent in the circumstances and felt compelled to protest against the proposal. Did Chou En-lai believe that Pakistan, which had committed a breach of faith with Western allies from which it continued to receive generous military aid, would abide by its assurances given to him? Or had he realized that Ayub Khan was no more

¹⁹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 27 January 1960.

*See author's *The Kashmir Story*, Chapter Three.

worried about the defence of India against China than he was about Western military pacts of which his country was a member? As later events revealed, either country knew well enough that the target for the manoeuvres of the other was India.

Secondly, on the basis of his oft-proclaimed knowledge of war and strategy, the President propounded the thesis of a monstrous threat hanging over the subcontinent, a threat which could be faced only by India and Pakistan together. Military history of the subcontinent, as he explained, pointed to the grave dangers posed by the partition, which split up the defence of a geographical unit with the consequent danger of defeat in detail and the danger of one of the parties inviting outside intervention to the peril of both. In practice, however, he would not entertain a non-aggression declaration which might have led to further constructive cooperation to ensure the subcontinent's security and progress. The proposal was ridiculous in the assumption that, while India needed Pakistan for its defence, India's goodwill, assistance, and cooperation were not equally indispensable to the defence of Pakistan—East and West. Did strategic and geographic facts constitute realities to be reckoned with at all times or a conjurer's implements to be used or discarded at will? President Ayub Khan's numerous statements and the consistency with which he shifted from one position to another did not show that he had much confidence in his own view of the threat to the security of the subcontinent or measures to counter them.

Thirdly, the Pakistan President made so light of his own proposal that he threw it away by making it conditional on a prior settlement of the Kashmir issue. Plainly two questions were involved—a settlement of the Kashmir problem and the security of the subcontinent from external aggression. Basically, there was no relationship between the two issues. It could not be seriously suggested that Kashmir was more important to Pakistan than the security and independence of the subcontinent, involving its own survival, apart from the fact that there were many other issues which divided the two countries. Besides, the persistence of a difference of opinion between India and Pakistan on Kashmir for nearly thirteen years preceding enunciation of the joint defence

doctrine had in no way affected their independence. It was, therefore, absurd to suggest that the unresolved Kashmir problem was a greater threat to the subcontinent than "the push of the North." Had Pakistan's survival as a sovereign State been dependent on Kashmir, Pakistan would have ceased to exist as soon as the State acceded to India.

By mixing the two issues, namely, the Kashmir issue and the survival of Pakistan as a sovereign State, Ayub Khan demonstrated that the proposal was made not in sincerity but as a tactical move. If it were accepted by India, it would enable him to bag Kashmir. In the case of its rejection by India, there would be dividends in the shape of larger military aid from the U.S.A. which would help dictate terms of a settlement to India. The armed forces of Pakistan, developed with the U.S. military aid, were not intended for deployment in Kashmir or against other parts of India but on the north-west flank of West Pakistan. "We have not enough forces to keep armies in Kashmir as well as watch the frontiers against other outside aggression," Ayub Khan warned the U.S.A. on 26 January 1960.²⁰ The squeeze was on for larger military aid from the U.S.A.!

While the President of Pakistan thus sought more arms, his Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Bhutto, chanted hymns of peace and non-violence. His government's approach to settlement of international disputes, he said, was the "Gandhian approach."²¹ Clearly the Government of Pakistan was trying to be all things to all men. In exercises of this kind, postures cannot be sustained for long. One has seldom to wait long for authentic revelations of Pakistan's true purposes. President Ayub Khan said: "When I talk of mutual defence, I mean the solution of problems between us."²² In one sweep, he flung aside all his grandiloquent statements about the push of the North, the indivisibility of defence of the subcontinent, and the urgency of preparing for a grave threat which loomed large from across the Himalayas.

The proposal for mutual defence was no more than an attempt

²⁰*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 27 January 1960.

²¹*Dawn*, Karachi, 19 January 1960.

²²To *Reynold's News* on 20 December 1959.

to inveigle India into a settlement of the Kashmir issue on Pakistan's terms. In reality, Ayub Khan had been no more interested in joint defence in 1959 than he was in 1962 when the push actually came.

If the Pakistan President was, in fact, opposed to the use of force for the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes; if he honestly regarded confrontation of troops on the opposite sides of the Indo-Pakistan frontiers as wasteful diversion of resources needed for economic development; if he was serious about the danger to the sub-continent from the North; and if he sincerely believed in closer and friendly relations between India and Pakistan, he should have accepted India's offer of no-war declaration, which would have met all these requirements, without committing either party to a military alliance.

Nehru dealt with this aspect of the matter in some detail in the Rajya Sabha on 12 February 1960. Field Marshal Ayub Khan had mentioned common defence on many occasions, he said, and almost every time with a different emphasis and in a different context. Welcoming cooperation with Pakistan "in an ever-increasing measure," he pointed out the serious difficulties with which the proposal was beset. Defence was closely allied to foreign policy on which India and Pakistan held different views. "Lately, Field Marshal Ayub Khan has pointed out more or less clearly what he means by a common defence. He means—he has said clearly—that this can come only after the Kashmir question is settled in his favour. So you will observe—I am not criticising him—that this common defence was not the real issue at all but something else—the Kashmir issue."

With the help of this proposal for joint defence, Pakistan hoped to drive India into a bargain over mutual differences, undermining India's policy of secular democracy at home and nonalignment in its relations with foreign countries. Its leaders were doing what Jinnah had done in undivided India, and were inspired by the same narrow, unrealistic, sectarian motives. Their antagonism to secularism was as fierce then as it is today. It was not a mere accident that, while opposing confederation with India, President Ayub Khan advocated a confederation of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. Neither was the meeting of Pakistan, Iran,

and Turkey in Istanbul as "non-Arab States" to devise ways and means of developing a common market an accidental one. The Arab States are secular in their outlook and approach to international problems.

With the burial of this proposal for joint defence ended an important phase in the foreign policy of Pakistan. This phase was marked by efforts to forge a special type of relationship with the Muslim States and with the Western powers. As for relations with the former, the national interest of Pakistan was defined by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan as early as 1951. He had assumed then that Islamic ideology and way of life had not been practised in any other Muslim State. Theocratic Pakistan with a strong anti-India bias was, therefore, to be the new apostle. The aim of its policies would be to develop among Muslim countries opposition and hostility to India by painting the latter as an intolerable oppressor of Muslims, by playing up every communal incident, and by other devious means. This was, obviously, no way of creating or maintaining harmonious relations with India. The policy was calculated to generate tensions, conflict, and instability when the people of India and Pakistan needed a period of peace and cooperation for social and economic reconstruction to banish hunger, want, and sickness which had haunted their lives under alien rulers. Fortunately, countries of the Arab world saw through the game which, nevertheless, achieved some limited success. Pakistan succeeded in creating misunderstandings between India and some of the Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and aggravated the differences and divisions among the Muslim countries themselves as, for example, between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia over the Yemen. It failed utterly in its aim to shake India's faith in secularism and nonalignment.

The fact that Pakistan was tied to the apron-strings of Britain was not lost upon the Arab States; and they opposed Pakistan's attempt to create a pan-Islamic bloc to serve the interests of colonial powers along with its own. The Baghdad Pact, later renamed CENTO, was directed in its conception and original aim against Arab States, particularly the U.A.R., and they did not fail to discern its meaning and purpose. Here was a

Muslim country, whose leaders missed no opportunity of talking about Muslim brotherhood, now offering itself as a tool to serve the ends of colonial powers in the newly emergent States of West Asia!

Mao Tse-tung had said: "Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road. We oppose illusion about a third road. Not only in China but throughout the world, all the people without exception, must lean on imperialism or on socialism. Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist."²³ This was, indeed, an over-simplification of the patterns of international life, and the hollowness of this doctrine was exposed by scores of Afro-Asian countries which followed an independent foreign policy without taking to either of Mao's two roads. Pakistan, however, chose to lean on imperialism in disregard of its own ideology. A Pakistan writer observed: "The heart of the matter is that Pakistan's alliances with the West cannot be supported ideologically."²⁴ This reveals a conflict between Pakistan's national interest and its national ideology. "Pakistan's foreign policy," wrote Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, "seems to be that we have not been able to resolve the dilemma whether our foreign policy should be based on ideology or on national interest. We have often intermingled the two and as a result we have been unable to have a settled foreign policy. Bismarck once said that to conduct foreign policy according to principles would mean walking along a narrow path in a forest, holding a long bar in the mouth.... A foreign policy based on ideology will be too rigid and unable to adjust itself to the rapidly changing conditions. Only national interest as the ultimate standard can give consistency and unity of objectives to different aspects of foreign policy."²⁵ The fact of the matter is that Pakistan policy was geared to nothing more positive than mere expediency to malign, misrepresent, and undermine India. It looked at the world through the eye of malice.

²³One People's Democratic Dictatorship, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953, p. 9. (Quoted in Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security*.)

²⁴Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, Karachi, p. 25.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 29-30.

If Pakistan could not carry the Muslim States in its crusade against the Indian policy of nonalignment and secularism which it held up to ridicule and scorn, it failed, equally, to carry the Western powers. In fact, Pakistan began to operate against the Western military blocs and the U.S.A., as it had done against Muslim countries, though it continued to receive military aid from them and demanded more arms to balance, as it said, economic aid which India received from the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Here again, the old element of irrationality, one of the constants in Pakistan foreign policy, was at work. According to Ayub Khan, the military pacts were more an irritant than a help, and yet he nursed the irritant. History was repeating itself. Pakistan bit the hand that fed it and reviled the very countries whose friendship it had sought for years. Western countries were prepared to give Pakistan economic and military assistance out of all proportion to its population or the needs of security, but they were not willing to be guided in their relations with India entirely by Pakistan whims.

In the circumstances, what was Pakistan to do? Wide as the world is, the number of sovereign States is limited. It was no longer easy to pick and choose, and yet Pakistan must seek new friends, even if that meant abandoning some of the old ones. So long as it considers enmity with India as the measure of its national interest, it really has no freedom of action, and its foreign policy, like a weathercock, must respond to every new wind, even if it comes from the North of which Ayub Khan had betrayed much fear.

Overtures to China

PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF FACE TO FACE WITH A number of problems of its own creation. There was Kashmir and the India bogey. There was the stalemate in the Security Council where the fear of the Soviet veto paralysed the benign initiative of Pakistan allies. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government under President Kennedy and the West generally had begun to see the merit and significance of the policy of nonalignment, which India and several other Afro-Asian countries followed.

All these and other developments must have been extremely distressing to Pakistan. Its one ambition was to malign, if not destroy, India, but events as they unfolded themselves appeared to put this ambition beyond hope of quick fulfilment. Up to 1959, the attitude of Pakistan to China was cautious and even critical. John Foster Dulles had said that the Pakistanis could be counted upon to serve as "a dependable bulwark against communism."¹ The view was shared by many American experts who had occasion to come into contact with Pakistan leaders. "We have in Pakistan a very fine, loyal, anti-communist ally,"² said Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the General Assembly, Pakistan was steadfastly voting against China's representation in the United Nations. China had not liked President Ayub Khan's proposal to India for joint defence and artfully asked Pakistan to indicate against whom joint defence was intended to be organized.³ When Chinese incursions into Ladakh were discovered

¹Quoted by Venkataramani and Arya in *International Studies*, July-October 1966, p. 88.

²The Mutual Security Act of 1956, Washington, D.C., 1956, p. 594.

³Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 43.

and India took up the matter with the Chinese Government, Ayub Khan warned India that "without our concurrence any settlement between China and India will be something we will not recognize."⁴ On 3 December 1959, the Pakistan Government addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council. Referring to the events brought about by Chinese occupation of a part of Ladakh, the letter stated: "The preservation of the international frontiers of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is . . . a matter which falls directly between the primary responsibilities of the Security Council and no Government can take any action with regard to these frontiers save in consonance with the decisions of the Security Council." The letter added that it was for the sovereign authority freely evolved by, and acceptable to, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and for that authority alone "to effect or refuse to effect any adjustment of its frontiers with any foreign power."⁵ This meant that, on Pakistan's own admission, there was a sanctity attaching to the State's established frontiers. It was indicated no less clearly that the Pakistan Government for one would not be prepared to recognize, far less negotiate, any alteration in the frontiers in the prevailing ~~situation~~. It had, of course, no right to do so, the entire State being part of the Indian Union.

And yet almost simultaneously Pakistan began to sound China about demarcating Kashmir's border with Sinkiang, the northern territories of the State, where the border lay, being under its unlawful occupation. Here again expediency and opportunism rather than principle or consistency were the load-stars of Pakistan actions. An important fact to be noted is that the initiative for this sinister deal came from Pakistan. Before the opening of the 1959 session of CENTO in Tehran, Ayub Khan revealed that Pakistan would soon ask China to define the border between Sinkiang and northern Kashmir.⁶ His Foreign

⁴Quoted in M.S. Rajan, "India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy and Relations," *International Studies*, April 1962; interview with Daily Telegraph, London, 27 November 1959.

⁵S/4242.

⁶Morning News, Dacca, 24 February 1961.

Minister, Manzur Qadir, later confirmed that Pakistan had taken the initiative in the middle of 1960.⁷ Evidently, Pakistan had made a reference to Peking earlier than the middle of 1960. According to Indian newspapers, preliminary negotiations were under way even in 1959, though this was denied by Manzur Qadir.⁸ When asked at a news conference on 24 May 1960 whether negotiations were still going on between China and Pakistan for demarcation of the border, Manzur Qadir said that Pakistan had made a suggestion to the Chinese Government but had not heard anything further on the subject.⁹

The suggestion appears to have been made to Peking between November 1959, when Ayub Khan first referred to the subject, and April 1960, when Kingsley Martin after meeting him mentioned the matter. "As he sees it," said Kingsley Martin, "Delhi becomes more accommodating when the Chinese threat suggests that it may be necessary for India to deploy her troops differently. If Delhi feels more comfortable about Chou En-lai, then, he fears, it will not bother to settle the Kashmir dispute."¹⁰ To make India more accommodating, what could be easier than to intensify the Chinese threat, for then India faced with a threat from China as well as from Pakistan would be forced to bend to the latter's demand. The Pakistan authorities have admitted that there was no threat from Sinkiang to the border of north Kashmir. Lieutenant-General K. M. Shaikh, then Food and Agriculture Minister, said that he knew of no Chinese infiltration along the Pakistan-held territory of Kashmir adjoining Sinkiang.¹¹ The Pakistan Foreign Office denied the report about China having laid claim to the principalities of Hunza and Nagar in northern Kashmir. Later Bhutto, Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, told newsmen that China had made no claim to

⁷In an interview to Correspondent of *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 16 March 1961.

⁸*Morning News*, Dacca, 24 February 1961.

⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 25 May 1960.

¹⁰Reprinted in *Morning News*, 19 April 1960.

¹¹Interview to Paul Grimes of *New York Times*. (Reprinted in *Dawn*, Karachi, 26 June 1960.)

any part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.¹² This was confirmed by Ayub Khan who declared in New York on 17 July 1961 that there had been no border difficulties with China.¹³ In Bonn the President reaffirmed the position, stating that Pakistan had no problems with China.¹⁴

In other words, the question of demarcation was taken up in the absence of any border incidents, any territorial claims or counter-claims by the parties. On Pakistan's admission, therefore, the border, as it then was, was accepted by China. Pakistan had simply fallen in line with China's scheme to press India on two fronts with which possibility the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi had threatened the Indian Foreign Secretary on 16 May 1959. Said the Ambassador:

China will not be so foolish as to antagonise the U.S. in the east and again to antagonise India in the west.... We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. It seems to us that you cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is so, here then lies the meeting point of the two sides.¹⁵

The sides that met in the end were Pakistan and China, thereby facing India with two fronts. The demarcation of the borders, so-called, was no more than an excuse. The Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan said in Rawalpindi: "The question of demarcation is a minor affair. There is no dispute and there are peaceful contacts between the two countries on this matter."¹⁶

Before this new development is examined in further detail, it is necessary to enquire as to what had brought the two sides together, apart from their hostility to India. Although their ideologies were different, Chinese and Pakistan objectives showed a tendency to coincide. To both, economic aid to India from the

¹²Dawn, Karachi, 14 September 1960.

¹³Extracts from *Speeches and Statements of F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan*, Vol. III, p. 183.

¹⁴Radio Pakistan, Karachi, news in English, 1200 hrs, 19 January 1961, giving details of President Ayub Khan's news conference in Bonn. (Ayub Khan has gone back on all this in his book, *Friends, Not Masters*.)

¹⁵Government of India White Paper on Correspondence etc. with China, 1954-1959, pp. 75-6.

¹⁶Dawn, Karachi, 8 December 1961.

U.S. and other sources was unwelcome. Both desired to seize Indian territory, Pakistan in Kashmir and China in Kashmir (Ladakh) and in other sectors of the Himalayan border. Both desired to see a weakening of India from within. India was growing in strength economically and politically; and neither was willing to wait, for time, they felt, would be to India's advantage. As regards tactics, Pakistan had its own reasons for a betrayal of its military allies, and China for a betrayal of the Soviet Union, its sole benefactor. China sought to secure its flank in Kashmir in any future military conflict with India. It was rather early for Pakistan to hope for a military alliance with China against India, but a coming together of Pakistan and China to isolate India would be an invaluable means of pressure against the latter. The manoeuvre had the merit of a warning to the U.S.A. that, unless Pakistan claims were carried to fulfilment with American support, it would face the risk of the disruption of CENTO and SEATO. If the U.S. succumbed to the manoeuvre, as it did to considerable degree, not only would Pakistan succeed, as it did, in securing more sophisticated weapons from U.S. arsenals, but also in reinforcing its position in West, South, and South-East Asia as a power to reckon with. In the midst of resultant Indo-U.S. misunderstanding, followed possibly by a drying up of U.S. assistance and consequent internal tensions in India, Pakistan would dictate terms to India on Kashmir.

On China's side, the move was intended as a warning to the Soviet Union against its "revisionist" regime hobnobbing too much with "reactionary" India which Chinese propaganda presented as living on the U.S. doles. China felt, presumably, that the development of cordial relations with Pakistan in a sensitive area close to the U.S.S.R. border would not be welcome to that country. It is also possible that Pakistan saw in its overtures to China a hope, however feeble, of neutralizing the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

On 15 January 1961, the Pakistan Foreign Minister disclosed that the People's Republic of China had agreed in principle to the demarcation of its border with northern Kashmir, that talks were continuing between the two governments and proper demarcation

would be undertaken after an agreement was signed.¹⁷ This meant that China, unlike the Soviet Union, did not recognize India's *de jure* sovereignty over Kashmir, but was willing to recognize Pakistan's *de facto* sovereignty over, if not *de jure* occupation, a part of it. Naturally, a border agreement with Pakistan following on the heels of border agreements with Burma and Nepal would be a propaganda asset and a cause of embarrassment to India generally and in relation to the Kashmir question particularly. At the meetings of Indian and Chinese officials in 1960, the Chinese had refused to discuss with the Indian delegation the border of the area in Kashmir under the unlawful occupation of Pakistan on the ground that the area in question was not under Indian control. Deliberately, or unwittingly, China was accepting the division of the State along the cease-fire line. By this new move China, presumably, hoped to force India into the American camp to confound Pakistan calculations to the contrary and to destroy India's policy of nonalignment, which Mao Tse-tung, in a rare imitation of the thought and beliefs of John Foster Dulles, had condemned as unreal and impossible. Besides, in the midst of her growing isolation, China needed a supporter and spokesman for its claims on India. Who could do the job better than Pakistan which had at least one foot still firmly planted in the Western camp.

Soon evidence piled up in support of these trends. Pakistan declined to participate in the talks in Manila sponsored by some of the Asian members of SEATO to discuss ways and means, as a newspaper put it, of "further bolstering the Free World's anti-communist posture in Asia." A leading Pakistan newspaper wrote, obviously under official inspiration, that "it would have been most impolitic for Pakistan to get identified with a move of this kind which seems unnecessarily provocative to the communist bloc."¹⁸ Pakistan newspapers generally began to propagate the line that Indian allegations against the Chinese regarding the Himalayan border were propagandist. They now condemned the bogey of a "common danger,"¹⁹ which Ayub Khan had earlier

¹⁷*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 16 January 1961.

¹⁸*Dawn*, Karachi, 20 January 1961.

¹⁹Editorial in *Dawn*, Karachi, 20 January 1961.

raised. For the first time in many years, Pakistan reversed its previous policy and voted for the seating of China in the United Nations in December 1961.

In the first week of May 1962, a simultaneous announcement was made by the Governments of Pakistan and China, declaring their agreement to demarcate Kashmir's border with Sinkiang. The announcement said that the boundary between Chinese Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, "the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan," had never been formally delimited and demarcated in history. With a view to ensuring tranquillity on the border and developing good neighbourly relations between the two countries, the two sides had agreed to conduct negotiations so as to attain an agreed understanding on the location and alignment of the boundary and to sign on that basis an agreement of a provisional nature. They agreed that after the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authorities concerned should reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government regarding the boundary of Kashmir, so as to sign a formal treaty to replace the provisional agreement.

The announcement was not so innocent as it looked. Pakistan was about to alter unilaterally a part of the border of Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of the territory of the Indian Union, from which Pakistan was required to vacate its aggression. In its communication to the Security Council, Pakistan had taken exception to any alteration of the frontiers of the State; it was now on the point of bringing about an alteration. Besides, fully aware of the Indian position that the northern border of India with China—which follows well-known natural features recognized in history, tradition, and usage—required no fresh delimitation, Pakistan was now to reinforce China's expansionist doctrine that every border required fresh delimitation.

India promptly lodged protests with China and Pakistan on 10 May 1962. Apart from the merits of the Kashmir issue to which India drew the attention of both,²⁰ the Indian protest notes dealt with two points, namely, that there was no common border between

²⁰For China's attitude to the Kashmir issue, see author's *The Kashmir Story*.

China and Pakistan, and that any agreements, provisional or otherwise, which Pakistan and China might reach regarding Indian territory, would not be binding on India, neither party to any such agreement having any legal or constitutional *locus standi* of any kind. China was also told that in pursuit of its aggressive designs on Indian territory, it was exploiting the Kashmir issue to its own advantage. In reply, the two countries emphasized the need for maintaining tranquillity on the border and the provisional nature of the agreement. Pakistan even went to the extent of asserting that the agreement would be "a positive contribution to the strengthening of peace in Asia."²¹ Here was an attempt to force an open door. The authorities of Pakistan and China had repeatedly testified to the absence of any trouble on the border. The tranquillity, the need for which they emphasized, was already there. Even assuming there was a *de facto* border between the two there was no urgency for a fresh settlement, particularly as there was no trouble and both parties had repeatedly professed intentions of mutual peace and amity.²²

The real intentions of Pakistan were revealed by its officially controlled press. The final settlement of the Kashmir question, it was said, was not going to be worked out in New York. The hands of "the Indian tyrant" would have to be forced by other means.²³ "The cordiality of our relations with China should be put on a sound, solid and lasting basis of concrete understanding. The one Power which Moscow cannot disregard is Peking... will Russia continue to stonewall Pakistan on Kashmir when Mao Tse-tung follows different course of action?... Let us seek strength within the campus of our own geography, the Middle East on one hand and China on the other."²⁴ Ayub Khan's Pakistan was preparing to serve as a medium for the dissemination of Mao's thought in West Asia.

Ayub Khan dropped hints which were eagerly taken up and elaborated by the State-controlled press and radio. "Many people

²¹For notes exchanged with China on the subject, see *The Indian White Paper Nos. VI, IX and X.* ²²*Ibid.*

²³Editorial in *Dawn*, Karachi, 8 May 1962.

²⁴*Pakistan Times.*

feel," he said on 10 May 1962, "that the United States is very closely identified with India and therefore with the aggressive Indian designs. If this goes on I have no doubt the smaller countries in the area will be forced to look for protection elsewhere."²⁵ After the Chinese invaded across the McMahon Line in NEFA on 8 September 1962, and Ladakh on 20 October, the official and press opinion in Pakistan swung completely over to China against India which was described as the aggressor trying to magnify a minor border trouble into a major conflict in order to secure arms and equipment from the U.S. and other Western countries to overawe Pakistan into submission. Newspapers in Pakistan gloated over Indian reverses and poured ridicule over its armed forces. It was generally agreed in non-aligned countries that Chinese invasion of India was a blow to the concept of nonalignment. More than seventy nations publicly expressed sympathy with India's position in its contest with China.²⁶ According to one authority, "a tide of sympathy for India's cause swept through the Afro-Arab-Asian world" and "the six Colombo neutralist nations made it clear that they did not propose to advance suggestions prejudicial to Indian security."²⁷ The Indian military reverses lent a new sharpness to Pakistan reaction. Bhutto said that Pakistan had no enmity whatsoever with China which was, in fact, a great friend. It would be a folly on the part of any one to think that Pakistan would go to India's help in its fight with China.²⁸ He said that "our friendship with China is unconditional. We will not barter or bargain it away for anything."²⁹ To another Pakistan Minister the conflict between India

²⁵In an exclusive interview to the United Press International.

²⁶Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *The Elephants and the Grass*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966, p. 88.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 89.

²⁸*Pakistan Times*, 9 November 1962.

"The India of Nehru may be likened to a wolf that has been fattened with economic aid and equipped with military fangs by communists as well as non-communist White Powers to fall on the Chinese sheep beyond the Himalayas."

²⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 November 1962.

and China was "a mock fight."³⁰ Similarly Mohammed Ali Bogra, the Foreign Minister, made light of the Chinese aggression.³¹ The President of Pakistan told the Pakistan National Assembly on 21 November 1962 that it was India's conduct which had precipitated the clash; China's aim would be limited because of the difficult terrain, the unkind weather, and the difficult lines of communication. China had no design on the Indo-Gangetic plains.³² In Tokyo, the Pakistan Ambassador assured the Japanese that India was the original aggressor, the Indian Army having mounted an offensive into the area of Tibet establishing 47 advance checkposts.³³ He, obviously, thought that Ladakh in Kashmir was Tibet! The President of Pakistan told President Kennedy that Pakistan could not be expected to go to the help of India against China.

Like two peas in a pod, Pakistan and China demonstrated their capacity for joint action on the eve of the joint talks between the Indian and Pakistan ministerial delegations on Kashmir and other related matters. On 26 December, Pakistan and China announced their agreement in principle on the alignment of Kashmir's border with Sinkiang, the announcement but for India's forbearance nearly torpedoed the talks. In reply to an Indian protest, China said that, after the defeat of its "military adventure against China," India, encouraged by certain Western powers, had been trying to entice Pakistan into a joint anti-China campaign.³⁴ This assertion, made in full awareness of Pakistan's continuing membership of SEATO and the other pacts directed at least in part against China, is evidence of China's inimitable capacity for opportunism and duplicity, matched only perhaps by Pakistan's.

Again, on the eve of the fourth round of joint talks in Calcutta in March 1963, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and China signed the Kashmir border demarcation agreement in Peking.³⁵ Under

³⁰Fazlul Qader Choudhury, Education Minister. (*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 11 November 1962.)

³¹Dawn, Karachi, 22 November 1962.

³²Ibid.

³³Ishai Evening News, 14 December 1962.

³⁴White Paper Vol. IX, p. 1.

³⁵See Appendixes.

this agreement Pakistan made a gift of 2,050 square miles of Indian Union territory to China. To further protests by India, both governments declared that the agreement was only provisional in nature. These declarations were dishonest. The arrangements stipulated in the agreement referred to the appointment of a boundary commission, the setting up of border markers, and the drawing up of protocols, which arrangements are normally made for permanent demarcation of international frontiers. Subsequently, the Chinese boundary commission delegates visited Gilgit, Hunza, and Nagar, and the two teams announced agreement on ground survey, aerial photography, and the erection of boundary markers along the border.³⁶ Besides, no Chinese Government would give up the territory which Pakistan had surrendered to it. If the agreement was provisional, no territory need have changed hands.

China gloated over its gains from Pakistan at India's expense. Chou En-lai described the agreement as "historic"³⁷ and Ayub Khan had presented it as "a notable milestone."³⁸ Few countries grow so lyrical over provisional arrangements. Chen Yi thought that the agreement was not only beneficial to the maintenance of tranquillity along a non-existent Sino-Pakistan border but also "of great significance to the defence of peace in Asia and the world."³⁹ Finally, Chou En-lai clinched the issue. "The majestic Karakorams," he said in Dacca, "have become the bonds of friendship between the Chinese and Pakistan peoples."⁴⁰ Chen Yi

³⁶White Paper No. X, p. 7.

Under the heading "Borders and Diplomacy," a Pakistan writer in Karachi's political weekly, *Look*, of 9 March 1963, states: "Until more light is thrown on the course of negotiations with China, it is not possible to call the agreement a first rate achievement. There are aspects too which show that we have made more concessions to the Chinese in our anxiety to clinch the deal than they have made."

"Pakistan has taken advantage of the Sino-Indian border conflict to secure China's recognition of the remaining part of Kashmir as Pakistan territory by means of this border agreement. It has further contributed to isolate India from China." (*Badische Neueste Nachrichten* of West Germany, 15 March 1963.)

³⁷Dawn, Karachi, 19 February 1964.

³⁸Dawn, Karachi, 21 February 1964.

³⁹Dawn, Karachi, 25 February 1964.

⁴⁰Dawn, Karachi, 26 February 1964.

said in Rawalpindi on 25 March 1965: "The landscape of the Karakoram mountains remains unchanged, but they have become [sic] closer to the hearts of our two peoples."⁴¹ He thanked the members of the China-Pakistan Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission for their hard work. The "hundreds of personnel who took part in boundary survey, mapping, security work and logistic support," he said, had "marvellously" accomplished the task by overcoming hardship under extremely difficult geographical and climatic conditions.⁴² From now on there would be no need for surreptitious Chinese espionage activity in a vitally sensitive security area. A protocol to the agreement was signed on 26 March 1965.

To India the agreement was "illegal and invalid," a violation of international law, and a collusive attempt at annexing part of Indian territory in Kashmir. In a letter to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of India described the signing of the boundary protocol as "an act of flagrant aggression."⁴³

The agreement ushered in a new phase of malice, directed at India, in the policies and actions of both Pakistan and China. President Ayub Khan had warned India against the push of the North, of the Chinese airfields in Tibet and of Chinese design to threaten India and East Pakistan from Malay. He had sought to justify his statements on the strength of his knowledge of military science and strategy. He now began to use the same knowledge to disprove his earlier statements. He had urged the need for building up military strength to deal with the rising menace of Chinese expansionism. He now argued that acquisition of strength by India was unnecessary and dangerous because, apart from the impossibility of China invading India across the Himalayas, China had nothing but peaceful intentions.

"During the last few months she [India] has received large quantities of weapons of war, in addition to her own great war potential," said the President of Pakistan. "Serious war between India and China is out of the question because of the physical

⁴¹Dawn, Karachi, 27 March 1965.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³S/6303, 27 April 1965.

barriers of the Himalayas and the realisation on both sides that a war would spell the ruin of both. But history shows that highly armed countries have not hesitated to overrun their smaller and weaker neighbours. And because we are still being considered by India as her enemy number one, we have every reason to be perturbed and anxious over India's growing might."⁴⁴ Ayub Khan assumed that Pakistan which had already received massive military aid from the U.S. and other Western allies could continue to collect arms without being a threat to anyone and that the ever-expanding Chinese war machine posed no threat to any country. He assumed also that a weak India, unable to face either China or Pakistan, was essential to the maintenance of peace in the region.

In a broadcast on 1 January 1964, Ayub Khan said: "Looking back, it has been a year of great anxiety for us because of the arms aid secured by India on the pretext of Chinese aggression. It is now recognized on all hands that China has no such designs."⁴⁵ He had already warned the Western powers that they should "not rule out the possibility of Pakistan firmly allying with China in order to safeguard her independence against Indian aggression."⁴⁶ The Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan had said on 26 October 1963 that China's friendly relations with Pakistan were "ultimately aimed at safeguarding the independence of both countries."⁴⁷ Here was power politics stripped of its trappings.

The Western and Socialist States reacted to these developments. According to Soviet commentators, the bloc which the Chinese leaders were trying "to hammer together on an unprincipled basis" in the international sphere was doomed to failure, and in this context pointed to China joining hands with Pakistan, a Western military ally.⁴⁸ Earlier in September 1963, the Soviet Government had accused China of occupying and colonizing unspecified areas across the U.S.S.R. border in much the same way as India

⁴⁴Independence Day broadcast. (*Speeches and Statements of F. M. Mohammad Ayub Khan*, Vol. VI, pp. 17-8.)

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 117. Similar ideas expressed on pages 29-30, 56, 145-6.

⁴⁶In an interview with the *Sunday Times* on 21 October 1963. (Quoted in *Pakistan Times*.)

⁴⁷*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 October 1963.

⁴⁸A report from Moscow in the *Times of India*, 11 May 1964.

had accused China of annexing parts of Ladakh and building strategic roads and airfields there. The Soviet statement warned China against "the artificial creation in our times of any territorial problems." "If they start fighting for the revision of historically developed frontiers, this will lead to no good, merely creating feuds."⁴⁹ Commenting on a statement by the Speaker of the Pakistan National Assembly that it was India which had committed aggression on China, the *Washington Post* wrote: "No doubt using this Alice in Wonderland logic the Chinese troops that occupied vast stretches of land claimed by India were only pacific tourists seeking rare specimens of botany. The Speaker's utterance is typical of much that is being said in Pakistan that is profoundly saddening."⁵⁰

When Pakistan invited Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi for a State visit in February 1964, the State Department spokesman considered it "unfortunate" that the leaders of the Chinese regime should be accorded an opportunity to pay a friendly visit to Pakistan.⁵¹

The foreign policy of Pakistan was in the melting pot. The worldwide criticism of the Sino-Pakistan agreement on Kashmir's border with Sinkiang and their support to each other showed the extent to which they were prepared to surrender to adventurist impulses. The President of Pakistan tried to rationalize the position. The object of SEATO and CENTO, he argued, was to prevent war coming to these regions. If freedom from trouble in the two areas could be obtained through good relations with neighbours, the object of SEATO and CENTO would be achieved.⁵² If this was so, there was no longer any justification for Pakistan continuing to be a member of the two military blocs. In London, however, the President assured everyone on 14 July 1964 that the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey summit meeting at Istanbul on 20 July "does not mean quitting the Central Treaty Organization."⁵³

⁴⁹ *The Guardian*, 23 September 1963.

⁵⁰ 30 September 1963.

⁵¹ *Dawn*, Karachi, 13 December 1963.

⁵² *Dawn*, Karachi, 23 February 1964.

⁵³ *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 16 July 1964.

The position was described succinctly by a Pakistan observer who wrote:

At home free licence was given to the press and public to sling our erstwhile allies with all the invective at their command. In the international field, a covert flirtation with People's China was finally set in motion. In order to lend a touch of reality to our gestures, a border agreement was manufactured.... At the same time businessmen, singers and table tennis players scrambled to and from Peking as a measure of our new found cordiality. To some in the Foreign Office this aroused visions of Bismarckian Realpolitik, with Pakistan skilfully exploiting the Sino-Indian conflict to wring concessions from both India and the U.S.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, Pakistan focussed attention on India's other neighbours. If they could not be ranged against India, they could at least be discouraged from getting closer to it. The colossal size of India, its enormous population, its formidable resource potential, the large number of resident Indians in some of the neighbouring lands, eradication of Buddhism from the land of its birth, visions of the flood-tide of Indian culture sweeping South and South-East Asia—these were only some of the themes employed by Pakistan propaganda to rouse fear of the "giant" and to emphasize the need for its containment by means of regional pacts and co-operation. Themes pertaining to economic aid from Western countries, the East European countries, and the Soviet Union were added on to make India look like an ogre, a menace to meet which small countries must combine under the leadership of China, possibly Pakistan!

Ayub Khan had expressed the view in London in 1961 that there was apprehension on the part of small countries which felt that, in order to protect themselves against India, they needed the protection of some other country. "And I can foresee that both in the present circumstances and in future circumstances, they would seek protection from China, and China will be willing to

⁵⁴Political Observer in *Dacca Times*, 4 October 1963.

give it."⁵⁵ According to his Foreign Minister, India was a threat to all countries from the Kabul to the Mekong. This came from a country which was one of the largest recipients of economic aid per capita, not to mention over two billion dollars of military aid from Western countries.⁵⁶

In his Independence Day broadcast on 13 August 1963, Ayub Khan, referring to receipt of military aid by India, observed that in history highly armed countries had not hesitated to overrun their smaller and weaker neighbours.⁵⁷ On 1 October 1963, he denied the possibility of a major war between India and China. If war-like preparations went on in India, he said, India would have to justify the huge expenditure on such preparations to the Indian people who were groaning under the resulting heavy taxation and inflation. In the circumstances, what would be more natural than a war of conquest against a smaller nation?⁵⁸ Addressing a joint session of the Ceylonese Parliament on 9 December 1963 in Colombo, he stressed that his preoccupation with this development was not confined to the security of Pakistan alone. "The acquisition of overwhelming military superiority by one country in a region cannot but be a source of anxiety when bitter disputes between that country and others remain unresolved."⁵⁹ On another occasion, he said that the situation posed a grave threat to the security of the smaller nations on the periphery of India and asked to whom these countries could turn if the U.S.A. continued to follow its policy.⁶⁰

In assuming this posture the Government of Pakistan was trying to kill several birds with one stone. In addition to filling Asian

⁵⁵TV interview in London by ABC correspondent. (Syed Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Ayub: Soldier and Statesman*, Mohammad Ali Academy, Lahore, 1966, p. 211.)

⁵⁶In 1962-64, India got \$2.1 per person in economic aid from all sources. Comparable figures are: Pakistan—\$5.0; Malawi—\$5.0; Kenya—\$5.9; Bolivia—\$11.1; Chile—\$17.4; the Philippines—\$53.0. (Michael Lipton, "India: Less Nonsense, More Aid," *New Statesman*, 28 April 1967.)

⁵⁷*Speeches and Statements: F. M. Mohammad Ayub Khan*, Vol. VI, Pakistan Publications, Karachi, p. 18.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶⁰*Speeches and Statements: F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan*, Vol. III, p. 5.

Ceylon's influential English weekly, *Tribune*, commenting on Ayub Khan's statement that India's neighbours including Ceylon were apt to turn to China

worried about the defence of India against China than he was about Western military pacts of which his country was a member? As later events revealed, either country knew well enough that the target for the manoeuvres of the other was India.

Secondly, on the basis of his oft-proclaimed knowledge of war and strategy, the President propounded the thesis of a monstrous threat hanging over the subcontinent, a threat which could be faced only by India and Pakistan together. Military history of the subcontinent, as he explained, pointed to the grave dangers posed by the partition, which split up the defence of a geographical unit with the consequent danger of defeat in detail and the danger of one of the parties inviting outside intervention to the peril of both. In practice, however, he would not entertain a non-aggression declaration which might have led to further constructive cooperation to ensure the subcontinent's security and progress. The proposal was ridiculous in the assumption that, while India needed Pakistan for its defence, India's goodwill, assistance, and cooperation were not equally indispensable to the defence of Pakistan—East and West. Did strategic and geographic facts constitute realities to be reckoned with at all times or a conjurer's implements to be used or discarded at will? President Ayub Khan's numerous statements and the consistency with which he shifted from one position to another did not show that he had much confidence in his own view of the threat to the security of the subcontinent or measures to counter them.

Thirdly, the Pakistan President made so light of his own proposal that he threw it away by making it conditional on a prior settlement of the Kashmir issue. Plainly two questions were involved—a settlement of the Kashmir problem and the security of the subcontinent from external aggression. Basically, there was no relationship between the two issues. It could not be seriously suggested that Kashmir was more important to Pakistan than the security and independence of the subcontinent, involving its own survival, apart from the fact that there were many other issues which divided the two countries. Besides, the persistence of a difference of opinion between India and Pakistan on Kashmir for nearly thirteen years preceding enunciation of the joint defence

Alliance in Action

BY THE END OF 1963, PAKISTAN HAD MOVED sufficiently close to China to justify a more stable basis for their relations. In fact, 1963 turned out to be the watershed in U.S.-Pakistan relations, on the one hand, and Pakistan-China relations, on the other. Relying on its lobby in the American Congress, which was to consider a bill seeking to give aid to India for defence against China, Pakistan did everything to prevent the passage of the bill principally by wrecking the joint talks with India on Kashmir and other related matters. This suited not only Pakistan but also China, for while it left the gulf between India and Pakistan unbridged, the differences between Pakistan and the U.S.A. became wider than ever. The two, Pakistan and China, were now ranged against their neighbour, India, to exploit the latter's military weakness. Collusion between the two was no longer a possibility but a fact.

Although Chinese attack on India in 1962 had exposed the military weakness of India, it failed in a larger sense. It roused worldwide sympathy for India and suspicion of Chinese motives. Equally, the world did not fail to see that the unilateral withdrawal of the Chinese invading force was not carried out from a tenderness of feeling for India but was compelled by a combination of adverse strategic and other factors. Besides, India had not only not succumbed, as the Chinese had expected, it stood more united than ever before in the face of the push from the North. From the Chinese point of view it would be much the wiser course to involve India in further military conflict with another State rather than for China itself to mount another invasion in the years

immediately ahead. Here was Pakistan's opportunity, its leaders thought; and they succumbed to Chinese blandishments.

At about this time, the Government of Pakistan decided that the time had come for it to embark on a military adventure to seize Kashmir and to help set in the processes of disintegration of India. Ayub Khan had already given an inkling of his mind in his correspondence with the U.S. President at the time of Chinese invasion of India. Aware of the military weakness of India, he wrote to Kennedy on 5 November 1962: "Mr. President, what you now ask us is to give an assurance to Mr. Nehru of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops, at present concentrated against us, elsewhere. I am surprised that such a request is being made to us." In his letter of 2 June 1963 to Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, he lifted the veil a little higher. "I remain convinced that the key to a just and peaceful settlement [of the Kashmir issue] lies with you and President Kennedy. If the flow of your arms supply is so regulated to influence India to be in a more amenable frame of mind, positive results are bound to follow from negotiations now under way." In other words, what he was advising the U.K. and the U.S.A. was to coerce or blackmail India by telling Nehru: "No surrender on Kashmir, no arms." Bhutto's declaration in the National Assembly, followed by threatening statements by Pakistan representatives in the U.N. General Assembly in subsequent years, and Nehru's death in 1964 which was treated by Pakistan leaders as a signal for the break-up of the Indian Union, helped Pakistan drift rapidly towards conflict. Its growing intimacy with China accelerated the process.

Ayub Khan had threatened Nehru with such a situation as far back as 1959 when he met the Prime Minister of India at Palam airport. What the President of Pakistan told Nehru has been placed on record by Qudratullah Shahab, then his private secretary:

Unless our relations improve and we begin to face outwards, we shall either be defeated in detail, or, either you or us, under each other's pressure, may invite an outsider to come in. This is my reading of the past history of this sub-continent. Invaders have always been invited by people from within. I trust you do not wish that history to repeat itself. I hope, Mr. Prime

Minister, that you will not misunderstand my reference to the invitation to an outsider. Human beings are curious. When in difficulties, they are quite capable of even wanting to sleep with the devil.¹

By 1963 Pakistan was deep in the devil's embrace. For, Bhutto, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, declared in the National Assembly on 17 July 1963:

God forbid if there was to be a clash, if India were in her frustration to turn guns against Pakistan, the international situation is such that Pakistan would not be alone in that conflict. A conflict does not involve Pakistan alone. Attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia and, therefore, the new element and this new factor that has been brought in the situation is a very important factor. I would not, at this stage, like to elucidate any further on this matter. But suffice it to say that the national interest of another State itself is involved in any attack on Pakistan.²

This statement was never questioned or challenged by the People's Republic of China. The conclusion is irresistible that it was made with China's consent if not at its instigation. India had not attacked Pakistan at any time in the preceding sixteen years; and there was

¹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 11 September 1959.

²*Dawn*, Karachi, 20 July 1963.

Questioning this statement, Maulvi Fatid Ahmed (Opposition, East Pakistan) said that if China had come so close to Pakistan, as the Foreign Minister claimed, what was the "stunt" in continuing to remain in SEATO and CENTO? (*Searchlight*, Patna, 25 July 1963.)

Ayub Khan: "If India grows menacingly strong, we shall be in a great predicament and shall have to look around for someone to help us. And if we are attacked by India, then that means India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other Asiatic powers, especially China, would take notice of that." (Interview to S. Harrison, *Washington Post*, 12 September 1963.)

When asked whether China had assured Pakistan of help if the latter were attacked by India, Bhutto said: "There is no assurance, there is no agreement between China and Pakistan in this matter...but there is a strong assumption." (*Morning News*, 9 October 1963.)

less reason for it to indulge in a folly of that kind now. Besides, how would any attack on Pakistan involve the territorial integrity and security of China, unless it was meant that China, which had already occupied 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in Kashmir (Ladakh), would regard an attempt by India to recover the northern territories of the State from Pakistan's unlawful control, a threat to China's territorial integrity and security? Bhutto must have made his statement in the fullest confidence that India would, in fact, never attack Pakistan. It is, nevertheless, strange, to say the least, that a member country of Western military alliances, tied up with the U.S.A. in economic and military arrangements, should feel so helplessly dependent for its defence on China—a new ally against which those alliances were directed.

Bhutto had suffered another lapse of memory. Had not Field Marshal Ayub Khan, his President, repeatedly said that Chinese forces could not cross the Himalayas to attack India? Or, had he plans to let the Chinese come in through the backdoors of Gilgit and other northern areas of Jammu and Kashmir which the Chinese had so thoroughly surveyed under the benign gaze of the Field Marshal. Bhutto reverted to the subject a few days later only to reaffirm the assurances from "our friend" to come to the aid of Pakistan in the event of an aggression.³

Then followed a flood of mutual assurances and counter-assurances on the subject. In December 1963, the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, Nan Han Chen, who was then on a visit to Pakistan, said: "If ever there is a war between India

³*Dawn*, Karachi, 25 July 1963.

Professor H.J. Morgenthau in the *Commentary* of May 1964 says: "The alliance with Pakistan has from the outset been a useless and counter-productive instrument of American Foreign Policy; it could truly be called a diplomatic act against nature. For the military forces of Pakistan, built up with our massive support, have as their primary target not the Soviet Union or China, but India . . . in the aftermath of that invasion [by China], Pakistan reached a political and also, it is generally believed, a military understanding with China."

According to Professor John Owen, a Visiting Professor at Dacca University, Peking and Rawalpindi had "an unwritten military agreement." This view was expressed in an article in the *New Leader*, Washington, 2 March 1964.

and Pakistan, China will surely support Pakistan and not India.”⁴ The arrival of Premier Chou En-lai in Pakistan in February 1964 was a signal for an incomprehensible emphasis on China and Pakistan defending the peace of Asia and the world. In Karachi, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese people would continue to advance hand in hand with the Pakistani people “in the common cause of promoting Asian-African solidarity and defending world peace.”⁵ Both, he said, had similarly experienced aggression and oppression of imperialism and colonialism,⁶ and the continuous development of friendly cooperation between the two countries was conducive to “the defence of peace in Asia and the world.”⁷ They were confronted with the similar task of safeguarding their independence and sovereignty *and* developing their independent economies.⁸ According to Chen Yi, both countries had a stake in Asia. “The Chinese people,” he said in reply to Bhutto’s speech at a dinner given in honour of the Chinese guests, “will stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistan people and the other peoples of Asia on this vast, fertile and new emerging continent of ours and strive to create a bright future for ourselves.”⁹ A bright future for the swarming millions of China in other Asian lands! The two countries, he said, were faced with “a common fighting task.”¹⁰

Similar thoughts, similar attitudes, similar objectives. Where the picture painted by the Chinese leaders was not clear or needed a deeper shading or a more luminous colour, Bhutto lent a helping hand. He declared in Lahore that the Chinese leaders wanted fair and normal relations with “all countries.”¹¹ Chou En-lai paid a tribute to the Pakistan Government for projecting China as a peace-loving nation on the screen of world opinion. “The Pakistan Government and public opinion have righteously refuted the slanders made by the forces hostile to China and pointed out that China is a peace-loving country. This constitutes a valuable support to China for which the Chinese Government and the people would like to express their sincere gratitude.”¹²* Not to be left behind

⁴Dawn, Karachi, 19 February 1964.

⁵Dawn, Karachi, 21 February 1964.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Dawn, Karachi, 24 February 1964.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

^{*}Dawn, Karachi, 25 February 1964.

the Commerce Minister of Pakistan said China had no territorial ambitions.¹¹

Bhutto denied that Chou En-lai's visit was in any way related to military collaboration with China. That was nothing new. In its short history the Government of Pakistan had denied so many things only to admit them when their denial could no longer be sustained.¹² Undoubtedly, Pakistan and China were strange bedfellows. The only thing they had in common was hostility towards India. In the joint Ayub-Chou communique, the reference to self-determination had a false ring, coming as it did from the mouths of the oppressor of Tibet and Muslim Sinkiang and the bloodstained tormentor of the struggling Pakhtoons.

For services rendered to China, Pakistan received its due reward. On 31 July 1964, Wahiduzzaman, Commerce Minister, announced China's offer of a \$60 million, interest-free loan on a long-term repayment basis. The loan was to be utilized for importing heavy machinery and complete plants for sugar and cement production.¹³ This was followed by the four-day visit of Vice Minister for National Defence and C-in-C of the Chinese Air Force to Pakistan.¹⁴ In September, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Musa, disclosed that seven Pakistan Army officers had been sent to Peking to learn Chinese. The significance of these developments became apparent with Bhutto's statement to the Conventionist Muslim League workers in Hyderabad (Sind) that, if the big powers did not stop military aid to India, Pakistan would seek a remedy "from other sources."¹⁵ The only other source was China. A commentator observed:

What is behind the flirtation of America's "most allied ally" in Asia with Peiping—the West's most implacable opponent? The background of this latest move of Pakistan in real politik is a complex one. Ironically, this move by Pakistan to "normalise" its relations with Peiping is motivated by much

¹¹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 26 July 1964.

¹²See author's *The Kashmir Story*.

¹³*Dawn*, Karachi, 1 August 1964.

¹⁴*Statesman*, 21 September 1964.

¹⁵*Patriot*, New Delhi, 9 October 1964.

the same reasons which led it to form close ties with the West in the first place. This is its pathological fear of India and its implacable determination to surpass that country in military strength. It saw its support of Washington's mutual security arrangements in Asia—CENTO and SEATO—as a means of obtaining massive military and economic aid. Today, while it hypocritically betrays all of its formal ties with the West, Pakistan is continuing to receive some half a billion dollars a year in U.S. aid. In this way Ayub Khan hopes to boost Pakistan's strength to the point where it could impose its will on India by military force.¹⁶

There was a flash of prophetic vision in these words.

In defence of his *volte-face*, Ayub Khan began to level accusations at his friend and ally. The United States policy "in this part of the world," he said, had changed in a fashion that imperilled the security of Pakistan. China was not going to attack India, which would only use its American weapons against smaller nations and to intimidate Pakistan.¹⁷ Ayub Khan was accusing India of aggressive intent, only to camouflage his own plans of invasion. He had made up his mind to bring matters to a head, and already in January 1965, American Pattons and other tools of war were being given a fresh coat of war paint. The rather heavy attack in Kutch, which followed in April, was intended to test the sharpness of these tools and to draw Indian forces away from the Punjab and from Kashmir. In April as well in August/September 1965, leading Chinese were on hand in Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Dacca for close consultations before major events.

Meanwhile, communications between China and Pakistan, so vital to a military alliance, were improved. An air agreement opened Burma and South Asia to China through East Pakistan and

¹⁶*Congressional Record*, Washington, 30 March 1964.

"The spectre of Pakistan-Chinese military collaboration against India cannot be discounted entirely, and is alarming. China invaded India's Himalayan provinces in 1962, then pulled back. Large Chinese troop concentrations remained in Tibet, however, while Pakistan guerillas have reportedly been active in the Kashmir ceasefire zone." (Editorial in *Los Angeles Times*, 1 March 1965.)

¹⁷*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 4 January 1965.

Africa and West Asia through West Pakistan. With the completion of the Indus Valley road, it was officially stated, a direct land route would be established between Rawalpindi and Peking via Gilgit in northern Kashmir. The link, it was said, would revolutionize the entire economy of the northern areas.¹⁸ The road, some hundreds of miles in length traversing one of the most rugged and sparsely populated and least productive areas of the world, is not likely to have any economic significance for decades. Its military significance to India as well as Pakistan—and above all China—is only too obvious. Military engineers and military authorities of both China and Pakistan are engaged in the construction of this strategic road. A shipping agreement was signed and steps were taken to provide a round-the-clock telephone service. An agreement was also concluded for the issue of free visas of all types. By these measures Ayub Khan helped the very danger, namely, the penetration of the region by China, against which he had warned India from time to time—the push of the North. He demonstrated once again that the foreign policy of Pakistan was continuing to suffer from an incurable inner conflict which generated irreconcilable impulses.

In March 1965, Ayub Khan, accompanied by his nuclear expert, paid a State visit to Peking. Speaking at the banquet given in his honour, President Liu Shao-chi made it clear that, as far as China was concerned, friendship with Pakistan was a long-term policy and was by no means a matter of expediency.¹⁹ An official organ was so carried away with emotion as to acclaim Sino-Pakistan relations "as a model of a new type of relations between States."²⁰ Ayub Khan had said sometime earlier: "Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West. We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare. We wish to follow and are following a clear and unambiguous path."²¹ There was something of a new type in the behaviour-patterns of the partners in this model relationship: this was the ready inclination

¹⁸*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 5 March 1964.

¹⁹*Statesman*, New Delhi, 3 March 1965.

²⁰*People's Daily*, Peking.

²¹*Foreign Affairs*, July 1960.

of both to stab their friends and allies in the back and yet to demand and accept benefaction from them.

The Pakistan President described his visit to China having made a "tremendous" contribution towards the promotion of peace in the region.²² This was to be soon demonstrated in Kutch where Pakistan mounted aggression with American tanks. Marshal Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, had said in Peking, during Ayub Khan's visit that China could never forget the support which Pakistan had given to China during the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and held out the assurance that China would not disappoint Pakistan.²³ While Pakistan was making preparations for aggression in the Rann of Kutch in April, the joint communique which the Presidents of Pakistan and China issued in Peking on the conclusion of Ayub Khan's visit took a different line. "They [the two Presidents] stressed," it said, "that in handling disputes of this kind [Kashmir] between Asian-African countries, to adopt an attitude of big nation chauvinism, to intimidate neighbouring countries and to embark on a policy of arms expansion and war preparations by exploiting such disputes would, far from being conducive to their settlement, further impair relations between them and the solidarity of Asian-African countries."²⁴

Towards the end of March 1965, Chen Yi was again in Pakistan and patted its leaders on the back for being "outstanding" in telling international conferences attended by the representatives of the Western countries that China was not aggressive and was a peace-loving country. The solidarity of the 750 million people of China and Pakistan constituted an important force for the defence of world peace,²⁵ and added that neither of the two countries aimed at deceiving the other.²⁶ That is, however, for historians of the future to judge.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto, found it essential in

²²*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 13 March 1965.

²³*Dawn*, Karachi, 7 March 1965.

²⁴Pakistan Press Release, No. 14, issued by the High Commission for Pakistan in Delhi on 10 March 1965.

²⁵*Dawn*, Karachi, 28 March 1965.

²⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 March 1965.

the existing conditions in the world that "we must learn to live with neighbours and others" in a spirit of understanding. Ideologies could be interpreted in more than one way but geography could not be changed. "If you cannot live with your next door neighbour," he remarked, "you cannot live with people far away."²⁷ In its relations with India, Pakistan had rejected this admirable precept. Its government had shut its eyes to facts of geography and history and done everything else to undermine the great potential of friendship and understanding with India. It did not wish, it seemed, to live with its next-door neighbour. All this talk of sweet reasonableness was a play on the eve of a pre-calculated military attack on India in the Rann of Kutch.

Before his departure, Chen Yi had extended an invitation to Sheikh Abdullah to visit China. The invitation was announced not by Chen Yi or the Sheikh but by Bhutto on 27 March 1965 in the course of a declaration to the effect that Pakistan was capable of defending itself against all aggression.²⁸ On 9 April, the Pakistan armour, mostly Patton tanks of U.S. origin, struck in the Rann of Kutch.

Frequent meetings between the leaders of the two countries on the eve of Pakistan aggression first in Kutch and then in Kashmir were significant. Bhutto had talks with Premier Chou En-lai on 2 April in Karachi which he said were a "follow-up" of the talks he had with Chen Yi in March.²⁹ Chou En-lai again stopped over in Karachi for two hours on 9 June 1965. By this time preparations were fully under way for aggression on a much more ambitious scale in Kashmir, a warning of which was given by no less a person than President Ayub Khan himself. Addressing a meeting of the Pakistan Muslim League Council in Islamabad in July 1965, President Ayub Khan asked the nation "to become prepared to face the critical situation ahead and render all sacrifices for national honour." He was confident, he said, that the nation would emerge victorious through the crisis.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Statesman*, New Delhi, 29 March 1965.

²⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 3 April 1965.

In the past too they had faced the challenges successfully and in future also they would be victorious. He alleged that India believed in military solutions of various Indo-Pakistan disputes and said: "Pakistan will be facing a difficult situation and the nation should be fully prepared to face it."³⁰

This was three weeks before Pakistan attempted to seize Kashmir by massive armed infiltrations, and about seven weeks before its enormous military machine, built up by the U.S.A., was set in motion against India. The Chinese policy of promoting chaos in Afro-Asian countries by revolution and other means was to be tested on the soil of nonaligned India by a votary of alliances with the help of American tools and Chinese inspiration. Pakistan's two aggressions in 1965 had China's fullest support. In the second case, China lent active help on the ground to Pakistan by issuing an ultimatum* to India, thereby effectively tying down the latter's forces in the eastern sector of the Himalayas. This was a proof and demonstration enough of a military alliance in action. The ally of the U.S.A. had turned upon India the fire and fury of American armour, American supersonic planes, and American guns in conjunction with the might and weaponry of aggressive and expansionist China. "Shooting is the most stupid thing to do. It leaves a scar."³¹ Ayub Khan had said that in the U.S.A. in 1961. In 1965, he could not resist the temptation to shoot. He had two categories of weapons then, American and Chinese. Military equipment with Chinese markings was found on Pakistan Army personnel captured or killed in Kashmir. The presence of a Pakistan military mission in Peking during the conflict is not without significance.

As an observer put it, the virtual withdrawal of the Chinese ultimatum to India was timed so perfectly to coincide with the arrival in New York of the Pakistan Foreign Minister that it was reasonable to suppose that it was the result of close diplomatic liaison between Rawalpindi and Peking. The Chinese ultimatum ensured that Indian troops could not be moved from the North East Frontier

³⁰*Dawn*, Karachi, 15 July 1965.

*See Appendixes 2-5.

³¹*Dawn*, Karachi, 14 July 1961.

Agency to the Punjab front, where, despite Rawalpindi's optimistic communiques, Pakistan's military position was deteriorating rapidly. As the *New York Times* put it, Pakistan's "only real object in fighting was to reopen the fundamental discussion of the Kashmir problem and this has not so far been attained. She has failed to inflict even a local defeat on the Indian Army and her losses in tanks and aircraft were no doubt the real reason why she has obeyed the U.N. resolution."³² Pakistan's military adventure had failed. The image of Pakistan as a powerful military nation, equipped with efficient arms by its Western allies, was shattered.

Why China did not attack India in NEFA or Ladakh is a separate issue and outside the scope of this book. For one reason it had been warned by both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. At a press conference on 13 September, Dean Rusk warned China not "to fish in troubled waters."³³ On the same day, Tass, the Soviet News Agency, also warned outside forces against facilitating "the widening of the conflict by their provocative statements and policies." Pakistan guerillas had been trained by Chinese experts,³⁴ and it might have been thought in Pakistan and China that this gave them immunity against detection and defeat. The conflict was brought to a halt, perhaps, rather prematurely by the great power unanimity in the Security Council which might have taken the Chinese by surprise. Nevertheless, Chinese forces did in fact move right up to the frontier and across at Nathu La and other points following the Chinese ultimatum and there were skirmishes between them and Indian forces. This showed that China was determined to intervene on the side of Pakistan more actively, perhaps, in the event of the conflict spreading to East Pakistan, which India avoided despite Pakistan provocations.

All this threw U.S.-Pakistan actions out of gear. In December

³²*New Statesman*, London. (Reproduced in *Hindustan Times*, 1 October 1965.)

³³*New York Times*, International Edition, Paris, 14 September 1965.

³⁴*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 29 October 1965.

The Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, Ghazali Ben Shaffie, said on 28 October that the Pakistan guerillas had been trained by China before they infiltrated across the cease-fire line.

1965, President Ayub Khan paid a visit to the U.S.A. and held talks with President Johnson. At a State Department dinner in Washington, Ayub Khan said: "Of all the many conflicts between India and Pakistan and so on, when you come to think about it, what is the meaning of that? The meaning of that is that a big country always wants to expand anyhow."³⁵ He overlooked perhaps that the host country, the U.S.A., and China whose spokesman he had become are bigger than India. Not to lose the benefits of the Chinese or the U.S. military camp, the President and his Foreign Minister had been vying with each other in giving a new version of history and international relations. Bhutto's interpretations of the relations between Pakistan and China, on the one hand, and Pakistan and the U.S.A., on the other, were a masterpiece of evasion and opportunism. Towards the end of March 1965, when Chen Yi was in Karachi, Bhutto explained his government's view of the matter at some length. Pakistan, he said, was not the author of the policy of alliances formulated by the Western countries, particularly by the United States. By rushing military assistance to India, the U.S. had not merely jeopardized the whole concept of alliances but also "shattered" it. He then made haste to say: "I would like to say that we attach the highest importance to our relations with the United States. We cannot be unmindful of the generous assistance given by the United States to Pakistan in its economic development and to strengthen Pakistan's military posture."³⁶

To please the other master, Mao's China, he asserted that, in the ten years of his country's association with the United States, there had been no penetration of Western influences in Pakistan society; on the contrary, these years had seen the rise of a Black Muslim movement in the United States. While Pakistan was not a nation to be dominated by foreign influences, he suggested by implication that Pakistan was behind the Black Muslim movement in the U.S.A.! Turning again to his American audience, which was becoming increasingly suspicious, if not critical of Bhutto's acrobatics in contradictory loyalty, he said: "I admit that we have

³⁵ Indian Express, New Delhi, 16 December 1965.

³⁶ Dawn, Karachi, 29 March 1965.

moved closer to China and that there has developed a great understanding between China and Pakistan but that has not been at the cost of the United States and what is more the relations with China have developed along lines consistent with the objective of world peace. We have moved forward in our relations with China, but we have not moved backward in our relations with the United States."³⁷ He added: "This does not mean that Pakistan will come under the shadow of communism. Pakistan will not be dominated by external ideologies. It may be said that there is a contradiction in this position. I proclaim that there is no contradiction in this position."³⁸

Bhutto's conception of the power of Pakistan ideology was grand indeed. All other ideologies merged into it, as tributaries in the mighty Indus, and were transformed into the one great ideology of Peace. "The U.S. wants world peace," he continued. "The Chinese leaders have repeatedly told us they wanted world peace. The U.S. does not want to aggravate world tensions. The Chinese leaders have told us that they did not want to aggravate tensions. Both Governments want peace. Where is the contradiction in having relations with countries desiring peace?"³⁹ The Pakistan Jack had climbed the beanstalk and laid low the giant of war, and there was sweetness and light all over. All the talk of world tension was but an evil dream. A new era had dawned on Asia and the world. All was well except for that one fly in the ointment—India.

Meanwhile, Pakistan began to look after Chinese interests in various capitals both overtly and covertly. When Republican Chinese were arrested for espionage in Brazil, it was the Ambassador of Pakistan who interviewed them and looked after them and negotiated their safe return to Peking via Karachi. These services were rewarded by China. On 14 November, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on a production programme and other technical details of a heavy mechanical complex in West Pakistan to be set up with Chinese help. The accord followed an economic and technical cooperation agreement between the two countries concluded

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸*Dawn*, Karachi, 29 March 1965.

³⁹*Ibid.*

earlier in February.⁴⁰ Chou En-lai was reported to have given to Pakistan a fresh credit of \$67 million to buy arms in addition to \$60 million economic credit offered earlier in the year.⁴¹ Another agreement was signed in Dacca for the supply of electronic equipment to Pakistan. A Chinese delegation arrived in East Pakistan to establish a \$60 million paper plant in Chittagong. A number of other Chinese missions, including cultural and medical, arrived in Pakistan.

Even more portentous developments were under way. China was reported to have already supplied weapons for three new infantry divisions being raised in Pakistan; both China and Indonesia had offered MiG aircraft for which Pakistan pilots were being trained in China; a flotilla of craft from the Indonesian Navy had been lent or made over to the Pakistan Navy.⁴² On 23 March 1966, Pakistan disclosed that it was equipping its armed forces with tanks and jets made in China. In the Republic Day parade in Rawalpindi, the Pakistan Army displayed Chinese-made T-59 tanks and a fly-past included Chinese-made MiG-19 fighters. There were reports that the Chinese might provide Pakistan with arms ordinance factories. These reports were current during Liu Shao-chi's visit to Pakistan towards the end of March 1966.⁴³

During the session of the National Assembly in Dacca, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan gave another demonstration of his government's skill in fusing the incompatibles. He said on 14 March 1966: "Our independence will not be real; our integrity

⁴⁰ *Statesman*, New Delhi, 16 November 1965.

⁴¹ *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 31 December 1965.

⁴² The *Times* correspondent quoted in an editorial in the *Statesman*, 6 January 1966.

⁴³ B.B.C. newsreel on 28 March 1966.

"It is becoming clear that Red China made military equipments such as medium weight 9-59 tanks with 100 mm guns and MiG-19 jet fighters are part of the weapons possessed by Pakistan. These military equipments were displayed at the Pakistan National Day Parade last Wednesday. MiG fighters suggest that they are manned with those who have received proper training. According to available information about 150 Pakistan personnel have been receiving training in Red China and the fact that the Pakistan Chief of Air Staff was also one of those who piloted these MiGs on the Pakistan National Day shows that he has been trained by China." (Editorial in Thai newspaper, *Bhim Thai*, 27 March 1966.)

will not be safe and our interests will not be protected if we entrust them into the hands of others." And more admirably: "We have no desire to engage in the game of power politics. Our allegiance is not on auction to the highest bidder, nor do we intend to play off one friend against another in search for diplomatic leverage."⁴⁴ He then observed with all the "responsibility" at his command that "India dared not raise its little finger against East Pakistan. I cannot say any more. One day all will be known."⁴⁵ Here was an indication of a guarantee of military assistance to East Pakistan from China, a demonstration of the reality of the Pakistan-China axis. Immediately the members of the Assembly from East Pakistan hit back by saying that the responsibility for the defence of East Pakistan was that of the Government of Pakistan, not of China. This showed that at least one-half of Pakistan was not particularly enamoured of China's protection which Ayub Khan and Bhutto proudly brandished.

Hardly were the Republic Day celebrations over when the Chinese President accompanied by the Chinese Foreign Minister arrived in Pakistan. At a banquet given in honour of the guests, the President of Pakistan said that friendship between Pakistan and China was not based on expediency. The policies of the two governments were based on principles, one of which was the right of peoples to self-determination. He said that the "people of Pakistan remember with deep gratitude the support they received from the Government and the people of China in their hour of trial."⁴⁶ Liu Shao-chi confirmed in his reply that the Chinese Government and people had "firmly supported Pakistan in its righteous fight against aggression."⁴⁷ In other words, the aggressive military alliance which had been tested and tried in war was now publicly reaffirmed lest the world should remain in any doubt about it.

So much for the past. What about the future? "Pakistan people rest assured," said Liu Shao-chi, "that when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression and in defence of

⁴⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 15 March 1966.

⁴⁵*Dawn*, Karachi, 16 March 1966.

⁴⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 March 1966.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, 650 million Chinese people will stand unswervingly on their side and give them resolute support and assistance."⁴⁸ Chen Yi said in further explanation at Lahore: "A profound militant friendship has been forged between the Chinese and Pakistan people in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. This friendship is based on mutual sympathy and support. It is a sincere and disinterested friendship which can stand all tests."⁴⁹ Support was never one-sided and it was China's bounden duty to give firm support to the Pakistan Government and people "in their just struggle against India's armed aggression."⁵⁰ If an aggressor dared attack Pakistan, the Chinese people would stand resolutely and would help Pakistan in defeating the aggression.⁵¹

A little over a fortnight later in East Pakistan he made a specific reference to any future attack on East Pakistan, confirming what Bhutto had told the Pakistan National Assembly on 15 March. "In the future should East Pakistan or West Pakistan again face the armed attack of any aggressor," said Chen Yi, "the Chinese Government and people will continue to support the Pakistan people in their struggle to safeguard national independence, state sovereignty and national unity."⁵² At a dinner given in his honour at Dacca, Liu Shao-chi reaffirmed that China and Pakistan required of each other "unity against aggression."⁵³

Liu's visit coincided with the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, to the United States. The timing of the visit was aimed at undoing the Tashkent Declaration which was a thorn in the Chinese flesh. From now on, Pakistan steadfastly turned away from the Declaration and its obligations thereunder. The guarantor of Pakistan's "national independence, state sovereignty and national unity" poured forth a bounty of tanks and MiGs.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 30 March 1966.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹*Dawn*, Karachi, 31 March 1966.

⁵²*Dawn*, Karachi, 16 April 1966.

⁵³*Dawn*, Karachi, 17 April 1966.

In the course of Liu's visit, there were the usual references to Kashmir and the people's right of self-determination, the leaders of the two countries advocating abroad what they had suppressed at home. The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Bhutto, emphasized that, until the causes of the Kashmir war were removed, Pakistan was entitled to receive arms from any source. "We had to go to China to find a means of defence against aggression and had to apply to any source."⁵⁴ The statement was made presumably with an eye on the U.S.A. who might, it was hoped, lift the ban on the sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan. The Chinese were Pakistan's friends, he said, but the Americans were Pakistan's allies.⁵⁵

The world was not allowed to forget that Pakistan and China were military allies, comrades-in-arms determined to pay off old scores. Chou En-lai reassured a cultural delegation from Pakistan in April 1966 of his country's moral and material support to Pakistan against any external aggression that might be forced on her.⁵⁶ He told a Pakistani: "The peoples of China and Pakistan have formed a profound militant friendship in the course of their struggle against common enemies. Facts have proved and will continue to prove that this friendship can stand the test of time and is reliable."⁵⁷ Militant friendship—that is to say military, aggressive, planned.

Meanwhile, more Chinese delegations arrived in Pakistan—a geological mission in April and a delegation of Chinese Ulema in June. The Defence Minister of India informed the Rajya Sabha that Chinese officers were giving training in guerilla warfare to Pakistan forces in East and West Pakistan.⁵⁸

On the occasion of the visit of Ghulam Farouque, the Commerce Minister of Pakistan, to Peking, Chen Yi repeated and reaffirmed what the Chinese President and Premier had said earlier about the relations between the two countries. He also let fall a remark, the sweeping and categorical character of which is noteworthy.

⁵⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 31 March 1966.

⁵⁵*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 30 March 1966.

⁵⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 22 April 1966.

⁵⁷To Ejaz Hussain. (*Dawn*, Karachi, 27 April 1966.)

⁵⁸*Patriot*, New Delhi, 18 May 1966.

"Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said," he observed, "we should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports." The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists did not like Sino-Pakistan friendship, nor did the "Indian expansionists." "This proves we have done the right thing,"⁵⁹ he concluded. Thus was reason sacrificed to malice.

These assertions, declarations, and reassertions were followed up with quick action. Pakistan Army units in East Pakistan are reportedly being reorganized on the Chinese pattern, and a four-man Chinese supply mission is stationed in Dacca. There are also Chinese military advisers attached to the G.O.C., 14 Infantry Division, who control the entire Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. Many new units are said to have been raised and more are in the process of formation. On 4 July 1966, Pakistan and China signed a trade protocol on exchange of goods. Ghulam Farouque said in Dacca that China was already collaborating with Pakistan in the field of heavy industry in West Pakistan, and would do so in East Pakistan also.⁶⁰

The Defence Minister of India gave some idea of the Pakistan-China military alliance in a statement to the Lok Sabha on 8 August 1966: Pakistan, he said, had recouped its losses sustained in the armed conflict in 1965. It had undertaken a programme which would more than double the strength of its army, from five divisions to eleven, equipment for two of which China had agreed to supply. New divisions were also being raised in occupied Kashmir where armed manpower had increased to 35,000. Arms aid to Pakistan from China included 200 tanks and a substantial number of MiG-19 and MiG-15 aircraft. As a result, Pakistan had five more

⁵⁹ *Statesman*, New Delhi, 29 July 1966.

⁶⁰ *Morning News*, Dacca, 31 July 1966.

"The air service has also helped to bring the business agencies of the two countries closer still. This has been followed by a direct shipping service of the National Shipping Corporation. As a result of these efforts, trade between the two countries has risen from Rs. 48.5 million in 1951 to Rs. 277 million. This is a record increase of more than 500 per cent. China is now a traditional buyer of Pakistan's raw cotton, raw jute and jute goods. Items importable from China include steel and metal products, coal, cement, machinery, chemicals, raw materials and cereals." ("Pakistan-China Relations," *Dawn*, Karachi, 26 March 1966.)

squadrons than in 1965. Despite the U.S. embargo, Pakistan had been able to replenish materially its supplies of spares and ammunition for U.S. equipment through other countries. Some F-86 aircraft originally in West Germany had reached Pakistan through Iran.⁶¹ Pakistan appears to be building up two separate, self-contained armies—one for West Pakistan largely based on American equipment, the other in East Pakistan based on Chinese assistance and weapons.

Pakistan continues to arm itself at a feverish pace. Since September 1965, China has supplied Pakistan complete equipment for two infantry divisions, about 250 tanks, 125 MiG aircraft, and two squadrons of IL 28 bombers. Besides, a large number of artillery pieces and substantial quantities of tank and artillery ammunition and spares for tanks and aircraft have been supplied by China. In addition, Pakistan has procured arms and equipment from other countries including some NATO powers. These comprise aircraft, field and medium guns, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-tank missiles, and small arms and ammunition. "It would appear that the main anxiety of Pakistan in subscribing to the [Tashkent] agreement was to secure the withdrawal of Indian forces from positions in Pakistan and on the Pakistan side of the Cease-Fire Line. Having accomplished its objective, it ceased to pay any attention to the other provisions of the agreement which enjoined the restoration of normal relationship between the two countries and began rapidly to expand its armed potential."⁶²

As an illustration of Sino-Pakistan collaboration against India, the newspapers of the two countries, subject to rigid central control, are perfectly attuned. On 24 March 1967, a commentator in the *People's Daily* of Peking wrote:

The Indian people have a glorious revolutionary tradition. The great armed uprising of the Telangana peasants of 1949-51 struck terror in the hearts of the Indian ruling class. Today the country is convulsing to struggle against hunger and star-

⁶¹*Statesman*, New Delhi, 9 August 1966.

⁶²*The Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of Defence for 1966-67*.

vation. In Nagaland and Mizo tribal areas the armed struggles have already been continuing and a new revolutionary storm is about to rise in India.

Earlier a leading Pakistan newspaper had gloated with no less venom on the same subject. After referring to India's "efforts to subdue the freedom movements in Kashmir, Mizoland, Sikkim and Bhutan," an editorial in the *Dawn* of 5 January 1967 stated:

The Nagas were not a part of India even during the days of British paramountcy. But the Indians marched their troops into free Nagaland to cow down, subdue and suppress the proud, sensitive people. The Indian Jawans have since proved more brutal and barbarous than any army of occupation known in recent history. All these oppressions and callous cruelties have, however, failed to bring India any nearer her goal. The forces of the free Nagas are still unbeaten.

Pakistan and China are thus busy stoking the fires in Nagaland and Mizo Hills. They train guerillas and supply them with arms, giving sanctuary to those who escape from the net of Indian security forces.

The alliance between Pakistan and China is obviously of unusual interest. It has been forged at the initiative of President Ayub Khan. Yet it was he who cried hoarse against the danger of the push of the North and later decried as "utter military nonsense" his own theory that China would use Tibet and the Himalayas as the base for invading the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. In July 1964, he said in London that an invasion of that nature was ruled out by "geography and logistics."⁶³ The push of the North implied expansionism, and he was asked in London about the "expansionist and aggressive policies" of China. He replied that it was a matter of opinion and he had his own opinion on the problem. "China has not been expansionist and aggressive

⁶³At a press conference in London. (*Dawn*, 14 July 1964.)

According to Bhutto, "given geography and the power realities of the modern age, the military threat to us, if there is one, would come more from the Soviet Union than from China." (*Washington Post*, 10 March 1963.)

with us,"⁶¹ he said. The development of Sino-Pakistan relations had followed "from immutable facts of location, the priceless heritage of tradition, imperatives of progress at home and peace in Asia and the world."⁶² China did not constitute any danger to the area "either in its intentions or actual policy."⁶³ With regard to his latter-day theory about the disappearance of the danger of the push of the North, the President may be right in a sense. By inducting Chinese arms and personnel along with the attendant wherewithals of propaganda and subversion into Pakistan, by furnishing bases for Chinese activities from within the sub-continent, Ayub Khan has not only welcomed the push from the North but also helped convert that push into a push from within.

Pakistan and China have contracted a marriage of convenience forced by their hatred of India. Yet the incompatibilities are there. China is a foe of capitalism and religion, Pakistan a votary of both. China believes in revolution, Pakistan at least professes faith in religious ideology, traditional stability and peace, though it has violated the U.N. Charter many times by committing aggression on India. China is opposed to Western military alliances of which Pakistan remains a participant.

Expediency and opportunism have prevailed, and between Pakistan and China, each appears to be using the other. By an arms agreement and the Peking-Rawalpindi road, Pakistan has opened the doors to Chinese penetration in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. By entrusting the integrity and defence of East Pakistan to China—which was not threatened by India or anyone else in any case—Pakistan has not only written off its eastern wing in the long run, but also brought the reality of a threat closer to South Asia. China has acted on Mao Tse-tung's view that "the proletariat must learn to forge alliances with all such elements as may be willing to do so for a limited period against a common enemy." Pakistan has acted as a willing tool of this sinister philosophy in return for Chinese political and military

⁶¹*Morning News*, Dacca, 7 July 1964.

⁶²*Dawn*, Karachi, 26 March 1966.

⁶³Hsinhua carried a report from Cairo dated 19 March 1966 of what Ayub Khan told the Editor of a U.A.R. paper.

support against India, which may ultimately prove of dubious value. While only time will draw up a balance-sheet of gains and losses of the two parties, on present reckoning it seems a fair view that in the marriage of incompatibles Pakistan has surrendered rather more than it has gained or is likely to gain.⁶⁷ Basically it is a case of the carrot trying to overtake the donkey. The dangers to which Pakistan has exposed not only the Indian subcontinent but equally South-East Asia and West Asia are a measure of the recklessness with which Pakistan has surrendered to an expansionist and aggressive China.

Instrument of Chinese Policy

THE SWING IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF Pakistan from the U.S.A. to China was made easy by a number of intervening stages which the opposite armed camps shared. There was hardly anything in common between their ideologies, but in their individual approach they showed remarkable similarities.

To begin with, both China and the U.S.A. had nothing but contempt for India's policy of nonalignment. In the U.S.A. this attitude continued for over a decade, and began to change only with the advent of the Kennedy era. To Dulles, nonalignment was immoral; to Mao Tse-tung, it was no more than a brand of capitalism. In the Chinese conception of the world, there were only two roads, the one of capitalism and the other of communism: there was no third road which independent nations could take. Chinese suspicion and contempt of India's nonalignment was in evidence even in the earlier phase of India-China relations in the early fifties. Equally, American policy-makers dubbed non-alignment as communist in substance. Thus, each side saw and condemned in India's independent foreign policy of nonalignment what it found loathsome in the policies of its opponent.

Both believed in a show of force in one form or another. For the U.S.A. security lay in containing communist countries, an object which it tried to achieve by throwing a worldwide ring of military bases around them. The Soviet Union and China were threatened with massive retaliation, not excluding the use of nuclear arms, if the ring was broken at any point. A new weapon appeared on the scene, "brinkmanship," which amounted to

confronting a communist power with the enormous military strength of the Western world in a manner intended to leave it in no doubt about the determination of the Western powers to use that strength. The U.S.A. at least believed in peace, though some of its activities might have caused rather than healed breaches thereof. China, on the other hand, was openly in favour of revolution and war. Subversion, infiltration, revolution—these were and remain its principal articles of export. It welcomed upsets, encouraged conflicts among nations, and constantly preached the cult of violence even to its own people. China's policies were and are calculated to promote instability and chaos by undermining traditional and cultural ties among peoples.

Finally, there was more than a touch of fanaticism in the devotion of both to their respective ideologies. Men of liberal outlook, though of outstanding ability and character, were persecuted or otherwise maligned in the U.S.A. In China, Mao used his "let hundred flowers bloom" to bring out for liquidation individuals who believed in human values within the orbit of communism.

None of these approaches was alien to Pakistan. Its government was opposed to nonalignment. It believed in the use of force in settling Indo-Pakistan differences, and its capacity for religious fanaticism, especially in relation to India, was truly unsurpassed. The similarity in its general outlook and approach with that of the U.S.A. and China encouraged Pakistan in the belief that the most natural thing for it to do would be to join both camps and move from one camp to the other as necessary, notwithstanding occasional embarrassments. Field Marshal Ayub Khan's government transformed this policy of shift into a fine art. The country had to pay a price for his success. A free press, which might ask inconvenient questions, was muzzled and all political activity and public opinion subdued beforehand.

Pakistan Foreign Ministers seldom mince words on neutralism. One of them said: "To me neutralism seems suspiciously like 'fencemanship'—the art of sitting on the fence between two worlds hoping that each will help for fear of losing the sitter to the other. History has witnessed the swift and tragic end of such feats of

balancing when they are put to the test."¹ Already in 1952, Mohammed Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, had declared: "Do not count Pakistan as a neutral nation of Asia. Our basic sympathies are strongly with the West."² This attitude continued year after year. Bogra opposed Nehru at the Bandung Conference on nonalignment. As a writer has observed, the U.S. Government policy "denigrated Prime Minister Nehru's attempt to be neutral between the Soviet communists and American anti-communists. To Pakistanis any foe of Nehru was a friend of Pakistan's."³

Ayub Khan's view of nonalignment was simple and categoric. "The situation is further bedevilled," he said on the eve of his coup d'etat, "by the gospel of neutralism, which really is a shadow of communism. And neutralism is also cooperating with communism to keep the people in the Middle East ineffective. I wouldn't be a bit surprised if neutralism was after these territories in due course of time. Neutralism also does not want to see coherence and strength and getting together anywhere. Arabs are also misled by that. The vehicle of propaganda is the language of nationalism. The appeal is through local nationalism. But the real object is to ensure that they remain divided, they remain weak and an easy target."⁴ In brief, any country like India which pursued the policy of nonalignment and peace among nations was suspect, and a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of non-communist States. He has done nearly as much as the British—and that should be a great deal—to divide and weaken the Arab States. He seems to have realized latterly the necessity of cooperating with the U.S.S.R. He has, of course, been cultivating and cooperating with Chinese communism for quite some time.

Practically, all nonaligned States had adopted the principle of secularism in their policies and actions. For one thing these leaders did not wish to get involved in religious squabbles, national

¹Quoted in Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 321.

²D. N. Wilber, *Pakistan*, HRAF Press, New Haven, 1964, p. 316.

³Weekes, *Pakistan*, p. 257.

⁴*Asian Review*, July 1958, p. 222.

and international, as such involvement would affect the capacity of their governments for a nonaligned, objective view of situations on merit and principles. For another, religion is a vital matter of the conscience and beliefs of people, and it would be wrong for the State to interfere in such matters or allow its politics to be governed by sectarian considerations. Men of power are not necessarily the men of God and from religious tyranny of one kind to the godless tyranny of Mao's China would be but one step. But this principle of secularism was particularly galling to Pakistan because India had adopted it. Pakistan rulers saw, in terms of the two-nation theory, the business of the State really split up into things concerning the faithful and those concerning the infidel. In its dislike of secularism, Pakistan found itself in opposition not only to India but also to a host of other States including Arab and other Muslim States.

Pakistan desired a price for opposing nonalignment, and Pakistan leaders looked upon nonalignment and military pacts as two horses which a country could ill afford to ride at the same time. Either a country could be neutral or choose to be a member of a military pact.⁵ The U.S.A. under President Kennedy had begun to accept neutralism as a fact of life, as the Soviet Union had already done under Khrushchev. To America it was a question of winning or losing the friendship and understanding of the entire African continent and many Asian countries including India. Ayub Khan was, therefore, expected to raise this matter with Kennedy during his visit to Washington in July 1961.

By then the dust raised by Western and communist leaders over nonalignment in the early years was already settling down and the form and lineament of this policy appeared to have their own justification. "A vast peace zone has taken shape on earth," said Khrushchev. "There is a growing number of countries that adhere to a policy of neutrality and strive to safeguard themselves against the hazards of participation in military blocks.... It is possible to avert a world war by the combined efforts of the mighty Socialist camp, the peace-loving non-Socialist countries [i.e. the neutralist countries], the international working class and all the

⁵*Pakistan Times*, 24 June 1961.

forces championing peace."⁸ Reappraisal of American attitude to nonalignment, which had begun under President Eisenhower, had also cleared some of the cobwebs in American thinking. President Kennedy said of nonaligned countries that they "want to stay free, independent, perhaps of us, but certainly independent of the Communists." The greatest force favouring the free world was the desire of people to be free, and he believed that, if the U.S. identified itself with that force, it would strengthen freedom.⁹ It was in these circumstances that the question of U.S. relations with its allies, such as Pakistan, and the U.S. relations with non-aligned States came to the fore.

Inevitably thesis produced its antithesis. It was asked in Pakistan whether, in the circumstances, it was more beneficial to continue to be committed to or to withdraw from Western pacts. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, told the National Press Club in Washington on 10 July 1960 that the U.S. must be in a position to develop not only the strength of its allies but to help others in the free world, including the uncommitted. He went on: "There is no appreciable difference among countries of the free world—including the uncommitted countries: the underlying issue today is one of national independence and freedom of choice."¹⁰ Ayub Khan warned American television viewers that Pakistan might adopt neutralism if the force of circumstances presented neutralism as the only guarantee of Pakistan security, and expressed the hope that the choice would not arise.¹¹

Inevitably again the antithesis was contradicted by the thesis, and both were to chase each other again and again. In reply to the U.S. President's address of welcome in Washington on 11 July 1961, Ayub Khan sounded a humbler note: "We in Pakistan take a deep interest in the policies and actions of the United States of America, and, although we are a long way from you and you are a long way from us, the world is shrinking, and we feel that our safety, freedom, security, and independence are inexorably linked

⁸Quoted in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *Elephants and the Grass*, p. 134.

⁹Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁰Pakistan Times, Lahore, 12 July 1961.

¹¹Dawn, Karachi, 11 July 1961.

with yours."¹⁰ His efforts to be on good terms with the game-keeper as well as the poacher called forth a comment in the U.S.A. that he was not the only pebble on the beach.¹¹ However, it was clear that Ayub Khan had got over his shortlived weakness for the virtues of neutralism. He had mended his fences with the United States.

He could now even show some charity of thought to neutralism. Commenting on the impending neutralist "summit" conference in Belgrade, Ayub Khan explained: "We are not neutralists. Therefore we are not very good people to define neutralism." Some people thought that their future was not served that way and he respected those neutralists who were "honest and really neutral." He, obviously, excluded India from the latter category. When asked on his return to Karachi whether he had discussed with Kennedy the question of Pakistan going neutral, he replied that the necessity had not arisen. "What attraction is there in neutralism?" he asked.¹² The possibility of "Pakistan going neutral" was perhaps nothing more than a device to browbeat America into giving Pakistan more arms, more economic aid, and stronger political support against India. He had been asked in New York whether he was satisfied that the U.S.A. was not abandoning Pakistan for others, and he had replied that he was quite satisfied on that score and that, personally, he had never had any doubts in his mind.

Asked whether what had happened in Laos was likely to encourage the communist-inspired and communist-directed aggression in other neighbouring countries in South-East Asia, he said categorically: "I have no doubt in my mind that wherever they can find opportunity to go and support subversion, they will not hesitate to do."¹³ Addressing the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in Karachi on 25 August 1961, he defended Pakistan membership of Western military pacts. A tremendous struggle, he maintained, was going on between the two mightiest

¹⁰ *Khyber Mail*, Peshawar, 12 July 1961.

¹¹ *Washington News*. (Quoted in *Times of India*, 13 July 1961.)

¹² *Dawn*, Karachi, 20 July 1961.

¹³ T.V. interview on ABC, "Meet the Press," 16 July 1961; *Dawn*, Karachi, 19 July 1961.

powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. If a major war broke out, Pakistan because of its strategic position could not be saved from it by any amount of neutralism. Besides, Pakistan had two mighty neighbours, one of which was hostile towards it and the other had an ideology. The only way out for Pakistan was to have powerful friends who were interested in its freedom, progress, and security.¹⁴

Alongside with these statements, intended to reassure Western countries of Pakistan's trustworthiness as an ally, Ayub Khan had kept the door open to China. His negotiations with China about the border of Kashmir with Sinkiang have already been noted. By the end of 1962, after China had committed aggression on Indian territory in NEFA and Ladakh, nonalignment was held up to ridicule and scorn in Pakistan, and mutual recriminations between the U.S. and Pakistan over the latter's relations with China were in full swing. Ayub Khan now began to talk of the need for "normalization" of Pakistan relations with its neighbour, China. On 12 December 1963, a State Department spokesman remarked that the visit of Chinese leaders to the U.A.R. and African countries could not be held in the same category as that to Pakistan because Pakistan was "allied with the U.S. against communist aggressive aims."¹⁵ Soon after, Phillip Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, expressed a similar view.¹⁶ Under-Secretary George Ball had already told Ayub Khan that both SEATO and the Mutual Security Agreement between Pakistan and the U.S.A. were aimed against "aggressive communism," that for Pakistan to rely heavily on China vitiated the sense of those alliances, and that Pakistan's fear of possible Indian military aggression was unjustified by the facts.¹⁷ Ayub Khan did not need to show great skill or finesse in his double act. Such success as Pakistan blackmail achieved was due to the fact that, while the U.S.A. and West Germany were not inclined to abandon an ally in a hurry, China was in feverish search of an Asian friend and

¹⁴*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 26 August 1961.

¹⁵*Dawn*, Karachi, 13 December 1963.

¹⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 23 December 1963.

¹⁷*New York Times*, 4 September 1963.

ally to explain away its delinquencies to the world beyond its frontiers.

Hitherto, Pakistan had taken India to task for its policy of non-alignment in order to create misunderstandings between India and the U.S.A. Ayub Khan now attacked that policy from the Chinese point of view. The lead was given by Indonesia. Addressing the Pakistan National Assembly on 26 June 1963, Soekarno gave his own diagnosis of the malady from which the world suffered. This diagnosis was entirely Chinese. "At its core," said Soekarno, "the turmoil of the world today is the outcome of the confrontation between the old established order and the newly emerging forces ... the essentials of the situation we all face are the conflict between the old order based upon domination and exploitation of one group by another and the new forces working for democracy, social justice and world peace." Indonesia, China, and Pakistan were precisely the new forces of democracy, social justice, and world peace! He then asked: "How can we complete the Great Revolution of Mankind without the development of new concepts to underlie the institutions, new methods of execution, new forms of administration, new economic and social procedures?" And he went on to answer his own question: "We have to remove ourselves from the world of the old order to the world of the new. We must become dynamic, we must learn new ways." The new ways of China!

All this was in sharp contrast with the policy of nonalignment, at least as Nehru advocated it. Here was an invitation to strife and conflict, not only among the free countries of Asia and Africa but also among various groups in one and the same country. Soekarno was mouthing China's call for chaos. "It must be recorded," says an author sympathetic to Pakistan, "that Mr. Nehru used with great discretion the position of prominence into which India so naturally stepped, and used it moreover to ensure that the voice of Asia, and not only the voice of his own country, was heard with due attention. His sensitivity to any suggestion that Asian opinion was being accorded less than its due weight in the handling of international affairs by the Great Powers of the Security Council was occasionally misunderstood in the West."

It was not a claim to Indian leadership in Asia—a claim which he consistently repudiated: it was rather a determination to ensure that great world issues were not settled merely with reference to the interests and convenience of the Soviet Union, the United States and Western Europe.... The abiding influence in foreign policy of the nexus of ideas and convictions held by Mr. Nehru is illustrated by India's tireless support of people, struggling to free themselves from foreign domination and by the importance she attaches to the substitution of national independence for the colonial system all over the world.”¹⁸

China and Soekarno's Indonesia were not interested in Asia or Africa for these reasons but for their own. If they had their way, the countries of Asia and Africa would find themselves in the midst of endless strife and tribulation. China had visions of a world under its hegemony, of a separate international organization of its own, a rival to the United Nations. To oblige China, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations and the Pakistan Foreign Minister at first obliquely and then openly in September 1965 threatened to follow suit. Nothing was more unwelcome to China than a conference of nonaligned States, which refused to become its camp-followers, and it is significant that when Ayub Khan was asked in Colombo on 15 December 1963 about his view of the impending meeting of nonaligned States in Belgrade, he replied: “I would not waste any time on a Belgrade-type conference. I won't like to be called a sycophant of major powers. Nonalignment is a shadow of major power conflicts.”¹⁹ According to his logic, the States which did not belong to any military bloc were sycophants of major powers, and Pakistan which was a member of military blocs led by major powers, professing fealty to two opposing military camps, was independent in its

¹⁸L. F. Rushbrooke Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, pp. 114-5.

Albert Luthuli in his book *Let My People Go* (p. 210) says: “The way in which India at the UNO has taken up cudgels on behalf of the oppressed South African majority and dragged the whole scandal of apartheid into the open has heartened us immeasurably.”

¹⁹*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 16 December 1963.

policies!²⁰ But Pakistan was merely trumpeting for China, and its Foreign Minister promptly and dutifully supported Peking and Djakarta in their demand for an Afro-Asian conference, and in their insistence on the exclusion of Malaysia and the Soviet Union from its deliberations. The conference ultimately failed to materialize because of Chinese machinations. China succeeded, nevertheless, with the active support of Pakistan and Indonesia, in deepening the cleavages in Afro-Asian solidarity.

Both attempted to discredit India in the eyes of Afro-Asian countries. In fact, a well-planned and coordinated crusade was launched to achieve that end. Anything which could be used to tarnish India's image was seized upon. A favourite theme was that India had chauvinistic and expansionist designs on its neighbours and that, in the achievement of this objective, it was being helped by the U.S.A. The aid to India from the Soviet Union was condemned by Peking as further proof of Soviet "revisionism."

A new axis, Peking-Djakarta-Rawalpindi, came into existence. Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Ministers of the three countries flitted from one capital to another, holding meetings and breathing fire. Pakistan had long been China's spokesman. Chou En-lai had repeatedly acknowledged defence of China by Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO,²¹ particularly to disabuse the minds of Western military allies of any suggestion about China having committed aggression against India.²² It was now Chou En-lai's turn to speak up for Pakistan. Pakistan's alliances with CENTO and SEATO, he contended, were defensive in nature. "It was a matter of necessity and security as against India's aggressive designs."²³ Chou En-lai swallowed his earlier condemnation of SEATO with-

²⁰"Pakistan is unique in remaining an 'ally' of the United States and behaving more like an ally of communist China, the most obstreperous foe on the American horizon." (Editorial in *Chicago Daily News*, 24 March 1966.)

"The present status of Pakistan as a member of CENTO and SEATO is one only to seek advantages by destroying the principles and ideals of both without giving any good returns and without observing any obligations as a member country." (Editorial in *Siam Rath*, Bangkok, 28 March 1966.)

²¹*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 18 June 1963.

²²*Morning News*, Dacca, 30 May 1963.

²³*Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 2 June 1963.

out the slightest embarrassment. He gave expression to Chinese determination to defend Pakistan throughout the world as Pakistan had defended China in SEATO and CENTO.²⁴ In other words, China now regarded Pakistan as its tool in the SEATO and CENTO camps with hopes of using it as a Trojan horse in due time.

Thus, each supported the other, justifying its partner's policies, whitewashing its misdeeds and thanking it for acting as its advocate and spokesman. Here was community of purpose, method, and action. Never had Pakistan shown such an understanding of U.S. foreign policy objectives or given its Western military ally even one-tenth of the support it was now giving to China. The Shah of Iran once observed that, Pakistan, left alone and without allies, would certainly jump into the Chinese lap.²⁵ On the contrary, for all the alliances in which Pakistan participated, it sank deeper in the warmth and comfort of Mao's lap. The Pakistan Parliamentary Secretary for Information and Finance disclosed in the Pakistan National Assembly on 16 December 1966 that Radio Pakistan was broadcasting programmes to Muslim countries including Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and North Africa, but not to the Muslims in China, particularly in Sinkiang.²⁶ Since 1962, after the Uighurs rising, some 50,000 Chinese Muslims have fled across the Sino-Soviet border into central Soviet Russia. The refugees, according to Russian sources, fled from "religious persecution and measures of colonisation."²⁷ Yet no word of condemnation of these atrocities came from Pakistan which takes pride in its Islamic ideology and in its kinship with and concern for Muslims all over the world. In the projection of this ideology and this policy, Pakistan was acting as nothing more than a mere "shadow"—to borrow President Ayub Khan's expression—of the interests of Chinese power, on the one hand, and Western powers, on the other. To carry the metaphor forward, Pakistan clung to the benefits of

²⁴*Pakistan Times*, 18 June 1963.

²⁵To R.K. Karanjia, Editor, *Blitz*, Bombay. (*Times of India*, 29 May 1966.)

²⁶*Dawn*, Karachi, 17 December 1966.

²⁷*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 8 September 1963.

CENTO and SEATO as its armed forces continued to take part in their annual manoeuvres. In 1964, a U.S. aircraft carrier, the *Enterprise*, armed with nuclear weapons, paid a visit to Karachi, accompanied by the cruiser *Long Beach* and a "guided missile frigate," the *Bainbridge*.²⁸ The Foreign Minister of Pakistan proclaimed that the dynamics of twentieth-century politics did not demand that Pakistan should leave the alliances in order to follow, what he called, an independent foreign policy. In confirmation of all this, the U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee was told by U.S. officials in 1965 that Pakistan was cooperating with the U.S. on fundamental matters affecting America's national security.²⁹ And yet, according to President Ayub Khan, Pakistan had joined the alliances to ensure its security against India!

The curious way in which Pakistan seeks security is demonstrated by its attitude to nuclear developments in China. In his message to the Third United Nations International Conference, on the peaceful uses of Atomic Energy, President Ayub Khan stated in September 1964: "What is more tragic is the fact that countries, which are now acquiring or which have since acquired the know-how, think of diverting the fissionable materials for military purposes."³⁰ Yet when China carried out its first nuclear test, he hastened to hail this "most impressive achievement of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people."³¹

China had already embarked on its penetration of the African continent. With the help of loans, grants, subsidies, cultural and trade agreements, guerilla training and arms supplies, China was trying to spread its tentacles among the "newly emerging countries." A secret Chinese Army document dated April 1961 states: "The centre of the anti-colonial struggle is Africa.... What matters now is anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism; anti-feudalism is not yet important. It is time, not for social revolution, but for national revolution, time for a broad united

²⁸Statesman, New Delhi, 27 August 1964.

²⁹Dawn's Washington correspondent reported this on 19 February 1965.

³⁰Pakistan Times, Lahore, 9 September 1964.

³¹Ayub Khan's letter of 2 December 1964 to Chou En-lai. (Dawn, Karachi, 16 December 1964.)

front."³² This was borne out by the *People's Daily* (Peking) on 10 December 1961. "All oppressed nations and peoples," it stated, "will sooner or later rise in revolution" and this is precisely why revolutionary experience and theories will naturally gain currency among these nations and people and go deep into their hearts. That is why pamphlets introducing guerilla warfare in China have such a wide circulation in Africa." The pamphlets on guerilla warfare were being widely distributed in Africa by China and its satellites, including Pakistan. To cover up this activity, Bhutto was simultaneously trying to reassure the African countries of China's good intentions. He asserted in Cairo that China was "not an ogre getting ready to swallow South-East Asia but a benevolent giant." Mao's conspiracy to subvert and capture Indonesia was already afoot. Did Bhutto know more than he gave one the impression of knowing?

One of the Chinese objectives was to destroy the young roots of nonalignment in newly independent African States.³³ Pakistan had no difficulty in supporting this objective. The Western powers were now less intolerant of nonalignment and, at any rate, did not require Pakistan assistance to influence or undermine the policies of these new States in which their own contacts and influence were considerable. Pakistan aim, as China's, was to bring about isolation of India in Africa, as indeed in Asia.

While China and its minions were hawking guerilla warfare in Africa, Pakistan decided to make experiments with it nearer home to subvert Kashmir and other parts of India. A Pakistan writer has stated the reasons why an organization of irregulars is so vital to the Pakistan war machine. He starts off by quoting Mao Tsetung: "The so-called theory of 'weapons mean everything' is a mechanist theory of war, a view arising from a subjective and one-sided approach to problems. Our view is the opposite; we see not only the weapons but also the power of man. Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and

³² *Times*, London. (Reproduced in *Statesman*, New Delhi, 18 November 1964.)

³³ Frank Moraes, "China's Foreign Policy," *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 20 December 1964.

not material that counts. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the powers and morale of man. Military and economic power must be controlled by man." He then goes on to say that irregular warfare can help in reducing the crucial nature of the initial battles of Pakistan. It can help in spreading out and prolonging action. "The essence of this irregular warfare is to deny the enemy any target and to keep attacking him again at unexpected places." Irregular warfare with its informality, loose formations and independence of action, holds great promise. The irregular fighter, he adds, may operate independently or support widely dispersed small-sized military units which can fight in coordinated or independent combat actions. To prove the potentialities of this system of warfare, he refers to the increase in irregular warfare in Greece, China, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, Egypt, Oman, Ifni, Aden, the French Camerouns, Kenya, Burma, Laos, Algeria, Cyprus, Hungary, and Cuba.³⁴ In 1965, in addition to training and arming Nagas and Mizos in east India, Pakistan launched guerilla warfare in Kashmir on an extensive scale.

In the same year, Pakistan decided, in concert with China, to expand its diplomatic activity and open more missions in Africa. Already it had eight missions in Africa, now another three were to be opened in Tanzania, Senegal, and Ethiopia.³⁵ With more than a dozen diplomatic missions of its own in Africa, China distributed Pakistan propaganda material in countries where Pakistan had none. In return Pakistan performed similar services for China. The air bases placed by Pakistan at the disposal of China under the Pakistan-China air agreement enabled the latter to inject all manner of personnel into Africa in a bid to subvert selected areas of that continent. These facilities also placed

³⁴Aslam Siddiqi, *Pakistan Seeks Security*, pp. 64-7.

³⁵*Times of India*, 13 April 1965.

"The fact that the peoples of Pakistan and China were victims of colonial aggressions and oppression is another common base for their friendship and cooperation. Apart from these, they are united by a common determination to root out the last vestiges of imperialism and colonialism in all their forms from the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America." ("Pakistan-China Relations," *Dawn*, Karachi, 26 March 1966.)

Latin America within easy access of China's similar ambitions in that continent.

Then came a series of disasters. Chinese hopes collapsed in Indonesia and those of Pakistan's in Kashmir. The claim of Chou En-lai that Africa was ripe for revolution acted as a boomerang, as African countries began to see China in its true colours. Rupture of diplomatic relations followed in several cases. President Felix Huphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast accused China of being behind most of the subversions in Africa, including the attempt on the life of President Diori of Niger.³⁶ President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania declared: "Neither our principles, our country nor our freedom to determine our own future are for sale."³⁷ According to Dr. Banda of Malawi, the "subtle, hypocritical and organized" infiltration by Peking in Africa "is a factor of division, subversion and trouble."³⁸ Kenyatta had already warned Africa against the "danger of infiltration from the East" and against Chinese interference in African affairs.³⁹ President Bourguiba of Tunisia deplored Chinese "delusions of grandeur," accused Peking of engaging in "subversion" and "infiltration," and described the Chinese leaders as "mad men" who brought about wars. China, he said, infiltrated into Africa and wanted to "throw our continent into anarchy and subversion."⁴⁰ Apart from the assistance it rendered to China in the latter's schemes in Africa, this was exactly what Pakistan had tried to do in Kashmir, and is continuing to do in Nagaland and in the Mizo Hills area of eastern India. Infiltration of over a quarter of a million Pakistanis into Burma may yet pose unpleasant problems for that country.

In Morocco, China supported the opposition parties. Chou En-lai called upon Morocco and Ethiopia to "throw off outside control." Nigeria and Liberia are no less strongly opposed to China. "Nigerian official attitudes stem from the government's concern with Chinese intervention in neighbouring Cameroun and

³⁶*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 30 May 1965.

³⁷*Statesman*, New Delhi, 6 June 1965.

³⁸*Times of India*, New Delhi, 17 September 1965.

³⁹*Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 2 June 1965.

⁴⁰*Manuchi*, Tokyo, 6 February 1966.

from the support the P.R.C. has given to the radical opposition inside Nigeria."⁴¹ Even earlier, on 5 July 1964, Radio Lagos had commented on Chou En-lai's visit: "First of all, there has been the open disagreement by African heads of state over China's failure to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. Conceding, however, that China's action was to blackmail the U.N. into accepting its membership, Mr. Chou should have at least sought to convince Africa of his sincerity of purpose.... There is at least one hope that Mr. Chou's visit to Africa will open his eyes to the realities of present-day international politics.... China cannot do without the support of African nations in the U.N."

Because of Sino-Somali accord, Ethiopia became openly critical of China. In Cameroun, Congo (Leopoldville), and Rwanda the Chinese have incited armed insurrections. Malagasy's President Tsiranana observed that "the events in Zanzibar, Tanganyika and Somalia are imperative reasons why the Chinese Communist Government should not be recognized."⁴² The Government of Rwanda accused the Chinese of giving support to the Tutsi insurrectionary movement. How unprincipled the Republic of China is will be clear from the fact that, according to a writer, Chinese support goes to "King and aristocracy" against a revolutionary peasant movement.⁴³ There was strong criticism of Chinese policies in Africa by a majority of the fourteen Francophone African States which met in Mauritania in February 1965 to form a new African grouping, the Organization Commune Africaine et Malagache (O.C.A.M.). The precedence given to a nonaligned conference over an Afro-Asian Conference and finally the postponement of the Afro-Asian Conference were both slaps in the Chinese face. "Chou failed to persuade a single African government to indicate any preference for Peking over Moscow. Except for Mali, he also failed to persuade the African States to support the Chinese attempt to bring about an Afro-Asian Conference before the proposed conference of nonaligned states."⁴⁴

⁴¹Colin Legum, "Africa and China," *Policies Toward China*, p. 422.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 429.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 436.

With characteristic cynicism, Pakistan and China defy the very principles which they propound. While professing eternal hostility to and struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, China is content with its annual harvest of financial and other gains from Macao and Hong Kong and Pakistan remains unashamed in its sympathy with Portugal's claims to its former colonial outpost of Goa which India liberated in 1962. Both Pakistan and China find trading with South Africa and Portugal profitable. Dr. J. G. Kiano, Kenya's Minister of Commerce and Industry, disclosed in 1965 that trade between China and South Africa amounted to £300,000 in 1961, rose to £1,000,000 in 1962, £3,000,000 in 1963, and £7,000,000 in 1964. He said that, by trading with South Africa, China had not only violated the trade ban but actually earned foreign exchange from South Africa. It is noteworthy that this trade with racist South Africa was going on behind many Chinese denials. Kiano observed that, after China's categorical statement in July 1960 denying trade with Africa, it had rejected allegations about continuing trade made by a Kenyan delegation at Cairo in 1961 and by a Dar-es-Salaam newspaper, it had denied allegations made by the African National Congress in 1962 about maize purchases, it had denounced statistics published by the International Monetary Fund as biased, and it had denied a Tass statement in July 1964. Yet all the time China's trade with South Africa was not only continuing but increasing. On 24 September 1965, Kiano said in the National Assembly of Kenya that it was bad enough to continue to trade with South Africa and profess to be a champion of freedom, but "it is certainly far worse to trade with South Africa and try to deceive us Africans that this is not so, as in the case of China."⁴⁵

This was, indeed, deception *par excellence*. Trade in China is controlled, in fact entirely conducted, by the State, and the Government of China knew all along that its denials were plain falsehoods. The Government of China was perpetrating deception not only on the Afro-Asian world but also on its own people. This duplicity and deception were matched only by Pakistan's. The Pakistan Government did exactly what the Chinese Government

⁴⁵*Times of India*, New Delhi, 30 September 1965.

were doing. Additionally, the ports of call for Chinese ships plying this trade are in East and West Pakistan.

The General Assembly at its Seventeenth Session adopted its Resolution 1761 (XVII), which called upon members, *inter alia*, to cease all trade with South Africa. In spite of the adoption of this resolution, and in spite of its co-sponsorship and vote in favour of the resolution, Pakistan continued to carry on trade with South Africa. The United Nations issued a document,⁴⁶ containing the replies received from member States in pursuance of this resolution and the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963. The replies were contained in communications to the Secretary-General or to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid or in statements to the General Assembly or the Security Council. The Pakistan reply stated: "It has prohibited import of South African goods into Pakistan, and has banned the sale of arms, ammunition and all types of military vehicles and other strategic goods to South Africa. It is still carrying on a certain amount of export trade with South Africa in pursuance of earlier commitments, but is actively considering the termination of such exports."⁴⁷ The General Assembly adopted the resolution in question in 1962, but Pakistan was still carrying on trade with South Africa on 22 November 1963. In one respect, the reply was revealing. Pakistan prohibition was with regard to import of South African goods only. The ban on export was confined to the sale of strategic goods. There is a degree of honesty here which deserves acknowledgement if not admiration.

Thus have the crusaders against colonialism and racial discrimination been carrying on trade and other relations with countries which have flouted the aspirations of the Afro-Asian people. To quote one more instance, Pakistan exports to Portugal and its colonies, which stood at Rs. 68.5 million in 1964-65, according to the Pakistan statistical bulletins, rose to Rs. 122.7 million in 1965-66.

This high degree of accord between China and Pakistan was expressed by Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih on the Pakistan National Day at the Pakistan Embassy in Peking on 23 March 1966. "We

⁴⁶A/SPC/94, 22 November 1963.

⁴⁷A/SPC/94, p. 21.

have also cooperated very well in furthering the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism," he affirmed. "Friendship between the peoples of China and Pakistan is based on opposition to aggression and defence of justice and it is sincere and precious friendship. It will certainly develop from generation to generation."⁴⁸ Pakistan had travelled far in its shift from the Western military camp to the Chinese camp. It had, nevertheless, left some valises behind to lay claim to the comforts of Western shelter when necessary. Earlier in April 1964, when the SEATO ministerial conference met in Manila, the Pakistan Foreign Minister said that he preferred to attend the Second Afro-Asian Preparatory Conference in Djakarta. "In SEATO," he confessed, "we are among friends and we feel secure. This is not the case in the Afro-Asian conference and my presence here is more important than in Manila."⁴⁹ It certainly was.

While busy with China in undermining nonalignment in Asia and Africa, Pakistan paid outward homage to some of its symbols, showing considerable resilience in changing its tactics and postures, however embarrassing the change. Asked in Washington in July 1961 why, as a Muslim country, Pakistan did not take the initiative to settle the Israel-Arab conflict, Ayub Khan retorted: "Have you tried that? Lots of others have and got their fingers burned. Quite frankly, acting as a busybody is only a waste of time."⁵⁰ This was a side-kick to India whose good offices had been sought in Korea and Lebanon.

There were many reasons why Ayub Khan was unwilling to act as a mediator in the Arab-Israel dispute. Pakistan has a great deal to live down in its relations with the Arabs. It was about the only country of Afro-Asia to justify and support the notorious invasion of the U.A.R. by Israel, Britain, and France in 1956. Besides, as Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, said recently, Britain had established Israel and Pakistan to create tensions in South and West Asia. The roles contemplated for the two, which both have loyally played, were identical. While

⁴⁸A Hsinhua report in *Dawn*, Karachi, 25 March 1966.

⁴⁹*Statesman*, New Delhi, 17 April 1964.

⁵⁰*Dawn*, Karachi, 15 July 1961.

Pakistan, apart from keeping up tension and conflict in South and South-East Asia, has sought to lure some of the Arab countries into imperialist alliances, Israel has asserted its pressure on behalf of the imperialist powers to keep progressive Arab States in check. There are also other remarkable similarities between the two countries. Both are fanatically theocratic States, based on the two-nation theory. Their chosen antagonists—the Arabs and the Indians—profess, by and large, a secular political and social ideology. Despite its latter-day professions of brotherly sympathy for the Arabs, Pakistan, like Israel, has acted as the agent of Western interests to divide the Arabs. Pakistan is not interested in the elimination of the crisis in West Asia. In fact its continuance and aggravation would admirably suit Pakistan aims, including propaganda aims vis-a-vis India.⁵¹ Therefore, whereas the Arabs resent and oppose Zionism and justifiably condemn Israel for expelling about two million Arabs from their hearths and homes, Pakistan goes further and makes declarations about Israel's elimination. Nothing is lost by declarations and Israel could hardly be wished away. But there might be some gains in propaganda in the Arab world. For does not India recognize Israel?⁵²

But mediation for or intercession on China's behalf is another matter. In February 1964, Ayub Khan said that if Pakistan's good offices were required on Viet Nam he would be only too glad to offer them.⁵³ He was even prepared to act the role of an intermediary between the United States and China.⁵⁴ In 1965, he revealed that Pakistan was mediating for the establishment of relations between China and Turkey, another member of CENTO.⁵⁵ Apparently, he had no objection to being a "busybody" or to "burning" his fingers in the service of Mao's China.

In Moscow, Bhutto declared that Pakistan believed in and subscribed to peaceful coexistence and to the Bandung principles,

⁵¹Appendices 2-6; see also Shiv Sastri, "Israel, Kashmir and Pakistan," *Indian Express*, 16 August 1967.

⁵²A.K. Kakaria, "Pakistan and Israel—Partners in Design," *Nagpur Times*, 5 September 1967.

⁵³*Dawn*, Karachi, 23 February 1964.

⁵⁴*Dawn*, Karachi, 14 July 1964.

⁵⁵*Dawn*, Karachi, 29 March 1965.

complete and general disarmament, complete liquidation of colonialism of whatever form or texture, white or brown.⁵⁶ The Pakistan Foreign Minister was talking about peaceful coexistence, when his country's war machine was being geared up for assault on India in the first week of August. Mikhail Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, had more than a year earlier put his finger on Sino-Pakistan relations when, speaking at the plenary meeting of the committee, he asked: "Can anyone believe that a rapprochement with Pakistan has been dictated by interests of development of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Asia against imperialism that the Chinese leaders talk so much about?"⁵⁷ Whatever the motives, it is undeniable that Pakistan has swung over to China, and is ready to say the piece given to it. It assures everyone of Chinese peaceful intentions, emphasizing by implication the futility of Western military pacts of which it, nevertheless, remains a member. However, it is noteworthy that Pakistan has not denied to the U.S.A. the use of its territory for military purposes against China or the Soviet Union. To which position is it more faithful, if at all it is faithful to either?

The fluctuations in the foreign policy of Pakistan are not ideologically motivated. The policy is still determined, as it was in the past, by Pakistan's continuing hatred of India. All that it seeks is support against India, not against communism or imperialism or colonialism or neo-colonialism. No principles are involved here. If there is any consistency, it is one of seeking and offering collaboration against what is assumed to be the common enemy, namely, India. Thus, Pakistan made common cause with the U.S.A. in condemning the nonalignment of India. Equally readily, Pakistan switched its loyalty and affection to China and condemned India in outright terms on the Sino-Indian border dispute. The basis and motivations of the foreign policy of Pakistan are as simple as that. Since it is assumed in Pakistan that India is its enemy number one, and it is Pakistan's national interest to down India, Pakistan must inevitably, contrary to all logic and

⁵⁶ Dawn, Karachi, 6 April 1965.

⁵⁷ Meeting held on 14 February 1964. (*Statesman*, New Delhi, 5 April 1964.)

the dictates of experience, set out in search of countries which view India as their enemy. There is, really speaking, only one such country other than Pakistan in the world today, i.e. China. Chinese declarations of defiance of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are no more than shadow-boxing although China's ambitions to a super-power status are to be acknowledged. China can cause little harm to the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. and neither will be inclined to run into meaningless and unprofitable conflicts with the former. India, because of its geographic location, population, resources potential, and other factors is an obstacle in the way of the spread of Chinese ideology in Asia and Africa. Possibly also China sees in India a potential rival. India must, therefore, be disrupted or dominated. It is in this context that the petty ambition of Pakistan to malign and undermine India fits into China's larger geopolitical aims, not vice versa. Pakistan is but an instrument of Chinese policy.

Such is the spell that Mao has cast on Pakistan rulers that it almost seems that these champions of Islamic ideology are dressing it up in communist attire. They have little to say about the atrocities committed by Red Guards on Chinese Muslims and Muslim religious and cultural institutions. A few newspapers in Pakistan have already gone to the extent of holding up the Red Guards as an example of dedicated youth. In their emulation of Chinese methods, the rulers of Pakistan have gone a step further. On the analogy of the Red Guards and the Red Book of Mao Tse-tung's sayings, a Green Book of President Ayub Khan's utterances has been produced. The Muslim League National Guards, clad in green, flourished their Green Books as they greeted the President at the Institute of Engineers in Dacca recently.⁵⁸ Red Book, Green Book; Red Guards, Green Guards. Abdul Monem Khan, the Governor of East Pakistan, said he welcomed the publication of the booklet to project President Ayub to the people. Simultaneously, it is reported that a Pakistan firm has undertaken to print and distribute the Green Book by the million. This popularity contest should be worth watching.

CHAPTER NINE

Reward for Betrayal

IT WAS NOT TO BE THOUGHT THAT HAVING invested two and a half billion dollars in the Pakistan military machine, the United States would simply turn its back on Pakistan and call it a day.

A characteristic of the Pakistan armed forces is their dependence on the United States for the arsenals of the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since five divisions of the Army and practically the entire Air Force have been reorganized on the American pattern pursuant to the U.S. military aid agreement, the arms needed to keep these forces in trim can come best from the United States. Pakistan must, therefore, go back to the United States or be prepared to reorganize its defence forces on some other pattern. The latter course would take years to complete. This dilemma which faced Pakistan was the United States' opportunity.

In September 1965, the United States had suspended all sale and gift supply of arms to Pakistan and India, a decision which was revised in March 1966 to permit the sale of non-lethal weapons. On 12 April 1967, a spokesman of the State Department said in Washington:

We have concluded an extensive review of our policy with regard to the provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan and have decided that we will not resume grant military assistance which has been suspended since September, 1965. We are therefore closing the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India (USMSMI). This process is expected to be completed by July 1, 1967, in both cases.

We have also decided to remove present U.S. Government restrictions on the kinds of spare parts, which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment. Henceforth, we will be prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare parts.

The United States will continue to keep its military sales policy under careful review to ensure that it is not contributing to an arms race between India and Pakistan. We strongly hope that both countries will make progress in resolving the problems and differences that divide them and that they accord an increasing priority in the allocation of their resources to agricultural and industrial development.¹

This short announcement was full of surprises in its assumptions and methods. India and Pakistan were treated alike, as if the statement did not affect one party more than the other, ignoring the obvious fact that, while the spare parts for lethal weapons would be of invaluable assistance to Pakistan in rehabilitating scores of its tanks, jet aircraft, and other weapons damaged during the armed conflict in 1965, spare parts supplies would be of little value to India which did not possess U.S. weapons in the first instance. All that India had received after the Chinese invasion of its Himalayan border in the east and west was mostly radar communications and road-building equipment worth about 76 million dollars, in comparison with military aid of the order of over two and a half billion dollars gifted to Pakistan over a period of eleven years. The effect of the new move would, therefore, obviously be to increase the effective strength of the Pakistan armour and air force without any corresponding augmentation in the Indian defence forces. This was an unusual way of limiting or discouraging an arms race between the two countries. To Indians it appeared as another generous American reward for Pakistan aggression against their country.

What was the significance of case-by-case scrutiny of indents? According to the line taken privately by American officials, this was

¹*Dawn*, Karachi, 13 April 1967.

necessary, first, to keep an eye on the level of defence expenditure of the applicant, secondly, to prevent diversion of development expenditure to purchase of arms and, thirdly, to maintain a military balance between the two countries. At the same time, it was emphasized that the quantities sold would be limited and in any case there would be no supply of U.S. lethal equipment. Such a procedure would necessitate a detailed examination of the defence budget of the applying country, a super-audit with an eye for concealed expenditures.

Besides, one of the objectives of the decision is to promote the resolution of Indo-Pakistan differences. Considering that the effect of the U.S. decision would be to provoke an arms race between India and Pakistan, it is difficult to see how this admirable objective is to be attained. It has already poisoned the atmosphere in the two countries, torpedoed whatever efforts were afoot to reduce defence expenditure, and put off any possibility of meaningful talks about the limitation of arms between India and Pakistan at a reasonable level in relation to the requirements and responsibilities of the two countries. The U.S. decision has, in fact, resulted in retarding a settlement of the problems between the two countries through negotiation and discussion. Either the U.S. Government had not fully considered the implications of the decision and its likely effects on the two countries and on its relations with them, or this announcement had revealed only a part of the picture and there was much more in it than met the eye.

The latter, which appeared to be the more likely possibility, was proved to be correct by subsequent revelations. Officially inspired reports in Pakistan newspapers disclosed that the sale of U.S. lethal equipment indirectly through third countries would be permitted also on a case-by-case basis, provided its release was in accordance with U.S. policy concerning an arms limitation between India and Pakistan. Why did the U.S. Government, in the first instance, choose to withhold this information, which was rather more vital than the announcement about the sale of lethal spare parts, etc.? Why was this part suppressed in the official announcement? The move was a tactical one, the official statement being intended to draw criticism and act as a cover for the sale

of lethal weapons of American origin to Pakistan through third countries? For reasons of its own, Pakistan had let the cat out of the bag.² There was another reason for concealing this vital information. The new policy marked a departure from the previous U.S. policy under which the sale or supply of U.S.³ military equipment by third countries was banned. Was this ban lifted merely to enable third countries to sell a limited quantity of U.S. weapons to Pakistan and India, as the American officials assured the Indian public?

The mystery is not solved by press reports from Washington which speak of U.S. keenness to prevent Pakistan from becoming completely dependent on China for its arms supply.⁴ India had been drawing the attention of the U.S.A. to the dangers inherent in the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan.⁵ The requirements of Indian defences against China were now underplayed though the outlines of Indian defence plans after the debacle of 1962 were well known to the U.S.A. and it was recognized that India's defence build-up was within the minimum necessary limits. According to official Washington, because of its domestic troubles, China was unlikely to be in a position to engage in adventures abroad for many years. It was said: "It will be ten years before India need worry about China again."⁶ By U.S. assessment, Ayub Khan had not been particularly successful in his efforts to acquire military hardware he badly needed to recoup the losses suffered in 1965 or to make good the deficiencies in armour and firepower disclosed in the fighting.⁷

The Pakistan authorities spoke on the subject diversely. According to President Ayub Khan, the bulk of Pakistan military equipment was out of date and needed replacement.⁸ A spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office had already stated that Pakistan might have to look to other sources⁹ for arms and Ayub Khan

²*Ibid.*

³C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary. (*Statesman*, New Delhi, 18 April 1967.)

⁴*Statesman*, New Delhi, 13 April 1967.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Statesman*, New Delhi, 16 April 1967.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Dawn*, Karachi, 19 April 1967.

⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 13 April 1967.

told a correspondent: "He who searches finds."¹⁰ The Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Air Force had said in January 1967 that the Air Force was stronger and more effective than ever before. Lest this should appear to be too general a statement, he explained that new sophisticated aircraft had been inducted and a large-scale re-equipment programme had been successfully completed. As a result, the Pakistan Air Force was flying more aircraft than ever before.¹¹ Commenting on this, President Ayub Khan said at the Pakistan Air Force Academy on 21 January that he was "quite aware that this is not the full story and that a great deal more has been left unsaid."¹² Reverting to the subject on 15 April 1967, Air Marshal Noor Khan referred to a "new functional concept with emphasis on speed and self-reliance" which had been evolved.¹³

Which version is to be believed—the Washington version according to which Pakistan had not been successful in making good the losses suffered by its defence forces in the armed conflict with India in 1965 or the version put forward by Air Marshal Noor Khan and President Ayub Khan at least in relation to the strength of the Pakistan Air Force? This is reminiscent of what happened in 1954 when Pakistan signed a military aid agreement with the U.S. and of the assurances and denials to the Government of India and the rest of the world. In November 1953, a State Department spokesman denied the reports that the United States and Pakistan were negotiating a pact for military aid by the U.S. to Pakistan in return for bases in Pakistan.¹⁴ When Nehru reacted to arms talks between Pakistan and the U.S.A.,¹⁵ further denials came from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. The Pakistan President even chided Nehru for making allegations "without first thinking it necessary to verify their veracity." Zafnullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, declared that Pakistan "never was and was not at present considering participating in a military alliance."¹⁶ In Washington, the Chairman of the

¹⁰Desn. Karachi, 19 April 1967.

¹¹Desn. Karachi, 22 January 1967.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Desn. Karachi, 16 April 1967.

¹⁴New York Times, 13 November 1953.

¹⁵Venkateswara and Arya, *International Studies*, July-October 1966, p. 50.

¹⁶In an interview to *Le Monde*. (*Ibid.*)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee asserted that no military alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan was under consideration.¹⁷ All these denials proved false in a matter of months.

On the latest decision, Congressional leaders were told in Washington that, without assistance from the U.S.A., Pakistan would be forced to turn elsewhere for spare parts and pay a higher price.¹⁸ This confirmed incidentally that spare parts for sophisticated American equipment were available, though at a higher price, in the world market. In fact, it was known in India, as it was known in the U.S.A., that Pakistan had obtained the spare parts it needed to put its damaged war machine back into gear.¹⁹ The U.S.A. could not give the assurance that Pakistan would not be allowed to expand and strengthen its war machine through "third country" sale or transfer.²⁰ Official Washington thus put forth something to satisfy everybody. American sources said that Pakistan had already purchased in the world markets the American spare parts it needed, and denied the possibility of a later replacement of whole weapons.²¹ It was admitted in the U.S.A. that, while the partial lifting of the ban applied to both Pakistan and India, its primary effect would be on Pakistan which had suffered heavy equipment losses in the Kashmir fighting.²²

These are not the only suspicious features of the U.S. decision together with the clarifications which have been issued. Washington has made its decision, it has been said, to prevent Pakistan from becoming completely dependent on China for arms supply. This reason has been seriously put forward in the American capital and by Americans abroad; it assumes that Chinese arms are being supplied to Pakistan in considerable quantities, so much so that there is a danger of Pakistan becoming dependent on China for its future arms requirements. Having taken this position, Washington proceeds to destroy it by emphasizing the inability of China

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁸*New York Times*, 12 April 1967.

¹⁹*New York Times*, 17 April 1967.

²⁰Washington despatch in *Indian Express*, 14 April 1967.

²¹Editorial in *Baltimore Sun*, 18 April 1967.

²²*Washington Daily News*, 12 April 1967.

to offer anything more than the token supplies it has already made to Pakistan. If, because of its cultural revolution and the resultant mess, China is in no position to furnish arms to Pakistan except in insignificant quantities, as official Washington seeks to argue, how does Pakistan become dependent on China for arms? And this being the case, how does the urgency of reducing Pakistan's non-existent dependence on China for arms and equipment arise? It is clear that Washington's argument lacks substance and its decision to resume arms supply has been dictated by other considerations.

It has also been suggested in Washington that Pakistan efforts to buy arms elsewhere are hamstrung by lack of foreign exchange. The difficulty about funds explains the efforts Ayub Khan has made to enlist sympathy in West Asian countries. How successful he has been is demonstrated by the fact that 90 Canadian-built F-86 Sabre jets which West Germany had delivered to Iran in 1966 were then passed on to Pakistan. This information was released by a Foreign Relations Sub-Committee of the U.S. Senate in 1967.²³ A Pentagon statement supplied to the same sub-committee disclaimed firm knowledge as to how many of the planes might have been returned to Iran. In October 1966, the statement said, twenty-six had been "returned briefly." But the Pentagon admitted that it did not have "precise information as to where these planes may be at a given moment, in view of the pattern of their being moved back and forth between the two countries."²⁴ The U.S.A. is also reported to have under active consideration a German request for permission to sell 100 M-47 Patton tanks to Pakistan.²⁵

The assumption that Pakistan has failed to acquire military hardware to make up for the losses suffered in 1965 or to make good the deficiencies in armour and firepower disclosed in the fighting suggests a substantial need which cannot be met by a limited programme of replacements or supply of additional weapons. Private assurance by the U.S. officials that they will only be supplying spares, that no lethal equipment will be sold, and that

the new policy is only of trivial significance goes ill with the permissibility of the sale of U.S. weapons by or through third countries.

All these mysteries, doubts, and questions are resolved on one assumption which in the course of time may receive confirmation. The official announcement is no more than a camouflage to assure India that no large-scale arming of Pakistan is intended, when in fact it is. And considering the limitations which the U.S. Government has emphasized in its publicity drive, the only way of achieving its objective is to sell lethal spares and weapons directly or through third countries at nominal prices, so as not to throw any strain on Pakistan's foreign exchange resources, or add, except nominally, to its expenditure on arms. Thus, the grant of military aid to Pakistan which the U.S. decision terminated in appearance is restored in reality. If this conclusion is sound, a major shift has taken place in U.S. foreign policy objectives as these were enunciated in 1965 and 1966.

On the eve of President Ayub Khan's visit to the U.S.A. in December 1965, a White House despatch, which gave an indication of President Johnson's attitude to Pakistan and to some extent to India, was officially released in Pakistan. The President and the Congress, stated the despatch, had become increasingly disheartened by Pakistan's steady rapprochement with the Republican China. President Johnson felt that the U.S. could not be expected to support a Pakistan-Communist China rapprochement designed as a political squeeze on India. Pakistan's policy drift, he felt, made it increasingly difficult to defend American aid before the American Congress. Pakistan's vehement criticism of American military aid to India after the Chinese invasion of its Himalayan borders in 1962 ignored the fact that the American-Pakistan alliance was against communism not against India.²⁶

The President raised a matter of fundamental importance. What was the justification for the U.S. military aid to Pakistan? It was none other than to insure Pakistan against communist aggression from China and the Soviet Union. But as soon as Pakistan began to declare that this aid was not to be used against

either country, with which it claimed to have the friendliest relations, the justification for that aid disappeared. Thereafter, the only target for the U.S. military aid to Pakistan was India and no other country. This promptly put the U.S.A. in an unenviable position, for it was not the intention of the U.S.A. that its military assistance to Pakistan should be used by that country against India. With Pakistan's repudiation of its obligations under the U.S. military aid agreement, the alliance in effect collapsed in 1963, and with it the justification for any military aid to Pakistan. Nevertheless, military aid continued to flow in the face of the obvious fact that Pakistan intended to use it only against India.

In a little over a year, the U.S. position has registered a complete change. By the supply of U.S. arms to Pakistan the rapprochement between Pakistan and China designed as a political squeeze on India, to which the U.S. President had objected, will be strengthened, instead of being weakened. The rapprochement would have weakened if China had been left alone to demonstrate its lack of capacity—that was seriously suggested by U.S. sources—to supply arms to Pakistan. The rapprochement has remained unaffected; and the moral for Pakistan of the opening of the sluices of U.S. arms supply is that in order to secure further concessions from the U.S.A. that rapprochement should be strengthened. Thus, there is a danger of two arms races starting—one between India and Pakistan and another between China and the U.S.A. to arm Pakistan. Is it odd for India to feel that the U.S.A. has run into a *de facto*, though unwilling, alliance of action with China to arm Pakistan against India? Or do the policy-makers in the Pentagon and the State Department believe that American arms may yet be used by Pakistan to invade China or the U.S.S.R.?

The U.S.A. proposes to maintain, it is suggested, in the new decision a military balance between the two countries. It is implied, evidently, that a balance does not exist at present. Or, more meaningfully that the existing balance after the conflict of 1965 is not in favour of Pakistan. The military balance which the U.S.A. seeks on the subcontinent is, therefore, one of remilitarizing Pakistan at India's expense. To this end, the U.S.A. along with its allies proposes to pour arms into Pakistan, while limiting the

sales of spare parts to India for machinery and equipment supplied to the latter at a total value of no more than \$76 million. In reality, therefore, the U.S.A. is making a desperate attempt to recover its political influence and position in Pakistan, which were considerably eroded by the Indo-Pakistan armed conflict and the Tashkent Declaration. But the initiative does not rest entirely with the U.S.A. China has also a say in the matter and it remains to be seen how far the U.S. reading of the Chinese relations with Pakistan will be borne out by facts. It is unlikely that China will let go of Pakistan so easily. The harm that this attempt may cause to India, and Indo-American relations, is another matter.

The basic consideration for Pakistan is India. It was in the hope of getting the better of India, e.g. by annexing Kashmir, that Pakistan signed a military aid agreement with the U.S. and joined Western military pacts like SEATO and CENTO. Now Pakistan has forged an alliance with China.

Ayub Khan has already declared that the barometric relations between India and Pakistan depend primarily on India's attitude to Kashmir and on the levels of Indian defence expenditure.²⁷ Defence expenditure in the two countries could easily be controlled and even substantially reduced by a no-war pact, a reasonable course of action to which Pakistan is allergic. A strong India puts off its dream of seizing Kashmir by force. In this context for the U.S. and "third countries" to supply spare parts and weapons to Pakistan is to build up tension and conflict on the subcontinent. This reality cannot be obliterated by expressing concern for stability on the subcontinent or about differences that divide India and Pakistan. In 1954, the U.S. objective in signing a military aid agreement with Pakistan was to contain communist aggression. Instead of helping the U.S. in that task, Pakistan sneaked into the Chinese camp. If the earlier U.S. policy could not prevent desertion, will its repetition ensure the renegade's abiding loyalty?

Some American officials have been hawking around a new concept of military balance on the subcontinent. They concede that India must have two armies—one to deal with a Chinese

²⁷In an interview to London *Times* correspondent. (See *Dawn*, Karachi, 19 April 1967.)

threat across the Himalayas, another for defence against Pakistan. Strangely enough what they question is the need for both armies to be adequate. They would prefer to see India strong in relation to China but weak in relation to Pakistan. The suggestion ignores India's military requirements based on its area and population. India has five times the population of Pakistan and four times its area. Equally, the suggestion ignores the experience of past twenty years during which both Pakistan and China have invaded India, separately or in collusion. Not once has India committed aggression on any part of Pakistan or of China. The American suggestion makes no allowance for the U.S. Government's failure to honour the specific guarantees which it had given to India against the misuse of American arms by Pakistan. On two occasions in 1965 alone Indian territory was violated by Pakistan forces with the help of American arms. The American spokesmen also turn a blind eye to the obvious fact that India has to contend not with Pakistan or with China at a time but with the combined military strength of China and Pakistan along its borders at the same time, as it became clear in September 1965.

The net effect of American officials' proposal is, therefore, to weaken India by preventing it from creating and maintaining an armed force strong enough to deal with both the perils at the same time. Military history also shows that, other conditions being equal, the day is normally to the country which attacks first and suddenly, particularly if its victim like India has long lines of communication.

forces, nearly half a million strong! Obviously, the actual provision is much higher, possibly double the amount which has been disclosed. If this huge expenditure by Pakistan is justified, proportionately India should be spending over 2,000 crores a year on its armed forces, but India has made a provision of only Rs. 918 crores in its budget for 1966-67 for its armed forces the strength of which is roughly one and a half times that of Pakistan. According to this calculation, the actual defence provision in Pakistan must be about half a million crores! There is, thus, a concealed provision of Rs. 300 crores somewhere—partly under other headings of the Pakistan budget and partly in the form of military aid from its allies. Such notions of balance of power, which some Western enthusiasts are busy expounding, clearly go to prove that the lifting of restrictions from the sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan is neither so simple nor so innocent as its advocates suggest.

A militarily stronger Pakistan automatically adds to the strength of China against India. The result is a stronger Pakistan-China axis against India and a greater danger of U.S. arms being used to commit aggression on Indian territory, as Pakistan did in 1965, first in Kutch and then in Kashmir. Enjoying the distinction of belonging to two hostile camps, Pakistan has the satisfaction of knowing that neither the U.S. nor China will abandon it too easily in spite of its proven disloyalty. In this Alice in Wonderland situation, there is some one less clever by half than the other two. "In South Asia," writes a leading U.S. newspaper, "we lavished weapons on Pakistan on the supposition that thus we would build up a barrier of 'stability' against Communist China; but Pakistan used its arms against India and has become a friendly neutral, if not an ally of the Chinese."²⁸

Meanwhile, Pakistan has been trying to get closer to the Soviet Union. Delegations are being exchanged and a military mission led by Air Marshal Noor Khan has already paid a visit to the U.S.S.R. Pakistan objective is not only Soviet arms but the neutralization of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, a veto which since 1957 has frustrated its attempts and those of its supporters in the Council, the U.K. and the U.S.A., to impose

²⁸Editorial in *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 20 July 1967.

an unfavourable settlement of the Kashmir situation on India. It is, however, necessary to remember that the Soviet veto is not a decisive factor. There was a time when, under the inspiration of the U.K. and the U.S.A., almost the entire Council, barring the socialist States who abstained, voted for resolutions unfavourable to India. India defied blackmail and refused to submit to such resolutions, as it will most likely refuse again if, for reasons of power politics, members of the Council "gang up" against India, and the Soviet Union chooses to remain indifferent. Permanent Members of the Council, who exercise the veto, are not necessarily anti-India as a matter of policy, although there might have been differences of opinion on certain issues. They have their interests in India, perhaps much larger than their interests in Pakistan. India may be or may appear weak, but on the question of Kashmir more than any other national issue there is a public opinion to be reckoned with. There is little hope, therefore, for Pakistan to seize Kashmir with the help of the Security Council.

For this reason, Pakistan relations with the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, and China cannot have the same quality or dimensions. The U.S.A. and the Soviet Union would prefer to see Pakistan weaned away from China, but it is doubtful whether either would be prepared to pay the price for it, namely, joining up with Pakistan in wresting Kashmir from India. If they are not, their utility to Pakistan in the last analysis is limited, however, great the military aid which either or both may be willing to offer. There are no disputes between India, on the one hand, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union, on the other. This immediately robs Pakistan of an opportunity to force a choice of sides in the matter. There are and have been differences of opinion between India and one or the other power on this or that international issue, e.g. the nuclear treaty, but there is no dispute between them to bedevil their relations. On the other hand, it would appear that there are reasons, both for the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, to favour peace and stability in South and South-East Asia.

But Pakistan relations with China are on a different footing altogether. There is a border dispute between China and India and until it is settled the relations between the two countries can-

not be harmonious or free from conflict. Pakistan has also disputes with India. These disputes provide common grievance to both against India and common ground for action and collaboration. No such compulsion exists in Pakistan relations with the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. It is this basic reality which casts serious doubt on efforts on the part of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to break Pakistan away from China. That being the case, the Pakistan-China axis may last, at least as long as the Sino-Indian border dispute and Indo-Pakistan differences persist. In 1959, China warned India against having to face two fronts—China and Pakistan. But China has created three fronts for itself—the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, and India, not a very reassuring prospect for it. This is another reason why China cannot afford to and will not give up Pakistan. The choice is really Pakistan's. Pakistan has the lesson of Indonesia before it. If good sense and national interest prevail, Pakistan may seek its release from the bearhug of Mao's China. How unlikely this is will be clear from President Ayub Khan's latest declaration. "It is not in our interest," he says in *Friends, Not Masters*, "to alienate the People's Republic of China."

Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, has hinted that members of SEATO like Pakistan who do not go along with the Viet Nam policy of the alliance should quit the organization. In his opening address at the SEATO Council in Washington on 18 April, he called it "a harrowing situation that there could be some who seek to derive only advantages from membership of SEATO without accepting the corresponding obligations and responsibilities."²⁹ Presumably, this was a reply to President Ayub Khan who a few hours earlier had said in Pakistan that the U.S. decision on arms was "no concession to any country like us that has been and still is in alliance with the United States."³⁰ What Khoman said revealed the future pattern of Pakistan relations with sovereign States if it continued to use them as tools in its pursuit of an anti-Indian policy.

²⁹Dawn, Karachi, 20 April 1967.

³⁰In an interview with London Times correspondent. (Reported in Dawn, Karachi, 19 April 1967.)

CHAPTER TEN

A New Milky Way

IN RECENT YEARS, MORE PRECISELY SINCE CHINA'S attack on India in 1962, and in the light of resultant circumstances, President Ayub Khan has been busy painting a new image of international relations. The key is still the two-nation theory and the Indian bugbear, but the application of the theory is now extended to the world as a whole in a desperate effort to achieve a goal which has hitherto eluded his country.

Ayub Khan divides the world into four blocs: the Communist, the Christian, the Muslim, and the Hindu. He also talks about the "third world" consisting of Afro-Asian countries—a world of have-nots, with no dominant members to overawe the rest.* Numerically, the most populous is Pakistan with 110 million people, closely followed by Indonesia with 98 million, Thailand with 28 million, Turkey, the United Arab Republic, and the Philippines with 27 million each. It is noteworthy that the "third world" of have-nots includes Pakistan but not India. Interestingly enough, Pakistan also belongs to the Muslim world. The habit of keeping a foot each in two different worlds is too far grown to be shed.

Ayub Khan denies that it is a geographic concept or a social reality, but visualizes the pattern of ties as a universe of developing countries, containing a number of "constellations," each constellation held together by an internal balance of forces. What position should be allotted to Pakistan in the New Milky Way of international relations? According to Ayub Khan, Pakistan should belong to a major constellation extending from Casablanca to Djakarta.

*For these and other details see *Friends, Not Masters—A Political Autobiography*, Oxford University Press, 1967.

Here is pan-Islam in a new form, a powerful combination of Muslim countries to confront the developed world and to keep the other worlds at bay. As Ayub Khan views international relations, small countries have no place in the comity of nations and it is only by joining together that they can make their presence felt. The origin of the Turks, Iranians, Afghans, and many Pakistanis is traced to the steppes of Central Asia, and they are all exhorted to remember their common ancestry and put up a united front against the outside world of major powers and hostile *isms*.

Appeal to racial ancestry is a dangerous weapon. Since many Indians also trace their ancestry to the steppes of Central Asia, their exclusion from the esoteric band of new "liberators" of the entire world is difficult to understand. Presumably, many Chinese could claim similar origin. A racial combination of people, so wide in its sweep, should normally have no room for the two-nation theory or religious obscurantism which is the very essence of the Pakistan State. But this is not what the Pakistan dreamer has in mind, for he proposes to divide the entire world along religious lines, Christian, Muslim, Communist, Hindu, etc., the Muslim countries from Casablanca to Djakarta forming a formidable alliance—"constellation" is a new word for this heady wine—to help Pakistan in achieving its bigoted objectives, including the subjugation of India.

The proposal arises out of the frustration which has been Pakistan's lot in the international field ever since it became sovereign. The ambition is to be a major power, but this is hardly possible because of its limited size, population, and resources. At the same time without the attributes of a major power, how is Indian "intransigence" to be overcome? One way of achieving this object is to bring into existence a large combination of States which in their totality of area, manpower, and resources could claim the rights and status of a major power. The United Nations, its specialized agencies, and its numerous other committees on which all members, large or small, Muslim or non-Muslim, enjoy equality are not enough because, while they ensure to members equality in voting, they do not help Pakistan in realizing its dream of achieving triumph over India.

Since the absurdity of such a monolithic universe of under-developed Muslim countries is only too obvious, Ayub Khan is in favour of regional groupings and collaboration. For example, the countries in the Maghreb—Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria—should come together and form a constellation within a constellation. The destinies of Egypt and the Sudan lie together because they depend on the same source of water and communication. There is another minor constellation. The countries of the Arabian peninsula would similarly band together. This view of the Muslim world in North Africa and West Asia is fascinating as it is mischievous. The hub of all these minor constellations, the force that holds them together in their assigned places within the milky way, is of course to be Pakistan.

Hitherto the secular, progressive, socialist Arab States have stood between Pakistan and its goal of Muslim leadership. Nasser's U.A.R. and other Arab countries have refused to toe the Pakistan line in their relations with India. This has been a major handicap to Pakistan leaders who have tried every possible method in the past to secure Arab support against India. When direct appeals failed, pressure was brought to bear on them through military pacts. As this latter policy boomeranged, Pakistan supported colonial aggression in Egypt and imperialist intervention in the Lebanon. Pakistan also began to take sides in Arab disputes, as with Saudi Arabia in the Yemen, and finally confronted the U.A.R., Iraq, and others with RCD. Naturally enough, in Ayub Khan's nexus of constellations there is no place for progressive, socialist, and secular forces of the Arab world.

The new theory of Ayub Khan envisages, in fact, a break-up of the Arabs into three separate and warring regional factions. It rejects the Arab League and the principle underlying the League. The concepts of Arab unity and the Arab nation are its targets. What would suit the aggressive forces of colonialism and imperialism better than the proposed demolition of these nascent forces of Arab unity, Arab socialism, and Arab nationhood. Would this fragmentation of Arab forces also suit the aims of Pakistan?

In Ayub Khan's assessment three small Arab groups in North Africa and West Asia would be in a better position to extract

Ayub Khan's exposition of an alluring world order in which the developed countries conveniently placed at the mercy of under-developed countries, led by Pakistan, throw open their treasures and arsenals for the latter's benefit.

The Pakistan-China axis has, thus, begun to acquire an ideological base. Pakistan leadership calls for unity among Muslim countries on the basis of Islam, on the one hand, and, on the other, by advocating Chinese policy of promoting dissensions and disorders in the world, seeks to undermine and destroy that unity beforehand. This strange phenomenon can be explained only in one way. The declarations of Pakistan leaders about their adherence to the Muslim faith are superficial and insincere. They overlook the broad and humanizing spirit of Islam. They seek to exploit its institutional feature in the service of their grandiose political and territorial ambitions. Else how could one explain Pakistan's continued silence on the ceaseless persecution of Muslims and Islam in China?

The technique now advocated by Ayub Khan is strikingly similar to the one employed by China against its Muslim population. Peking has always regarded Chinese Muslims as a potentially dangerous minority and one which must, therefore, be subdued and integrated in the floodtide of Mao's heresy. In 1953, a "Chinese Islamic Association" was formed, ostensibly with the object of promoting the study of Islam and encouraging the publication of Muslim classics. "In fact, the association was an instrument of Peking and its real purpose was to fragment the Muslim minority, and make it appear that the Muslims supported Government policies."¹ A long article in the *Peking Daily* of 12 February 1967 denounced Chinese Muslims and described them as "a filthy pile of bad people," "demons," "monsters," and by a variety of similar epithets. In early March 1967, Red Guard cadres approached the Ox Street Mosque in Peking, revered by the Muslims, and desecrated it by pasting posters and slogans inside and outside the shrine. A major Chinese language newspaper in Hong Kong had managed to slip out of Peking photographs of the desecration. The posters called for burning the holy Koran,

¹Tom Sawyer in *Daily Nation*, Nairobi, 17 April 1967.

abolishing the inter-marriage ban, and an end to praying and circumcision. "If you don't repent," the posters threatened, "we will scoop you out and destroy you. We must crush all the stinking religious rat-holes and destroy them with you."² To cover up these atrocities at home, the Chinese send delegations of pliable Ulema (Muslim religious scholars and leaders) abroad. Delegates of this kind from China have been received in Pakistan with enthusiasm.

The Pakistan Embassy in Peking is among the most active. Its personnel enjoys the greatest freedom of movement. Its officers are, perhaps, the best informed about the goings-on in the present-day China. And yet the new crusaders of Islam in Pakistan have chosen to observe enigmatic silence about the ugly happenings in China in relation to Islam. Apparently, the national interests of Pakistan are served better by silence, however, much its leaders may talk about Muslim constellations from Casablanca to Djakarta. The old policy of presenting many faces to the world continues. To the Western powers Pakistan presents its face of anti-communism, to Afro-Asian countries the one of independence in foreign policy, to Muslim States the one of a champion of Islam; to the Soviet Union it presents an anti-Western face, and to China the dual vision of a sleeping partner in Western military alliances and a more active comrade in revolutionary struggles. Behind all these many faces, there is one real visage, of rather vengeful aspect, the true visage of unwavering hostility to India.

The starry-eyed dreamers of Pakistan are in reality the message-bearers of Mao's China, not only in the councils of Western military alliances, but also in Africa and West Asia. In West Asia, Pakistan is an ally of Iran and Turkey in CENTO and RCD. It maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan through which it strikes discordant notes in the Arab councils. If China is unable to recover lost ground in Africa directly, it can rely on Pakistan to help achieve that goal.

A striking feature of Ayub Khan's concept of international relations is a belief in the inevitable fulfilment of Pakistan's national ambitions. Exploitation of religion is conceived as a means to that

²Ibid.

end. Not satisfied with dividing Hindus from Muslims, Ayub Khan now projects the struggle between the Muslims and the Christian world. An attempt is made to strike fear in the Muslim countries by suggesting that in the eyes of major powers all countries which profess the faith of Islam are suspect. A working tool of Western powers in their machinations in West Asia, North Africa, and South and South-East Asia, an eager recipient of vast economic and military aid from those countries, reluctant to withdraw from their military alliances, Pakistan endeavours to persuade other Muslim countries to accept its finding that major powers of the West are not only Christian but also hostile to Islam. For one thing, this cult of fear, if it strikes root, would widen the gulf between Muslim countries and the major powers, leaving Pakistan without many competitors for the latter's bounty; for another Pakistan may have a better chance of becoming the leader of the Muslim world. Pakistan leaders' profession of concern for Islam would at least be convincing if Pakistan were to withdraw from CENTO and SEATO and denounce its military agreements with major powers, including China. An interesting part of all this is that one of the anti-Christian constellations, the RCD, is blessed in its birth and growth with much Christian understanding and patronage of the U.S.A., and more especially of Britain.

According to Ayub Khan, the Communist world, the Christian world, and the Hindu India are placed in confrontation with the Muslim countries of West Asia and North Africa. His view that the whole world is turned against Muslim countries is insidious. Pakistan is a living contradiction of this view. Its economic and military strength has been built almost entirely by Christian States. An exposition in which facts are expendable inevitably leads to fanciful conclusions. Ayub Khan assumes that India has a deep pathological hatred for Muslims and its hostility to Pakistan stems from refusal to see a Muslim power developing next door. From this follows the further assumption that India will never tolerate a Muslim grouping near or far from its border. Facts contradict such a laboured view. India has the happiest relations with Afghanistan, Kuwait, the Yemen, Syria, the Lebanon,

the U.A.R., the Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, and other Muslim countries. None of them has but the friendliest sentiments for India. Equally, India has little objection to a Muslim power, Pakistan, developing next door, provided that it does not use its strength to commit aggression on Indian territory, as Pakistan has done five times in the last twenty years. As for a Muslim grouping near or far from Indian borders, there is nothing to show, for instance, that India ever objected to the rise and functioning of the Arab League. India has, on the other hand, justifiably objected to the creation of military alliances and pacts in which Pakistan revels, for these combinations, instead of promoting peace and international cooperation, create tensions and conflicts as India and Arab countries know to their cost.

No less amusing is Pakistan's attempt to include itself among small countries. A country with a population of 110 million, the highest of all countries from Casablanca to Djakarta, excluding India, which thinks only in terms of bigotry and military power seeks for itself the role of a cat among chickens. These pretensions to smallness are nothing but an attempt to assume leadership of countries between Casablanca and Djakarta by asserting size, population, and military strength. In Ayub Khan's new firmament there is no orbit for Buddhist countries. Only the unerring faithful may follow the milky trail. This is not promotion of peace and fellowship, human understanding and cooperation, but their perversion. The constellations of powers, interlinked with one another, sustaining the universe of developing nations—excluding India and other countries which happen to differ with Pakistan—would, nevertheless, be a glorious spectacle, but for the fact that an alien meteorite (Pakistan) has constantly been at work to cause its disruption from within. If nationality must be based on religion, as in Pakistan, no bridges can be thrown across the chasms which divide nations from one another.

In spite of all the glib talk of coexistence in Pakistan, there is no feeling of charity in President Ayub Khan's thoughts for co-existence among human beings, or systems of thought and belief or among organizations such as nations and States. Like Jinnah he holds that Hindu and Muslim philosophies are fundamentally

different and there can be no coming together between Hindus and Muslims. In propounding his ideology, he is advocating blind intolerance and fanaticism which go ill together with international peace and progress. Like the Chinese leaders, the leader of Pakistan is evolving a political language in which poisonous thoughts are given a generous coating of sugar, and all that is good in life—peace, progress, cooperation, tolerance, friendship—are rejected. This is the Chinese concept of "co-existence."

In its preoccupation with theocratic considerations, Pakistan has no rational or realistic guide to show the way. In its campaign to project India as a monster threatening the independence of small nations, Pakistan lays emphasis on India's size, population, and armed forces, and charges it with chauvinism and expansionism, which, it says, it must resist. On the other hand, in relation to China, Ayub Khan denigrates India and declares that India cannot compete for the leadership of Asia. He does not expect India to offer any real challenge to China because of what he calls the texture of its society and its way of life. Far from playing a leading role in the affairs of the world, India, according to him, would be dependent on some major powers even for its survival. A breakdown of its social, economic, and political structure is hopefully anticipated, leading to the domination of the country by communism, more likely of the Soviet type, which would dutifully adapt itself to the rigid caste structure of the Indian society. That, Ayub Khan hopes, would estrange relations between India and China still further. He finds no difficulty in converting at will a giant, which all small nations should fear, into a creature of abject helplessness and vice versa. Since both positions are taken with equal passion, what is established in either case is not a fact but a fiction to serve a given purpose of the moment.

Starting off with a pan-Islam foreign policy soon after partition, and after pursuing a course of opportunism, alliances, and counter-alliance, Pakistan has now come back to its pet illusion. It remains to be seen to what extent history will repeat itself—whether Pakistan will once again move close to the U.S.A., offer phoney proposals, like the one of joint defence, to India and discard them to forge still closer bonds with China. Considerable

attention is also being paid to the Soviet Union to wean that country away from India. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan paid a flying visit to Moscow recently to seek Soviet support in the Security Council on Kashmir and suspension of arms supply to India. In its twenty-year-old friendship with India, the U.S.S.R. has not sought to dominate the subcontinent. It is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. will seek to dominate Pakistan though it would be natural for the former to try to check and erode Chinese and Western influences to which Pakistan has shown a tendency to succumb. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's primary interest in the subcontinent, especially in the light of recent developments, would appear to be in favour of peace and stability; and its stakes in the future of India are high indeed. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet Union will fall for Pakistan's play of fond affection. Violations and disregard of the Tashkent Declaration by Pakistan, under Chinese pressure, are a factor which neither the Soviet Union nor India could easily ignore.

In the meantime, events have dealt a serious blow to the illusion which Pakistan leaders nurse. The so-called Hindu India with which, according to them, Muslims, especially Pakistan Muslims, could have nothing in common, has elected a distinguished Indian Muslim to the highest office in the land, namely, that of the President of India. Not only the ruling Congress Party but also many members of the opposition parties voted for him. In Pakistan cosmology such an event is impossible. It is ruled out by Pakistan logic of political relations, its concept of religion and culture, and its foreign policy.

And yet, this great event took place in the India of Gandhi and Nehru after they had both departed from the scene. If Pakistan felt any genuine concern with the progress and well-being of Islam or the Muslims in India, it should have welcomed this great event as an example of secularism, tolerance towards religious minorities, and respect for their equal rights. The event attracted considerable attention and drew many tributes from far and near. The London *Times* noted in its editorial that it was rare in the oldest as well as in the newest State for religion to cease to be an element in

the political action.³ Dr. Zakir Husain's election was a triumph for the secular Indian State, stated the *Guardian*.⁴ The *Times* (London) saw in this election a vindication of principles which Nehru championed.⁵ The *Daily Telegraph* (London) wrote about the triumph of the Indian concept of democracy.⁶ The same paper commented that one of the founding principles of India was that "Muslims and Christians too for that matter, and people of all faiths and none can all be good Indians."⁷ A leading newspaper of another country known for its religious tolerance regarded Dr. Husain's victory as a signal of sanity, of a sound sense of values and balanced judgement.⁸ An American newspaper, not much known for its championship of Indian political themes, wrote: "No facet of Dr. Husain's victory in the Indian Presidential election is more important than the demonstration that India is what Jawaharlal Nehru and other progressive Indians proclaimed it to be—secular and not a Hindu State."⁹ Many profound and moving tributes came also from many a Muslim country, Iraq, the U.A.R., Tunisia, Kuwait, the Sudan, Syria, the Lebanon, and others.

Only in one country was this event in the life of new India viewed with pique and discomfiture and ridiculed; and that country was Pakistan. For, the event had shown that the Muslims in India were holding their own and were not dependent on Pakistan for the championship of their rights and causes. It showed also that the two-nation theory, on which Pakistan's internal and external policies continue to be based, had little relevance or meaning in India. It is surely not an impossible hope that at least some of the Pakistan thinkers and politicians will grasp the meaning and significance of this great event.

Meanwhile, the cosmogony of Ayub Khan has already been put to the test. When the West Asian crisis arose, there was

³Editorial in *Times*, London, 10 May 1967.

⁴Editorial in *Guardian*, 11 May 1967.

⁵Editorial in *Times*, London, 10 May 1967.

⁶Editorial in *Daily Telegraph*, London, 11 May 1967.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Editorial in *Ceylon Daily News*, 11 May 1967.

⁹Editorial in *New York Times*, 10 May 1967.

no immediate response from the Pakistan Government. Until towards the end of May, not a single leader of Pakistan offered support to the U.A.R.'s decision to move its army to the Israeli border to neutralize Israel's threats to and pressures on Syria. The radio and newspapers in Pakistan played down the Arab-Israeli confrontation. However, when King Feisal of Saudi Arabia announced his support for Nasser's move to blockade the Gulf of Aquaba, Radio Pakistan played up the Saudi declaration rather than Nasser's original decision. In line with this hesitant approach, the Pakistan Government refused to grant permission to Arab students in various colleges of Lahore and Peshawar to stage a rally to demonstrate their support for President Nasser. Arab nations had to wait till 1 June for the Pakistan President's declaration that the Arab cause was "just and right." He reminded his countrymen, however, that it was important "to control our emotions on such occasions."¹⁰

To repair its image and bolster up its position in West Asia, Pakistan turned its full attention to India, the favourite whipping-boy, and charged India with acting in collusion with Israel against the Arab cause! This manoeuvre would have delighted Machiavelli. It failed to work except in China. In Pakistan and China equally, it appears, there is premium on fabrication rather than fact. Both are only too sure of their ability to draw wool over other people's eyes. Both pursue a foreign policy in quarantine, as it were, cut off from and, therefore, irrelevant to the realities of international life. Its aim is to deceive others but often the effect is, especially in Pakistan, self-hypnotism and self-deception.

In this case, India emphatically opposed Israel's war-mongering and act of aggression in the United Nations and outside. The position adopted by the Government of India in the West Asian crisis was consistent. The Americans, the British, the Russians, and everyone else knew that this was so, but not Pakistan. The Arabs knew and said so. "The Arabs appreciate India's honourable stand on the Palestine question. For this political parties all over the Arab world, the Lebanon, the UAR, Syria, and

¹⁰*Indian Express*, New Delhi, 2 June 1967.

Jordan are grateful to India.”¹¹ “India has always stood by the Arabs against Israel.”¹² “It is natural for India with its cultural heritage and historical background to stand by the Arabs and extend full cooperation.”¹³ “India today is the Arabs’ spokesman in the Security Council as if she herself were an Arab country. She represents the Arabs and explains their point of view, defends their rights exactly in the same way as she did during the Anglo-French aggression on the Suez.”¹⁴ Throughout the crisis, Pakistan’s officially controlled press and Radio Pakistan and Pakistan missions and journalists abroad were busy misinterpreting and maligning India. They almost wished, it seems, that the Arabs had received less support than they did. At any rate, it was, in their reckoning, an unfortunate development that the Indian Government should give unequivocal moral and political support to the Arabs.

Grounded in malice and owning allegiance to no particular principle, Pakistan attempted to play on both sides of the net. It was in the face of Pakistan opposition that the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, which met in Cairo in July last, recorded its appreciation of the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. Obviously, Pakistan made this gesture to please its Western masters. At the same conference, Pakistan also opposed the liquidation of foreign bases, though its Foreign Minister Pirzada had declared in the National Assembly that Pakistan was already following and was “proud to follow an independent foreign policy under the dynamic leadership of President Ayub.”¹⁵ Similarly, the Pakistan resolution on Jerusalem failed to work up much enthusiasm in the

¹¹ *Al Telegraph*, Beirut, 3 June 1967.

Commenting on the Indian Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament, *Al Goumhouria* (Cairo) of 27 May said: “While hailing the Indian leader for her courageous attitude, we recall a similar attitude taken by her father when he condemned the British-French aggression on our country and India’s unshakable attitude towards the rights of the Palestinians.”

¹² *Al Goumhouria*, Beirut, 6 June 1967.

¹³ *Al Nidal*, Beirut, 8 June 1967.

¹⁴ *Lissan-ul-Hal*, Beirut, 4 June 1967.

¹⁵ *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 18 June 1967.

Arab world. The *Egyptian Gazette* described it as "cold comfort," a mere gesture "which is utterly inadequate to disguise the world organization's failure." According to the *Al Ahram*, the United Nations had "signed a document of subversion to imperialist powers."¹⁶

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan finds itself caught in a cleft stick. It is understandable that Pakistan should have tried to live down the ignominy of the Suez affair by supporting the Arab cause in the recent crisis. But condemnation of aggression and the demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory immediately brings up the ghost of Pakistan aggression in Kashmir and the pending question of the vacation of that aggression. It is not possible to condemn aggression in one place and not to condemn it in the other. Has Pakistan genuinely become aware of the importance of the Charter, of condemning aggression, of the utility of Articles 39 and 51, and of denying the fruits of conquest to the invader? India has demanded nothing more, nor less, from Pakistan or from the United Nations with respect to the Kashmir question. Perhaps, there is hope that the new awakening among Pakistan leaders will encourage some introspection and the growth of a sense of responsibility about their actions nearer home.

It is impossible to calculate the heavy loss, in terms of men, material, stability, economic progress and trustworthiness¹⁷ which Pakistan has suffered generally over the past twenty years, but more particularly during and since the armed conflict with India. Pakistan gambled and lost. If the rulers of Pakistan are realists, they may not embark on similar adventures again. For all the treaties and pacts in which Pakistan is involved and for all its allies, there is little hope for Pakistan to bring India down on its knees under the threat of force. The disenchantment which came in the wake of the armed conflict in 1965 is bound to have its repercussions, but these can be turned into constructive channels by greater

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¹⁶Quoted in *Times of India*, Delhi, 7 July 1967.

¹⁷According to Sardar Bahadur Khan, former leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, unless it is proved that SEATO and CENTO are essential to Pakistan's defence, the country should withdraw from them, for Pakistan has antagonized half the population of the world by being a member of these pacts. (*National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, 24 November 1962, p. 46.)

and more practical men than those who strut the Pakistan scene today. Driven by the inner discords of their policies, they merely talk the language of nonalignment. To gain for Pakistan its proper place and role in the world they need to seek the spirit and substance of the policy of nonalignment, friendship, and peace.

As Pakistan does not acknowledge its obligations under agreements and alliances, there is no anchor to its relations with its allies or with others. If Pakistan regards as satisfactory its relationship with such countries as China, on the one hand, and Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, on the other, the reason for such satisfaction can flow only from their explicit or implicit opposition to India. This is, at best, a negative factor. A firm and lasting anchor can be found only in friendship with India from which Pakistan flees as from the devil. And yet one day in the interests of its own survival as a self-respecting nation, Pakistan may find that there is really no escape from this friendship. This, of course, applies equally to India, though for India to try to hasten the process is to put off the day. The initiative rests with Pakistan as it has always rested.

"Unfortunately, so far we have not had a settled foreign policy," says a Pakistan writer. "This is a precarious situation. For when a country lacks a settled foreign policy, it is unable to safeguard its vital interests."¹⁸ These national interests, as defined by Ayub Khan, are security from external aggression, internal unity, and economic development. As already explained, the Pakistan-China axis has tended to promote not only instability and tension in Afro-Asian countries but also within Pakistan. This has inevitably weakened the internal policies of Pakistan. Playing one country against another or taking advantage of conflict among nations or groups of nations to harm India can only aggravate existing suspicions and distrust and lead to further contention and conflict. Sooner or later, this must affect economic development in Pakistan as it will in India. With its sights set only on immediate gain, a foreign policy can hardly avoid adventurism with all its attendant dangers, as was illustrated by the conflict with India in 1965 which Pakistan went long out of its way to seek. Bluff, deception, threats, and duplicity have really no place,

¹⁸Mahmud Husain, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 98.

in the long run in international relations, especially between neighbours. Since these indicate a position not of strength but of weakness, Pakistan cannot help becoming a willing instrument of other powers. As a member of CENTO and SEATO, it became a tool of colonial and imperial powers who for a time regarded the policy of nonalignment as immoral—it was certainly inconvenient to them. By joining hands with China, Pakistan is not only continuing to work against nonalignment but also against all other factors of peace and stability so necessary for the economic advancement of underdeveloped countries.

Pakistan is a country in two parts: the east wing and the west wing. Internally, the east and west wings of Pakistan lie split. Apart from intervening Indian territory, they are divided by a political gulf, widened considerably by Pakistan's military adventures against India. It is an open secret in East Pakistan, as anyone can see by going through the debates of the Pakistan National Assembly, that Pakistan had deliberately and as a matter of policy chosen to start an armed conflict with India without provocation from the latter. Preparations for war had been in progress in West Pakistan for more than a year. Because of hostilities, East Pakistan, in spite of the Pakistan Government's tall claims, found itself in complete isolation. Although the Pakistan Air Force went out of its way to extend hostilities to East Pakistan by bombing Indian airfields in Calcutta, Assam, and Tripura, India took no retaliatory action. These facts are also known fully in East Pakistan. There was no war hysteria in the eastern wing which considered it too ridiculous for the Pakistan Government to go to war with India on the Kashmir issue or, indeed, on any other issue. There was considerable satisfaction in East Pakistan when the Tashkent Declaration was signed and the prospects of lifting emergency restrictions opened up before the people. This satisfaction was short-lived, for the Pakistan Government soon disillusioned them. A powerful dissident movement is now in swing in East Pakistan, demanding autonomy and liberation from Pakistan's adventurist and oppressive regime.

The failure of Pakistan foreign policy was deeper and, in fact, decisive in another sense. The one objective of that policy was

to seize Kashmir and humble India, and it failed utterly. The arming and training of a vast army over a period of eleven years with the help of the U.S.A., the U.K., and other Western powers, and with China's support, came to naught when tested on the battle-ground in Kashmir and West Pakistan.

There is today a serious undercurrent of popular discontent in West Pakistan, not to speak of East Pakistan, which explains the frequency of the abuse heaped upon India in the western wing. Musa, Governor of West Pakistan, described India in Quetta in January 1967 as a cowardly neighbour and "a mean enemy."¹⁹ In April 1967 he asked the people to beware of the slogan-mongers who were out to create internal dissensions over the question of Kashmir. These slogan-mongers were "paper tigers," he said. "When they are wanted in the battlefield, they are nowhere to be found."²⁰ Even in West Pakistan the people have, obviously, begun to question the wisdom of a Kashmir policy which has brought the country to a sorry pass.

The dichotomy in Pakistan thinking, resulting from its blind adherence to the two-nation theory, has been aptly summed up by a foreign writer.

Public life in Pakistan has suffered from a marked tendency to try to act on two contradictory principles at the same time. The people want the country to be founded on the full measure of the immutable principles of Islam; yet they are willing to abandon none of the advantages of a modern secular state. They want democracy but they also admire an act of strength and rally to support the man who has acted. They want provincial autonomy but are not ready to deny power to the Central Government. They want a foreign policy that will give automatic support to all Muslim causes; yet they also desire all the benefits of a policy of selective interest.²¹

Such a goal is beyond the grasp of any Pakistan Government. Oil and water can be mixed but religion and secular principles

¹⁹*Dawn*, Karachi, 29 January 1967.

²⁰*Dawn*, Karachi, 14 April 1967.

²¹Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 326.

cannot be. In the last analysis what matters is not the fads of politicians but the happiness and welfare of millions of people. The last twenty years have clearly shown that a foreign policy based on the two-nation theory is effective in promoting armed conflict with India but not in ensuring the long-term security and well-being of Pakistan. Its foreign policy targets have been unreal and deceptive and its efforts to reach them have ended in disaster.

Speaking recently to Ali Hamdy Ali Gammal, President Ayub Khan said: "The Tashkent Declaration had a good start. But India refuses to enforce it. Yet the disputes between us and India could be ironed out. But this, too, will not remove the state of tension existing between the two countries. The real problem, in my view, is the armament race."²² This suggests that Kashmir is no longer the real issue.

The time has come for Pakistan to take a fresh look at its relations with India, with some regard for realities. The soldier-President of Pakistan has been seeking military security for his country. This one can understand, but military security without material and spiritual security upon which people can rely and from which they can draw strength is like planting a rosebush in desert sand. The question is no longer one of choice but of necessity, if greater disasters are to be avoided in the future. Before partition, the subcontinent was one. Then it was split into two. In the interests of both India and Pakistan, it is essential that this process of division should not go further, particularly because some powers have set for themselves the task of dismembering the two countries.

In January 1967, leaflets advocating a "United States of Bengal," comprising West Bengal, East Pakistan, Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim, and Bhutan were distributed widely in East Pakistan. Some critics suggest that the CIA of the U.S.A. was behind it; according to others, it was China. It is immaterial whether it was one or the other; what is important is that taking advantage of the squabbles between the two countries, a power is out to impose its hegemony on the subcontinent by breaking it up into a number of independent States. Inspired by similar

²²A member of the U.A.R. Press Delegation which visited Pakistan in May 1967. The report in question appeared in *Al Ahram*, Cairo.

ideas, foreigners and even some misguided Indians have advocated an India south of the Vindyas and another to its north. Neither is West Pakistan safe, for there too provincial, linguistic, and other centrifugal forces are in evidence.

Here is a challenge which could be met better by India and Pakistan jointly. Pursuit of futile policies, working at crosspurposes, in disregard of the natural interdependence of the peoples of India and Pakistan in all the various walks of life, inviting outside intervention to aggravate mutual problems and difficulties, can only lead to progressive fragmentation of the sovereignty and independence of the two countries.

Nehru was Pakistan's greatest well-wisher in India, and it may be long before Pakistan finds another of his eminence, and yet no one was more maligned by Pakistan rulers. Nehru realized that the deeper interests of the two countries lay in the internal political and economic stability of both and in their freedom from entanglement in the power struggles of other powers. He realized equally that these interests, as real today as they were then, could not be safeguarded and protected without mutual co-operation. He persevered in his quest for Pakistan cooperation but was frustrated by its leaders.

Pakistan rulers mislead their people, as they constantly seek to mislead the world at large, by holding up India as a threat to the territorial integrity and independence of Pakistan. "India is out to annul the partition." This is the constant refrain of their propaganda at home and abroad. Years ago, Nehru declared his opposition to any such folly. India has enough troubles of its own. Annulment of partition, even by mutual consent, would be nothing short of disaster for both countries. Reversal or trimming of social, political, economic, defence, and foreign policies, pursued for two decades, would create stresses and strains of unmanageable proportions for both. To give only one example, the clamour of millions of refugees to go back to their original homes and lands would be enough to wreck the State. But the slogan of India's opposition to partition is raised to silence the critics in Asia, Africa, and the West who counsel cooperation between the two countries, and who see much in common between their peoples.

Pakistan leaders have been deceiving the ignorant abroad by suggesting that the proof of India's hostility to the existence of Pakistan lies in its opposition to the two-nation theory, the two nations in this case being the peoples of India and Pakistan! This misrepresentation of their own theory, which Jinnah explained on numerous occasions, shows the extent to which they can assume and renounce allegiance to the canons of his political philosophy.

Pakistan also misrepresents India as being opposed to the existence of Pakistan. This is done to promote its aim of achieving parity with India in military and other terms, a notion as unrealistic as it is dangerous. It is unrealistic because the mere fact that the two countries are sovereign States, neither in any way subservient to the other, gives them political and diplomatic parity. Pakistan enjoys parity in the United Nations in which every member State, irrespective of its size, population, or power, has but one vote. In the economic field, nothing prevents Pakistan from attaining the pinnacle of development except the way in which it chooses to employ its resources. Smaller countries like Japan or Switzerland have achieved a standard of living which is out of all proportion to their area and population.

Nevertheless, by no effort short of successful invasion of its neighbour's territory could Pakistan acquire parity with India in terms of area, population, and resources. Complete parity with India is, therefore, an impossibility. Military parity can be dangerous not only because it will throw the economy of Pakistan completely out of gear but also because it is bound to rouse in India suspicions of Pakistan intentions and force the latter to spend much more on defence than the Indian Government need otherwise do. A craving for military parity with India also suggests that Pakistan harbours ambitions of colonialist conquest at India's expense. In short, this urge and scramble for military parity with India is an invitation to mutual suspicion, conflict, and disaster. The great powers might have helped, and may yet help, Pakistan to achieve military parity with India, but Pakistan and India should know all too well by now the result of misguided endeavours of that kind. India does not seek to dominate Pakistan. Pakistan endeavours to dominate India can only cause an upset in the natural

balance of forces in the subcontinent and lead inevitably to conflict as it has done in the past.

Geography, history, language, economy, and defence point to the inescapable need for cooperation between the two countries. To ignore them, as Pakistan leaders have been trying to do for the last twenty years, is an unpardonable folly. These and other visible and invisible bonds bind the people of the two countries together, without prejudice to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of either. In the light of past experience, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the sovereignty and independence of neither will attain the fullness of power without mutual cooperation which alone can open the way to understanding and goodwill, two weapons which may withstand all the armed might of China or America.

Once the natural friendliness of the people of the two countries, now submerged in artificially created suspicion, ill-will, and strife is brought to surface, the differences at present dividing them will fall in their proper place and yield a solution in an atmosphere of trust and amity. If, on the other hand, these realities are ignored, the future can hardly hold promise of better things than the past has shown; the chances are that it may be bleak indeed.

Neither India nor Pakistan can claim that its policy in respect of its neighbour has been above reproach. Enough time has been wasted in mutual recriminations. Territorial integrity and independence are not impaired but strengthened by mutual understanding and concerted effort. Twenty years of Indo-Pakistan cooperation could transform the political and economic scene on the subcontinent and usher in a new and glorious era in the lives of its people apart from putting new armour on their sovereignty and independence. What greater vision of the future could there be for India or Pakistan?

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

Text of the "Agreement" Signed by China and Pakistan in Peking on March 2, 1963

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan;

Having agreed, with a view to ensuring the prevailing peace and tranquillity on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung Conference;

Being convinced that this would not only give full expression to the desire of the peoples of China and Pakistan for the development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace.

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present agreement and have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries the following:

For the Government of the People's Republic of China; Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

For the Government of Pakistan; Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs;

Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

In view of the fact that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan has never been formally delimited, the two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line including natural features and in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly co-operation.

ARTICLE 2

In accordance with the principle expounded in Article 1 of the present agreement, the two parties have fixed as follows the alignment of the entire boundary line between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan:

(1) Commencing from its north-western extremity at height 5,630 metres (a peak, the reference coordinates of which are approximately longitude 74

degrees 34 minutes east and latitude 37 degrees 30 minutes north), the boundary line runs generally eastward and then southeastward strictly along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan river of the Tarim river system on the one hand and the tributaries of the Hunza river of the Indus river system on the other hand, passing through the Kilik Daban (Dawan), the Mintake Daban (pass), the Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Mutsjilga Daban (named on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik Pass (named on the Pakistan map only), and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (pass).

(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (pass), the boundary line runs generally southward along the above-mentioned main watershed up to a mountain-top south of this Daban (pass), where it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a southeasterly direction, which is the watershed between the Akjilga river (a nameless corresponding river in the Pakistan map) on the one hand, and the Taghumbash (Oprang) river and the Koliyan Su (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand.

According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of the bed of the Koliyan Su to reach its confluence with the Elchin river. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river.

(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin river (Shaksgam or Muztagh river) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 76 degrees 02 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 26 minutes north) with the east Shorbulak Daria (Shimshal river or Braldu river).

(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line, according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram range main watershed at a mountain-top (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 54 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 15 minutes north) which on this map is shown belonging to the Shorgulak mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line from the confluence of the above-mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through height 6,520 metres (21,390 feet) till it joins the Karakoram range main watershed at a peak (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 03 minutes north).

(5) Thence, the boundary line, running generally southward and then eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram range main watershed which separates the Tarim river drainage system from the Indus river drainage system, passing through the east Mustagh pass (Muztagh pass), the top of the Chogri peak (K-2), the top of the broad peak, the top of the Gasherbrum mountain (8,608), the Indirakoli pass (names on the Chinese maps only) and the top of the Teram

Kankri peak, and reaches its southeastern extremity at the Karakoram pass.

(Two) The alignment of the entire boundary line, as described in section one of this article, has been drawn on the one million scale map of the Chinese side in Chinese and the one million scale map of the Pakistan side in English which are signed and attached to the present agreement.

(Three) In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical in their representation of topographical features the two parties have agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section One is concerned, and that they will be determined as far as possible by joint survey on the ground.

ARTICLE 3

The two parties have agreed that:

(1) Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river bed shall be the boundary line; and that

Wherever the boundary passes through a deban (pass), the water-parting line thereof shall be the boundary line.

ARTICLE 4

One: The two parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a joint boundary demarcation commission. Each side will appoint a chairman, one or more members and a certain number of advisers and technical staff. The joint boundary demarcation commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly:

(1) To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated in Article 2 of the present agreement, so as to set up boundary markers at places considered to be appropriate by the two parties and to delineate the boundary line of the jointly prepared accurate maps.

(2) To draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get printed detailed maps, to be attached to the protocol, with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers shown on them.

Two: The aforesaid protocol, upon being signed by the representatives of the Governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present agreement, and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present agreement.

Three: Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the joint boundary demarcation commission shall be terminated.

ARTICLE 5

The two parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between

the two countries shall be settled peacefully by the two parties through friendly consultations.

ARTICLE 6

The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary, as described in Article Two of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People's Republic of China and Pakistan.

ARTICLE 7

The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the second day of March, 1963, in the Chinese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

APPENDIX 2

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 16 September, 1965

(65) Pu Yi Ya Tzu No. 760.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to reply as follows in refutation of the notes of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs dated September 2 and 12, 1965:

(1) In its notes the Indian Government continues to resort to its usual subterfuges in an attempt to deny the intruding activities of Indian troops along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary. This attempt cannot possibly succeed. Since cease-fire and troop withdrawal were effected along the Sino-Indian border by China on her own initiative in 1962, Indian troops have never stopped their provocations, and there have been more than 300 intrusions into China either by ground or by air. The Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged protests with the Indian Government and served warnings to it, and has successively notified some friendly countries. The facts are there, and they cannot be denied by the Indian Government by mere quibbling. Moreover, the Chinese Government has four times proposed (the latest occasion in June 1965) Sino-Indian joint investigation into India's illegal construction of military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary, but has each time been refused by the Indian Government. Now, the Indian Government pretentiously says that the matter can be settled if only an independent and neutral observer should go to the border to see for himself. It further shamelessly asserts that Indian troops have never crossed the Sikkim-China boundary which has been formally delimited and that India has not built any military works either on the Chinese side of the border or on the border itself. This is a barefaced lie. How can it hope to deceive anyone?

(2) It must be pointed out that, in each of its notes, the Indian Government has blatantly claimed parts of Sinkiang and Tibet on the Chinese side of the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary to be Indian territory "illegally occupied" by China. But in fact these areas have never belonged to India, and even had never been marked as within Indian territory before India tampered with the maps. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory south of the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border have all along been illegally

Indian Government. But the Indian Government has all along turned a deaf ear to them and does not have the slightest respect for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Far from stopping its acts of aggression, the Indian Government has intensified them by ordering its troops to intrude into Chinese territory for reconnaissance and provocations. The intruding Indian troops even penetrated deep into Chinese territory, made unbridled harassing raids, kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and seized their livestock. Is there any international boundary or any principle guiding international relations in the eyes of the Indian Government? This is indeed preposterous and going too far in bullying others!

The Chinese Government now demands that the Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself within three days of the delivery of the present note, and immediately stop all its intrusions along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary, return the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized livestock and pledge to refrain from any more harassing raids across the boundary. Otherwise, the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

APPENDIX 3

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's Statement in Parliament, 17 September, 1965

I want to inform the House that this morning we received a communication from the Chinese Government demanding that within three days we should dismantle our defence installations which they allege are located on their side of the border in Tibet across the Sikkim border. I might for the benefit of the House, read out the relevant portions of the communication, although I would be placing the communication and our reply on the table of the House.

"In its notes the Indian Government continues to resort to its usual subterfuges in an attempt to deny the intruding activities of Indian troops along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary. This attempt cannot possibly succeed. Since ceasefire and troop withdrawal were effected along the Sino-Indian border by China on her own initiative in 1962, Indian troops have never stopped their provocations, and there have been more than 300 intrusions into China either by ground or by air. The Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged protests with the Indian Government and served warnings to it, and has successively notified some friendly countries. The facts are there, and they cannot be denied by the Indian Government by mere quibbling. Moreover, the Chinese Government has four times proposed (the latest occasion in June 1965) Sino-Indian Joint Investigation into India's illegal construction of military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary, but has each time been refused by the Indian Government. Now the Indian Government pretentiously says that the matter can be settled if only an independent and neutral observer should go to the border to see for himself. It further shamelessly asserts that Indian troops have never crossed the Sikkim-China boundary which has been formally delimited, and that India has not built any military works either on the Chinese side of the border or on the border itself. This is a barefaced lie. How can it hope to deceive anyone?

"As is known to everybody, the Indian Government has long been using the territory of Sikkim against China. Since September 1962, not to mention earlier times, Indian troops have crossed the China-Sikkim boundary, which was delimited long ago, and have built a large number of military works for aggression either on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself. There are now fifty-six such military works, large and small,

which they have built in the past few years all over the important passes along the China-Sikkim boundary, thus wantonly encroaching upon China's territory and violating her sovereignty. In these years the Chinese Government has made thirteen representations to the Indian Government. But the Indian Government has all along turned a deaf ear to them and does not have the slightest respect for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Far from stopping its acts of aggression, the Indian Government has intensified them by ordering its troops to intrude into Chinese territory for reconnaissance and provocations."

We are sending a reply to all these points and as I said I shall place the reply on the table of the House. I will read out the relevant portions of our reply.

"Ever since the Sino-Indian border problem was raised by the Chinese Government, the Government of India had made strenuous attempts to settle the question peacefully and with honour. Even after the unprovoked Chinese attack across the border in October-November, 1962, the Government of India consistently followed the policy of seeking a peaceful settlement honourable to both the parties concerned.

As has been pointed out in various notes to the Chinese Government in the past, the Government of India has given strict instructions to its armed forces and personnel not to cross the international boundary in the Eastern and the Middle Sectors and the so-called 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector. The Government of India are satisfied after careful and detailed investigations that Indian personnel as well as aircraft have fully carried out their instructions and have not transgressed the international boundary and the 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector at any time at any place. The Government of India are, therefore, absolutely convinced that the allegations contained in the Chinese note under reply are completely groundless. The Government of India are constrained to reject these allegations and to reassert emphatically that they do not accept the claims to vast areas of Indian territory in the Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors of the border put forward in the Chinese note under reply. As regards China's stand on Kashmir and on the present unfortunate conflict between India and Pakistan, it is nothing but interference on the part of China calculated to prolong and to enlarge the conflict."

The background of the matter is that in September, 1962, some defence structures were constructed on the Sikkim side of the Sino-Indian frontier. These structures have not been in occupation since the cessation of hostilities in November, 1962. Since the Chinese Government alleged that some of these structures were on their side of the border, India had in its note of September 12, 1965, gone to the extent of suggesting that an independent Observer be allowed to go to this border to see for himself the actual state of affairs. The Chinese Government has not, unfortunately, accepted this reasonable proposal and has reiterated its proposal for joint inspection. In our reply which is being sent today, we are informing the Chinese Government that their contention is entirely incorrect. Nevertheless, as an earnest of our desire

to give no ground to the Chinese for making this a pretext for aggressive action, we are informing them that we have no objection to a joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibet border where Indian personnel are alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory. The Government of India on their part are prepared to arrange such an inspection as early as possible, at an appropriate official level, on a mutually convenient date.

We have sent a reply to the Chinese note accordingly and hope that Chinese Government would agree to action being taken as proposed. Copies of the Chinese note and of our reply have been placed on the table of the House.

I know the House would feel concerned about the intentions of the Chinese Government. We do hope that China would not take advantage of the present situation and attack India. The House may rest assured that we are fully vigilant and that if we are attacked, we shall fight for our freedom with grim determination. The might of China will not deter us from defending our territorial integrity. I shall keep the House informed of further developments.

APPENDIX 4

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 17 September, 1965

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and with reference to the Chinese Government's note No. 65 PU YI YA TZU of September 16, 1965, has the honour to say as follows:

Ever since the Sino-Indian border problem was raised by the Chinese Government, the Government of India had made strenuous attempts to settle the question peacefully and with honour. Even after the unprovoked Chinese attack across the border in October-November, 1962, the Government of India consistently followed the policy of seeking a peaceful settlement honourable to both the parties concerned. It was in this spirit that India accepted the Colombo Proposals, which China has not accepted hitherto.

2. As has been pointed out in various notes to the Chinese Government in the past, the Government of India has given strict instructions to its armed forces and personnel not to cross the international boundary in the Eastern and Middle Sectors and the so-called 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector. The Government of India are satisfied, after careful and detailed investigations, that Indian personnel as well as aircraft have fully carried out these instructions and have not transgressed the international boundary and the 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector at any time at any place. The Government of India are, therefore, absolutely convinced that the allegations contained in the Chinese note under reply are completely groundless. The Government of India are constrained to reject these allegations and to reassert emphatically that they do not accept the claims to vast areas of Indian territory in the Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors of the border put forward in the Chinese note under reply. As regards China's stand on Kashmir and on the present unfortunate conflict between India and Pakistan, it is nothing but interference on the part of China calculated to prolong and to enlarge the conflict.

3. The Chinese note has once again repeated the allegations of so-called violations of the Sikkim-Tibet border by Indian personnel. These charges have been already answered and refuted by the Government of India. Indian personnel have never crossed the Sikkim border and committed any harassments or raids into Chinese territory. Nor have they seized livestock belonging to

Tibetan herdsmen or kidnapped any Chinese inhabitants from Tibetan territory. In the Government of India's note of July 13, 1965, it was clearly stated that the two Tibetan inhabitants alleged by the Chinese Government to have been kidnapped by Indian troops were actually refugees from Tibet who sought asylum in Sikkim. As the Chinese Government is aware a number of Tibetans have come over into India from time to time on their own volition and without our permission. Such persons are detained and questioned, and any of them desiring to go back to Tibet are always permitted to do so. The two Tibetans in question can also go back to Tibet if they wish to do so.

4. The Chinese Government's note has reasserted the old allegations that India has built military structures on the Tibetan side of the border. The Government of India has refuted this allegation on several occasions in the past. In September, 1962, some defence structures were constructed on the Sikkim side of the Sino-Indian frontier. These structures have not been in occupation since the cessation of hostilities in November, 1962. Since the Chinese Government alleged that some of the structures were on their side of the border India had, in its note of September 12, gone to the extent of suggesting that an independent observer be allowed to go to this border to see for himself the state of affairs. The Chinese Government has not, unfortunately, accepted this reasonable proposal of the Government of India, and has reiterated its proposal for joint inspection. Even though the Government of India are convinced that their troops have not built military structures in Tibetan territory, they have no objection to a joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibet border where Indian personnel are alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory. The Government of India on their part are prepared to arrange such an inspection as early as possible, at an appropriate official level, on a mutually convenient date. If any structures are found on the Tibet side of the border, there can be no objection to their being demolished.

5. The Government of India would like to point out, in conclusion, that the charges made by the Chinese Government in its note are really minor ones and could well be settled through peaceful procedures such as those proposed in this note. These allegations do not, on any reckoning, justify the kind of threatening language and ultimatum held out by the Chinese Government. It is clear that China is fabricating these charges only to find a pretext for further aggression against India. India is a peaceful nation and has no desire for war-like conflicts. If, however, such a conflict is thrust on India by aggression from China the responsibility for the grave consequences that might follow from such action will lie squarely on the shoulders of the Chinese Government.

6. The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

APPENDIX 5

Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, on 19 September, 1965

(65) *Pu Yi Ya Tzu No. 763.*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to reply to the note of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Indian Government dated September 17, 1965, as follows:

The Chinese Government has noted a conspicuous change of tune in the note under reference compared with the previous notes of the Indian Government.

Over the past two years and more, the Chinese Government had on thirteen occasions made representations and lodged protests concerning the construction of military works for aggression by Indian troops crossing the China-Sikkim boundary, and the Indian Government invariably flatly denied its building of any military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself. In the present note, however, the Indian Government suddenly changes its tune by admitting that the possibility of the presence of its military works on the Chinese side is not excluded, stating that if any such works are found there is no objection to their being demolished.

In all its previous notes, the Indian Government categorically refused to return the Chinese border inhabitants kidnapped by Indian troops. In the present note, however, it suddenly changes its tune by saying that two of the kidnapped Chinese inhabitants will be permitted to come back to China if they wish to do so.

The Indian Government four times rejected the Chinese Government's demand for a joint investigation as being unnecessary. In its present note, however, the Indian Government suddenly changes its tune by saying that it has no objection to a joint investigation, although the demand was not reiterated in the Chinese Government's note of September 16.

Why does the Indian Government suddenly change its tune while defending its habitual stand of expansionism? Obviously, this is because the stern demand made by the Chinese Government in its note of September 16 has produced effect. But has the Indian Government really altered its aggressive intentions and actions? Far from the case. To put it bluntly, the Indian Government is using this tactic to play for time, evade China's just demand and

refuse to dismantle its military works for aggression within Chinese territory or on the boundary line.

But muddling through will never do.

The Chinese side is in possession of ample and abundant evidence which can prove to the world that Indian troops have crossed the China-Sikkim boundary to build military works. The Indian Government is aware of this. There is now no longer any need for investigation. In its present note, the Indian Government admits that the possibility of existence of Indian military works on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary is not excluded and it does not object to dismantling such military works as may exist. This in effect shows that there are indeed Indian military works for aggression within Chinese territory and on the boundary line. The China-Sikkim boundary is a delimited one. The Chinese frontier guards know the places where Indian troops have built military works across the boundary as they know their own palms. The Chinese Government firmly demands that the Indian Government dismantle these military works for aggression. In order to give the Indian Government the opportunity to do so, the Chinese Government is willing to put off the time-limit set in its note of September 16 to before midnight of September 22.

Besides dismantling the Indian troops' military works for aggression within Chinese territory and on the boundary line, the Indian Government must hand back the four Chinese border inhabitants who have been kidnapped and the eight hundred sheep and fifty-nine yaks that have been seized by Indian troops on the China-Sikkim border. All these kidnapped persons and seized livestock were explicitly mentioned in previous notes of the Chinese Government. The Indian Government asserts in its note that two of the Chinese inhabitants who were kidnapped by Indian troops went to Sikkim to seek asylum and that they will be permitted to return only if they wish to do so. This is a hoax. All the border inhabitants kidnapped and the livestock seized by Indian troops must be returned unconditionally, not short of a single one. The Indian Government must further guarantee that absolutely no intrusions or harassing raids across the border will recur in future.

In its note, the Indian Government pretends to be peace-loving, alleging that India is a peaceful nation, that it has made consistent attempts to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question peacefully, and that the matters raised by the Chinese Government in its note of September 16 are minor ones which do not call for the use of "threatening language" and the form of an "ultimatum". Is all this true? No. We did endeavour to believe that India would be willing to live together in peace with her neighbours. But gradually we came to discover that peace is only a smoke screen used by the Indian Government to cover up its prosecution of an expansionist policy. China and India should have been friendly neighbours co-existing peacefully in accordance with the Five Principles. The Chinese Government has indicated to the Indian Government its desire for friendship on innumerable occasions. But all these de-

monstrations of friendship have failed to prevent the Indian Government from nibbling away, intruding into and making harassing raids on Chinese territory, setting up a large number of strong points there, and even launching a massive armed attack on China along the entire Sino-Indian boundary. It was only when the Chinese Government used stern language in talking to the Indian Government and put its words into practice by repulsing India's massive armed attack in self-defence that the Indian Government slightly restrained itself.

It is a tactic of the Indian expansionists to describe all their acts of aggression against India's neighbours as minor matters which do not jeopardize peace; but if you earnestly demand the cessation of their acts of aggression, they will charge you with using "threatening language" and the form of an "ultimatum". But innumerable facts have shown that the Indian Government does not heed good words of advice, and only sober up a little when faced with categorical just demands and with firm will to see these demands fulfilled. The Indian intrusions and harassing raids across the China-Sikkim boundary are by no means minor matters, nor are those occurring in any sector of the entire Sino-Indian border. The Chinese Government must deal with them seriously.

From their own experience the Chinese people can deeply understand how Pakistan has been bullied by the Indian Government. The Indian Government's expansionism has linked China with all the other neighbouring countries which India has been bullying. The Chinese Government gives all-out support to the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right of national self-determination. The Chinese Government gives all-out support to Pakistan in her just struggle against Indian aggression. The Chinese Government fully supports the desire of the neighbours of India to safeguard their independence and neutrality and protect their internal affairs from interference. This stand of the Chinese Government is not to be shaken by any tricks on the part of the Indian Government.

In its note the Indian Government flatly denies the fact about its occupation of and intrusions and harassing raids into China's territory, and pretends that the Sino-Indian boundary question has already been settled. This will not succeed. India is now still in occupation of 90,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory south of the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, eight pieces of Chinese territory in the middle sector and China's Parigas in the western sector. After 1962, Indian troops kept on crossing the line of actual control on the Sino-Indian border for harassing raids, and even lately they are still doing so. None of these facts can be denied by the Indian Government. All these issues must be settled, and nothing whatsoever can make the Chinese Government give up its right of settling these issues. The Chinese Government for ever retains the right to settle these issues.

In conclusion, the Chinese Government reiterates that the Indian Government must dismantle all its military works for aggression either on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself before midnight of September 22, 1965, immediately stop all its intrusions along the Sino-

Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary, return the kidnapped Chinese border inhabitants and the seized livestock and pledge to refrain from any more harassing raids across the boundary. Otherwise, the Indian Government must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

APPENDIX 6

Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 21 September, 1965

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India and, with reference to the Chinese Government Note No. (65) Pu Yi Ya Tzu No. 763 of September 19, has the honour to reply as follows:

2. The Government of India are surprised by the language and contents of the Chinese Note of September 19. We have no desire to compete with the Chinese Government in the use of abusive and undignified language. But it must be pointed out that neither vituperation nor intimidation is conducive to a peaceful settlement.

3. It is regrettable that the Chinese Government has not responded to the peaceful gesture and the reasonable proposal made by the Government of India in its note of September 17.

4. In regard to the defence structures alleged by the Government of China to have been built by the Government of India on the Tibetan side of the Sikkim border, since matters of facts were in dispute the Government of India suggested in their note of September 12 an inspection by an independent observer but the Chinese Government did not accept this reasonable proposal. The Government of India, therefore, agreed to the suggestion of joint inspection by Indian and Chinese officials reiterated in paragraph (1) of the Chinese Note of 16 September. It is extraordinary that China now refuses to accept its own proposal for joint inspection into the allegation that Indian troops have built military structures on the Tibetan side of the Sikkim border.

5. The Chinese Government have now demanded that "the Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself before midnight of September 22, 1965." It has already been stated in the Government of India's note of September 17 that if after joint inspection any structures are found on the Tibetan side of the border there can be no objection to their being demolished. Surely, if in fact there were in existence any such structures on the Tibetan side of the border, the Chinese Government would not have waited for our consent to demolish them or asked us to do so by sending our personnel across the border.

6. Furthermore, it is not clear what the Chinese Government mean when

under reply have enunciated the new doctrine that China must interfere in the *inter-se* relations of Asian countries. This claim of China to assume the role of guardianship and hegemony over Asian countries is a role which no self-respecting nation in Asia would be prepared to accept or recognise. Large or small, strong or weak, every country in Asia has the fullest right to preserve its independence and sovereignty on terms of equality. The dominance of the Chinese will not be accepted by any of them. The Government of India, therefore, reject the claim of China to advise the Government of India how to resolve its differences with its neighbour Pakistan over Kashmir or any other matter.

11. India's record as a peaceful country and a good neighbour is well-known to the world and it is not necessary for the Government of India to argue this point with the Chinese Government who is blinded with hatred for India. It is also well-known to the world how India since the establishment of the People's Republic of China extended the hand of friendship to China and how, in return, the rulers of China committed aggression against India and occupied by force 14,500 sq. miles of Indian territory in Ladakh. India has neither forgotten nor accepted this illegal occupation of its territory by China. The Chinese note under reply has also repeated their aggressive claims to Indian territory in the Eastern, Middle and Western Sectors, claims which the Government of India categorically reject.

12. China's aggressive intentions are clear from the fact that even while they have in their note extended the time-limit by 72 hours, in actual fact they have started firing at our border posts both in Sikkim and Ladakh having already crossed the Sikkim border at Dongchui La and Nathu La. In the Western Sector, at Demchok, several hundred Chinese troops have taken position across the Indian checkpost which is well within the Indian side of the so-called "1959 line of actual control". This action by China is in clear violation of the recommendation of 2(a) of Colombo proposals and China's own so-called "unilateral cease-fire" declaration of 21st November, 1962.

13. The whole attitude of the Chinese Government, its threats and the three-day ultimatum prove that China is not at all interested in a peaceful settlement of the border question or in peaceful co-existence between India and China. India can only urge the Chinese Government to forsake the path of belligerence and intimidation and to return to the path of peace and reason in its relations with India. On her part, India has always been and continues to be willing to settle these differences by peaceful means.

14. The Ministry of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India the assurances of its highest consideration.

APPENDIX 7

Extracts from "Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian Countries": Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, March 14, April 13, 20, 25 and June 22, 1967

Mr. Cummings: ... it was common knowledge in Europe at the time of that transaction that that material was not for Iran but for Pakistan.... Those aircraft were flown by Luft Wafer pilots in civilian uniforms to Iran to an airbase ... somewhere in eastern part of Iran, and then they were flown from there to Pakistan (p. 28).

What I am saying, there are a series of bucketshop operators around the world that would like very much to get their hands on this equipment.

Senator Symington: Including the bucketshops of the Pakistani and Iranian Governments.

Senator Cooper: Has Pakistan bought any substantial amount of equipment from China? They have bought tanks.

Mr. Hoopes: They have acquired, we believe, about (deleted) tanks and about (deleted) tactical aircraft.

Senator Cooper: Is it true that India is complaining about this proposal to supply so-called lethal parts to Pakistan?

Mr. Hoopes: Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper: But does India admit that it has been able to secure parts to supply its own equipment?

Mr. Hoopes: It does not link those two facts. It does not link those two statements. It is perfectly true that the Indian buildup has been substantial. The Pakistani buildup has also been substantial.

Senator Cooper: You mean since the war in 1962. How about their equipment?

Mr. Hoopes: They have added equipment, as I have suggested, from China. That is the only source of major equipment (p. 56).

Senator Symington: We heard from Mr. Handley of the State Department. He stated the record should indicate that:

The Office Munitions Control, Department of State, now has pending an application of Levy Auto Parts, Incorporated, Dupond Circle Building, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, Washington DC.

We understand this is a subsidiary of a Canadian Corporation, "for the sale to Iran of spare parts for (deleted) M-47 tanks and not for the sale of tanks

Mr. Hoopes: Colonel Jordan tells me that they have dispatched lists of requests. We have not yet received them nor, of course, acted on them.

Senator Symington: What do we expect they will be?

Mr. Hoopes: That would be speculation, but I assume that they will involve spare parts across the whole range of their American-built equipment.

Senator Symington: Has India asked for anything?

Mr. Hoopes: Not to my knowledge, sir (p. 61, April 20, 1967).

Mr. Hoopes: I think the key point is, sir, that Pakistan believes it needs to modernize its military forces, or at least to reactivate those pieces of equipment it now possesses. I think that is the acid test.

Pakistan cites a need. They wish to buy American spares. (deleted)

Senator Symington: Why? They are afraid of whom?

Mr. Hoopes: They are primarily afraid of India.

Senator Symington: Is there any evidence the State Department has or the Department of Defence that India is planning a further attack on Pakistan?

Mr. Hoopes: I think the answer is clearly no (p. 62).

Senator Symington: Has Pakistan returned to its prewar level of U.S. military equipment in F-86s and in tanks?

Mr. Hoopes: I am not certain, sir. (deleted) (p. 62)

Senator Symington: According to the press within hours after the United States decided to renew sales of spare parts to India and Pakistan, representatives of the Pakistan military forces were at the American Embassy with long shopping lists. Do you happen to know if that is true?

Mr. Hoopes: We know that the Pakistanis have sent through channels requests for spare parts.

Senator Symington: I am only quoting the press. Have you a list of those spare parts?

Mr. Hoopes: I believe they are in transit now, and will shortly be in our hands for consideration.

Senator Symington: What is the U.S. policy towards third country sales to Pakistan. Are we opposed to such transfers? (deleted)

What other equipment, spares, or so-called end items has Pakistan acquired in addition to Chinese arms since the cut-off of American military aid in 1965?

Mr. Hoopes: I think it is very difficult to deal in precise quantitative terms, in part because the Pakistanis have been buying in a variety of (deleted) markets. (deleted)

I would hazard a guess that they have been buying around to maintain in operating condition a substantial portion of their American inventory (p. 71).

In response to a question about Pakistan returning to the pre-1965 level of U.S. equipment such as F-86s and tanks, the State Department furnished the following material which is incorporated on page 72 of the document: "It is not U.S. policy to replace items lost by the Pakistanis in their 1965 border war with India, and this has been made quite clear to Pakistan (deleted)."

Mr. Cummings: Wait, sir. Levy Bros. are Canadian, as far as I know, and they are based in Toronto with other places in Canada. We have never done business with them at all, but we know their name.

They are one of the people who are presently bidding in Pakistan to sell the surplus German armoured fighting vehicles to Pakistan, either directly or through Toufanian.

At the present time, there exists a minimum of three contracts between Toufanian and suppliers in the West for the furnishing of these armoured fighting vehicles to Pakistan from Germany. I would say there exists at least three contracts we know of, having seen the actual documents in one place or another in my normal travels.

One is Levy Bros., one is Merex, and one is with or through a Pakistani whose name is Hamid Khan.

Senator Symington: These are all three for armoured vehicles.

Mr. Cummings: These are all three for armoured vehicles. Our position in that is that we have directed last month a letter to the Department of State asking them for a policy which, if favourable, we believe we could move in and take that business for a number of reasons (p. 31).

In answer to a question whether the United States has a veto over the final disposition of American military equipment supplied under sales or grant agreements to West Germany with an end-use clause, Mr. Kuss* said: "That is correct ... I negotiated them."

Mr. Cummings: It seems difficult for me to believe that the very considerable transactions which took place primarily last year between Germany and Iran and Pakistan, by implication, were totally ignored by the United States or that the United States pressured the Germans at all (p. 33).

I had the impression when that business was going on or being primarily developed, which was in the fall and winter of 1965-66, because it was well-known on the continent, we get all of those requests automatically—we cannot fill them in many cases, but we get them—it seems to me that the United States was almost indifferent to what happened to the material because, for instance, there were thousands of rounds of tank gun and artillery ammunition which were shipped out of Germany and France to Iran for Pakistan. (deleted) All of that material was U.S. standard material or even U.S.-produced material, and there was no licensing problem experienced by Merex. (deleted)

Senator Symington: Where was it going?

Mr. Cummings: That went to Pakistan also (p. 33).

Mr. Bader: Mr. Cummings, one thing on this: We have been told by the Department of Defence over and over again that these end-use agreements are binding, no matter how many times this material is sold or resold; that is,

*Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Logistics Negotiations.

if we sell equipment to the Germans, even if this material should go to Merex, that the U.S. Government has a veto as to where it should go, whether to Iran or Pakistan.

From your testimony, it seems to me that these agreements are rather worthless or, at least, not enforced very well.

Mr. Cummings: I do not know, of course, every end-use agreement. I do know in the case of the Germans, it was my understanding that only certain categories of weapons were subject to that ultimate U.S. control. In other words, the light weapons were not, but heavy weapons were. That is our understanding of it.

Mr. Cummings: They have some small business. I cannot really give you a panacea answer on that. I think in general, as the years pass, the Governments tend to think that they can do what they want with it, particularly with semiobsolete or obsolescent type of items.

Senator Symington: Also, again according to the press, American military officials in Pakistan and India have no recollection of conducting any end-use inspections for the past 2 years. Is this correct?

Mr. Hoopes: It is possibly correct. You must remember that our relations with Pakistan, in particular, have suffered deterioration and the Pakistani military have been reluctant, particularly since the war in 1965 when we cut off all grant aid, to allow us to inspect the dispositions of their military forces and their equipment. However, with respect to India we have been making regular end-use inspections (p. 70).

Senator Symington: You said in your testimony that we can "prevent" the sale of surplus German tanks to Pakistan. How can we do that?

Mr. Hoopes: Well, sir, we have a legal agreement with the Germans that they will not transfer without our consent. (deleted)

Senator Hickenlooper: We had that with Iran.

Mr. Hoopes: Sir?

Senator Hickenlooper: I say didn't we have an agreement with Iran and didn't they transfer some airplanes?

Mr. Hoopes: They did not transfer airplanes received directly from us; no, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper: I know, around the corner, but they got them back in the barn, and then they transferred them; didn't they?

Senator Symington: ... Then, as I see it, having been around this town for some time, they control what they control. Later apparently you all go over and represent to the German Government that we are not happy about the way they have been handling this matter of arms sale and resale; but the horse has gone, the barn door was open, so our whole effort to control arms through agreements seems to be falling on its face, all over the world.

Mr. Hoopes: ... The Canadian Government was bound to us by a "end-use agreement" stipulating that it could not transfer title to any person or organization

or government, unless the consent of the United States had first been obtained. In this particular case, the United States gave its consent to Canada for the resale by Germany to Iran, on the understanding that Germany was to receive assurances from Iran prohibiting subsequent transfer of the aircraft. (deleted) (p. 75)

Senator Symington: Speaking of Pakistan, the subcommittee has been told that there was no doubt within the intelligence community that the F-86s in question were going to Pakistan, and reports to this effect were circulated before the aircraft left Germany.

Did you see those reports? (deleted)

Did you approve of their sales to Pakistan?

Mr. Kitchen: I was involved in securing the Bureau's approval of the sale. I concurred in the sale (p. 85).

Mr. Hoopes: The basic reality we face is that both India and Pakistan are determined to have modern arms at levels that relate to their sovereign judgment of need. We cannot prevent them from acquiring arms, nor can we, even by exerting maximum feasible leverage, impose our own view as to the proper levels and composition. It is possible however that we can exert a restraining influence by certain positive actions of a limited character. (deleted)

A further reason for the policy shift was a growing awareness that, with the passage of time, a policy of total arms suspension was dissipating our influence and producing side effects of serious concern. (deleted)

All of these developments are destabilizing and their cumulative effect could produce an uncontrolled arms race which no one wanted or intended. They clearly run counter to both United States and Indian interests in the sub-continent. Yet a U.S. policy of total arms suspension made it increasingly difficult for U.S. diplomacy to cope with them.

Senator McCarthy: What bothers me is the kind of hydromatic shifts that go on here. The United States has halted all military shipments. Now that is fine. They don't say whether they are grant or whether they are sales.

The next sentence says, "Since then, no grant military assistance has been provided." So most people say, "Look, we have stopped all military shipments"—but, in fact, you haven't. It means you are still selling them if they are spare parts. It also means you are going to sell non-military things.

When you take these two sentences together and read them, it sounds as though there has been a decision downtown to cut off arms sales and arms grants to India and Pakistan when in fact, if you read the language carefully, it means you haven't done anything of the kind. It is still pretty much wide open. This is what I object to.

Senator Symington: Then you decide you are going to lift that suspension and sell them lethal spare parts. So, in effect you continue giving them more arms to help in their problems incident to the arms race. But instead of saying

we have now decided to give them more spare parts therefore, in effect, activate their lethal military equipment, the story comes out we are not suspending but terminating arms sales. So I think Senator McCarthy is accurate when he says the impression given the American people was that we were further emphasizing our desire not to participate in the arms race. But we did not think Pakistan was strong enough to stand against India. Based on your own statement, we were, in effect, willing to get back in the arms race by reactivating with spare parts the equipment they had already purchased or been given (pp. 53-54).

Mr. Hoopes: I can't give you a precise percentage, but I would say that the U.S. equipment in Pakistan is relatively inoperative for two reasons. One is the losses occasioned during the war, and second is the cumulative effect of the U.S. suspension of lethal spare parts over the last 18 months.

Senator Cooper: Then what Senator Symington said is correct. By supplying these parts, the United States is essentially activating the military equipment of Pakistan. That would be correct; wouldn't it?

Mr. Hoopes: That would be correct in a literal sense, Senator.

Mr. Hoopes: I think that there are going to be, whatever we do, military forces of substantial size in both nations.

Senator Cooper: Whether furnished by us or by somebody else.

Mr. Hoopes: Correct. Whatever we do, we believe that Pakistan is going to maintain modern forces within its means. At the moment President Ayub and his advisers face a choice about re-equipping their forces. Either they have to make a decision that there will be no U.S. spares available, in perpetuity, and, therefore, their American equipment will rust, and they will be faced with a major capital investment from another source, (deleted) or they will be able in fact to get American spares and extend the life of their American inventory.

Now we believe frankly that it is in the interests of arms limitation and the Pakistani economy, U.S. influence in the subcontinent and general stability, if we make it possible for President Ayub to extend the life of his American equipment. (deleted)

Senator Cooper: Whatever we do, they are going to get equipment; I know this from being there. Their fear of each other is so much greater than their fear of Russia or China or anybody else. It is an obsession both in Pakistan and in India, but I think we will be charged with—I don't think this applies to India at all because they haven't got enough of our equipment to make it reasonable to buy parts—activating the Pakistani Army.

Mr. Hoopes: I think it depends on how we apply our policy. This is an entirely possible consequence. On the other hand, if we are to head off a major increase in Pakistani arms expenditure, which would in turn cause India to run up further expenditure, we have at least the possibility of persuading them to act with restraint, and therefore gain a measure of stability and some restraint between the two countries. That is the essential purpose of this (United) effort.

Senator Aiken: They are getting the spare parts from us for existing equipment. This would have the effect of keeping the Pakistani economy in a stronger position than if they had to purchase new equipment abroad.

Mr. Hoopes: That is correct, sir, and economic stability and economic advancement in Pakistan is a U.S. objective (pp. 56-57).

Senator Symington: Won't this change contribute to an arms race between India and Pakistan, with the spare parts going exclusively to Pakistan?

Mr. Hoopes: Well, sir, everything depends upon the way in which we are able to use this instrumentality to induce restraint. As I say, we are standing at a point in time where the Pakistani are either going to take a small amount of American spares and extend the life of their American inventory, which will I think have a stabilizing effect, or they are going to buy rather large quantities of new equipment, which I think will have a destabilizing effect. I think one of those two things is going to happen.

We believe that by introducing the availability of American spares on a controlled basis, we will in fact contribute to restraint (p. 61).

Senator Symington: According to your statement, the justification for renewal of spare parts to Pakistan is that "it is in the interest of arms limitation and the Pakistani economy, U.S. influence in the subcontinent and general stability, if we make it possible for President Ayub to extend the life of his American equipment." (deleted)

Senator Symington: I don't mean to be critical, but I have been connected with the military for some years, and this would seem pretty specious lethal and nonlethal. Take recent experiences in the Sinai desert. A troop carrier is nonlethal. Mount guns on it and it is plenty lethal (p. 86).

Mr. McNaughton told this committee that the United States had complete control over the resale or other transfer of military equipment of U.S. origin. But when the subcommittee asked the Defence Department for a list of sales and commitments that the German firm, Merex, has made in reselling U.S. equipment, Mr. McNaughton replied: "This specific information is not available within the executive branch."

Can you explain this apparent contradiction? (deleted)

Is Mr. McNaughton in error, then, when he says the information is not available within the executive branch?

Mr. Kitchen: I don't know whether complete information is available (p. 90).

Mr. Lausche: ... Now, if we are going to say that we are going to control our arms sales in the free world, and the Soviets find out that we are not controlling the sale of those arms whether it is the fault of ourselves, they will have all the bells to ring to say our word is not to be relied on (p. 97).

Appendices

Senator Symington: ... It is beginning to be realized that of the three legs to our platform of security and well-being the economic leg is just as important as the political or military. At the same time all this is going on, we find that we either have been unable or unwilling to control heavy sales of arms by the very allies we have been defending and financing, which breeds continued arms races all over the world. It is difficult to understand and as policy could have in it, the seeds of World War III.

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PREFACE

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I have made an attempt to examine this question. Since chronologically one precedes the other—the interval between the two is spread over nearly two decades—it was found necessary to make a broad survey of the foreign policy of Pakistan, a task which proved to be no less rewarding than a critical examination of the main issue, for it brought to light a number of common determining factors which are prominent throughout the growth and development of that policy. As the military alliance is directed against India, I have naturally examined the question from that angle, a comprehensive and detailed study of the foreign policy of Pakistan being outside the scope of this work.

In his book, *Friends, Not Masters—A Political Autobiography*, Field Marshal Ayub Khan expounds a new view of international relations, presenting the world as a collection of religious constellations, one of which he would presumably be happy to see revolve round Pakistan. This has necessitated the expansion of the last chapter. Basically his political autobiography is an attempt to present Pakistan foreign policy in a more attractive guise, with ugly blemishes which caused so much embarrassment to his country in its relations with the U.S.A., China, the Soviet Union, and the Arabs, concealed under heavy make-up.

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THE PAKISTAN-CHINA AXIS IS ONE OF THE MOST fascinating developments in international affairs. Like an exploding meteorite, it has affected many countries and regions in various ways—India, South and South-East Asia, West Asia, the Soviet Union, Africa and the West, principally the U.S.A. It is no less remarkable in its defiance of international practice, diplomatic propriety, loyalty to allies, and in its betrayal of professed ideology. Normally such a development should be impossible, as seemed the concept of Pakistan. Both have become a reality. Are the two superficially related or is there a causal nexus?

I have made an attempt to examine this question. Since chronologically one precedes the other—the interval between the two is spread over nearly two decades—it was found necessary to make a broad survey of the foreign policy of Pakistan, a task which proved to be no less rewarding than a critical examination of the main issue, for it brought to light a number of common determining factors which are prominent throughout the growth and development of that policy. As the military alliance is directed against India, I have naturally examined the question from that angle, a comprehensive and detailed study of the foreign policy of Pakistan being outside the scope of this work.

In his book, *Friends, Not Masters—A Political Autobiography*, Field Marshal Ayub Khan expounds a new view of international relations, presenting the world as a collection of religious constellations, one of which he would presumably be happy to see revolve round Pakistan. This has necessitated the expansion of the last chapter. Basically his political autobiography is an attempt to present Pakistan foreign policy in a more attractive guise, with ugly blemishes which caused so much embarrassment to his country in its relations with the U.S.A., China, the Soviet Union, and the Arabs, concealed under heavy make-up.